Filed: Mar. 09, 2009
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: these allegations insufficient to state a claim., 2, Since plaintiff was not proceeding in forma pauperis, the, court was not invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) but rather its inherent, authority to manage its own docket.Sanchez Ramos, 498 F.3d 3, 7 (1st Cir.precede any sua sponte dismissal.
Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 08-1977
RANDOLPH E. GREEN,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
CONCORD BAPTIST CHURCH, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Randolph E. Green on brief pro se
March 9, 2009
Per Curiam. Plaintiff Randolph Green appeals from a
district court order dismissing his pro se complaint just ten days
after it was filed. Finding plaintiff's allegations to be not just
meritless but incurably so, the court entered the order of
dismissal sua sponte without prior notice or leave to amend. Such
a disposition is appropriate only in egregious cases. Yet even if
the court acted prematurely, we would regard any such error as
harmless, since it is by now clear that an opportunity to amend the
complaint would be futile. We thus affirm.
In his vague, bare-boned complaint, plaintiff is
apparently complaining about the sale of a church in Boston,
Massachusetts of which he has been a member for 62 years. Named as
defendants are the "Concord Baptist Church Corporation" and the
"Housing Economic Development Corporation," neither of which is
further identified. Plaintiff claims to have a property interest
in the former, although he provides no explanation. The complaint
focuses on a meeting of church officials at which the decision to
sell was apparently made. Among his contentions are that the
meeting was unlawful; his right to vote on the proposal was
abridged; the church lawyer in attendance had a conflict of
interest; and the selling price was too low. These events are said
to have violated due process and equal protection, along with a
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collection of other federal rights.1 Without any further
explanation as to how he was harmed, plaintiff requests damages in
the amount of $20 million.
The district court was obviously justified in deeming
these allegations insufficient to state a claim. Among other
deficiencies, there is no basis for inferring that state action
existed (for purposes of § 1983), that a conspiracy was involved (§
1985); that some form of discrimination occurred (§ 2000a-2); that
plaintiff was deprived of a protected property interest (due
process); or that he was improperly subjected to differential
treatment (equal protection). As the district court noted, it is
impossible to "identify the role that any particular defendant is
alleged to have played with respect to any specific cause of
action." For that matter, it is not even apparent how plaintiff
has been harmed, apart from an inability to attend church services
at that particular location.
The court's decision to dismiss the complaint sua sponte,
without first giving plaintiff notice and an opportunity to amend,
presents a closer question.2 Such an action is "rarely" warranted.
Cepero-Rivera v. Fagundo, 414 F.3d 124, 130 (1st Cir. 2005). "The
1
The complaint also cites the Fifth and Thirteenth Amendments
and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 & 2000a-2. Sections 1981 and 1988 are
added on appeal.
2
Since plaintiff was not proceeding in forma pauperis, the
court was not invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) but rather its "inherent
authority to manage its own docket."
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general rule is that in limited circumstances, sua sponte
dismissals of complaints under Rule 12(b)(6) ... are appropriate,
but that such dismissals are erroneous unless the parties have been
afforded notice and an opportunity to amend the complaint or
otherwise respond." Chute v. Walker, 281 F.3d 314, 319 (1st Cir.
2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). To be sure, a sua sponte
dismissal entered without notice or opportunity to amend "may be
proper in relatively egregious circumstances." Martinez-Rivera v.
Sanchez Ramos,
498 F.3d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 2007). Where the allegations
in the complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
"are patently meritless and beyond all hope of redemption," i.e.,
where it is "crystal clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and
that amending the complaint would be futile," then such a dismissal
may stand. Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States,
257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st
Cir. 2001). "But haste makes waste, and it will be the rare case
in which a sua sponte dismissal--at least, a sua sponte dismissal
without leave to amend--will be upheld."
Id.
The cases falling within this exception generally contain
incurable defects that are evident from the face of the complaint--
e.g., claims based on indisputably bogus legal theories or
delusional factual scenarios. See, e.g.,
Martinez-Rivera, 498 F.3d
at 7-9 (upholding sua sponte dismissal of three claims deemed
inherently defective on legal grounds, but reversing as to two
claims deemed potentially salvageable through factual
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supplementation); Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 n.1 (1st
Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (listing examples). The problem with the
instant complaint, however, is not what it contains but what it
does not contain: it is utterly bare-boned and conclusory, lacking
any explanation as to how defendants violated plaintiff's legal
rights and caused him injury. Such a deficiency is not necessarily
incurable; in theory at least, additional allegations set forth in
an amended complaint could bridge the gap. With respect to a
complaint of this nature--i.e., one that is not inherently
defective on its face but simply has no meat on its bones--it would
seem that notice and an opportunity to amend should ordinarily
precede any sua sponte dismissal.
Yet we need not ultimately decide whether the district
court acted precipitously here. We would find any such error
harmless, since it is clear at this point that an opportunity to
amend would be futile. The chances of plaintiff producing an
amended complaint that stated a cognizable claim are virtually non-
existent. Even with all allegations construed in his favor, it is
well-nigh impossible to conjure up a scenario in which the sale of
the church harmed him in a way that contravened federal law.
Significantly, neither in district court nor on appeal has
plaintiff made any effort to supplement the factual allegations in
his complaint or to clarify the legal grounds for recovery; no
attempt has been made, in other words, to address the shortcomings
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identified in the order of dismissal. And plaintiff has a track
record of filing meritless, often frivolous, suits. See, e.g.,
Green v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 1st Cir. No. 07-2355 (rejecting
challenge to level of benefits received for work injury sustained
43 years earlier). Under these circumstances, providing him with
an opportunity to amend his complaint would be an empty formality.
We decline to vacate and remand for such a purposeless undertaking.
Affirmed. The motion opposing the November 28, 2008
notice of submission is denied.
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