Filed: Apr. 14, 2008
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: and Lipez, Circuit Judge.Lorraine Femino on brief pro se.1, Appellant also has requested leave to file a supplemental, appendix containing documents filed in a related district court, action.differently from other types of disabilities.claim that her benefits were arbitrarily terminated;
Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 07-2178
07-2179
LORRAINE FEMINO,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
NFA CORPORATION,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Selya, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Lorraine Femino on brief pro se.
William E. O'Gara and Pannone Lopes & Devereaux LLC on brief
for appellee.
April 14, 2008
Per Curiam. In these consolidated appeals, pro se
plaintiff-appellant Lorraine Femino seeks review of the district
court's grant of summary judgment to her former employer, NFA
Corporation ("NFA"), in two actions alleging violations of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA).1 Appellant's claims arise from the
termination of her long-term disability benefits under an employer-
sponsored plan ("LTD Plan") based on a provision limiting benefits
for disabilities based on "self-reported symptoms" to twenty-four
months. Essentially for the reasons set forth in the magistrate
judge's two Reports and Recommendations dated June 6, 2007, we
conclude that the ERISA claims brought in each of the underlying
cases were subject to claim preclusion based on the final judgment
entered on September 5, 2006, in Femino v. NFA Corporation, Civil
Action No. 05-519ML ("Femino I"), an earlier ERISA action filed in
the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island.
See Gonzalez v. Banco Cent. Corp.,
27 F.3d 751, 755 (1st Cir.
1994). To the extent appellant challenges related discovery
rulings made in Civil Action No. 06-143ML ("Femino II"), we see no
abuse of discretion.
As to the ADA claims, the district court concluded that
appellant was ineligible for protection under the ADA because she
1
Appellant also has requested leave to file a supplemental
appendix containing documents filed in a related district court
action. The unopposed motion is granted.
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was totally disabled at all relevant times and therefore, by
definition, was not a "qualified individual with a disability."
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12111(8). Appellant challenges this
interpretation of the statute, and argues that the relevant
language is ambiguous and should be construed to include even
totally disabled former employees. We have not yet squarely
addressed this issue, but we find it unnecessary to do so in this
case because we conclude, as the district court did, that
appellant's claims lack merit in any event.
On the merits, appellant's primary contention is that the
district court misconstrued her claims and failed to consider her
claim of "disparate-impact" discrimination. Appellant states that
she does not allege, as the district court suggested, that the
self-reported symptoms limitation was discriminatory as written
because it treated disabilities based on self-reported symptoms
differently from other types of disabilities. Instead, she
maintains that her claim was based on the theory that the self-
reported symptoms limitation, although not discriminatory on its
face, was administered in a manner that disproportionately affected
individuals who, like appellant, were disabled due to fibromyalgia.
To make out a prima facie case of disparate impact
discrimination, a plaintiff must (1) identify the challenged
employment practice or policy, and pinpoint the defendant's use of
it" (2) "demonstrate a disparate impact on a group characteristic
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. . . that falls within the protective ambit of [the ADA]"; and (3)
"demonstrate a causal relationship between the identified practice
and the disparate impact." E.E.O.C. v. Steamship Clerks Union,
Local 1066,
48 F.3d 594, 601 (1st Cir. 1995) (citations omitted);
see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3). Even assuming that appellant's
allegations are adequate to state a claim of disparate-impact
discrimination, the only evidence she offered to demonstrate that
the self-reported symptoms limitation had a disproportionately
negative effect on individuals suffering from fibromyalgia was that
the medical evidence in her own case was deemed insufficient to
establish that her disability was not based on self-reported
symptoms. This is not enough to demonstrate a disparate impact on
the particular group appellant identifies. In essence, appellant's
disparate-impact theory seems to be nothing more than a dressed-up
claim that her benefits were arbitrarily terminated; absent any
evidence of discrimination, ERISA provides the appropriate avenue
for review. However, as noted above, that avenue is no longer open
to appellant in light of the judgment entered in Femino I.
The judgments of the district court are affirmed.
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