Filed: Mar. 17, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: , Seth R. Aframe, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom, John P. Kacavas, United States Attorney, was on brief, for, appellee.*, Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.was tainted by jury bias.jurors were not biased and that the jury verdict was untainted.rationally from those findings.
Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 10-1789
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
RICHARD VILLAR,
Defendant, Appellant.
___________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Circuit Judge,
Souter,* Associate Justice,
and Selya, Circuit Judge.
James M. Fox for appellant.
Seth R. Aframe, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
John P. Kacavas, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
March 17, 2011
*
Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the
Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
Per Curiam. This appeal is a sequel to an earlier appeal in
which we reversed the denial of the defendant's post-trial motion
to set aside his conviction on bank robbery charges and remanded
the case to the district court to determine whether the conviction
was tainted by jury bias. See United States v. Villar,
586 F.3d
76, 79 (1st Cir. 2009). The background facts and the nature of the
jury bias claim are illumined in our earlier opinion. See
id. at
79-82.
On remand, the district court assiduously adhered to our
mandate. It held an evidentiary hearing, interviewed all the
jurors, made detailed factual findings (including credibility
determinations), and concluded, based on these findings, that the
jurors were not biased and that the jury verdict was untainted.
Accordingly, it again refused to set aside the judgment of
conviction. The defendant appeals for a second time.
We need not tarry. The district court's findings of fact are
amply supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous. See
United States v. Romain,
393 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 2004)
(explaining that a trial court's choice between conflicting but
plausible inferences from the evidence cannot be clearly
erroneous); see generally Cumpiano v. Banco Santander P.R.,
902
F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir. 1990) (explaining that a finding is clearly
erroneous only if the reviewing court is left with "a strong,
unyielding belief that a mistake has been made"). The district
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court's conclusions about the absence of jury bias follow
rationally from those findings. Consequently, we need go no
further: we uphold the district court's determination that the jury
acted without bias and summarily affirm its validation of the
judgment of conviction.
Affirmed.
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