Filed: Sep. 25, 2008
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: Joseph A. MacDonald, on brief, for petitioner.This court reviews findings of fact in immigration, proceedings, including findings with respect to, credibility, to determine whether those findings, are supported by substantial evidence in the, record. Co. v. Zaldivar, 413 F.3d 119, 120 (1st Cir.
Not for Publication in West’s Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 08-1103
KIMNY KEO,
Petitioner,
v.
MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Torruella, Baldock, * and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Joseph A. MacDonald, on brief, for petitioner.
Gregory G. Katsas, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Division, Linda S. Wendtland, Senior Litigation
Counsel, and Justin Constantine, Trial Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, on brief, for respondent.
September 25, 2008
*
Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. The former Immigration and
Naturalization Service (now the Department of Homeland
Security) charged Petitioner Kimny Keo, a citizen of
Cambodia, with overstaying his non-immigrant visa. See 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). Petitioner admitted the charge’s
factual allegations (contained in a Notice to Appear) and
filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal.
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b), 1231(b)(3). 1 In his application,
Petitioner alleged a fear of persecution in Cambodia related
to his past political activities.
Following a hearing at which Petitioner testified at
length, the Immigration Judge (IJ) found him not credible.
See id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii),(iii) (establishing framework
for credibility determinations). Based on blanket findings,
the IJ first concluded Petitioner was not eligible for
asylum. The IJ explained that Petitioner did not meet his
burden of establishing he was a “refugee” within the meaning
of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), i.e., one having a well-founded
1
Petitioner also unsuccessfully sought relief under the
United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). Because
Petitioner has not argued his CAT claim in his appellate
brief, that claim is not before us on the Petition for
Review. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st
Cir. 1990) (recognizing “settled appellate rule that issues
adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some
effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived”).
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fear of persecution based on, among other things, “political
opinion.” See id. § 1158(b) (requiring applicant for asylum
to establish refugee status). The IJ further concluded
Petitioner was not entitled to withholding of removal
because he did not meet his burden of establishing his life
or freedom would be threatened on account of “political
opinion” if removed to Cambodia. See
id. § 1231(b)(3). The
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s
appeal, agreeing with the IJ’s “decision for the reasons
stated therein.” The BIA explained that the IJ’s adverse
credibility determination was not clearly erroneous. See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).
In Jiang v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 2007)
we set forth the standard of review applicable to the
present Petition:
This court reviews findings of fact in immigration
proceedings, including findings with respect to
credibility, to determine whether those findings
are supported by substantial evidence in the
record. Under that standard, an adverse credibility
determination may stand if it is supported by
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on
the record considered as a whole.
(internal quotations and citation omitted). We need not
repeat Petitioner’s story here. We have carefully reviewed
the entire record and the parties’ briefs, and conclude the
IJ and BIA reached a permissible result under the applicable
law. We have repeatedly opined that “‘when a lower court
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accurately takes the measure of a case and articulates a
cogent rationale, it serves no useful purpose for a
reviewing court to write at length.’” Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Zaldivar, 413 F.3d 119, 120 (1st Cir. 2005)
(quoting Seaco Ins. Co. v. Davis-Irish,
300 F.3d 84, 86 (1st
Cir. 2002) (citing cases)). Because substantial evidence
supports both the IJ’s and BIA’s respective decisions, we
deny the Petition for Review for substantially the reasons
set forth in those decisions. See Lin v. Mukasey,
521 F.3d
22, 26 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Where the BIA adopts the IJ’s
ruling, but also engages in discussion of its own, we review
the decisions of both together.”).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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