LYNCH, Chief Judge.
The issue on appeal is whether abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), is proper in a federal court civil rights suit brought against the Massachusetts Attorney General by a business trade association, which is not itself a party to any relevant state litigation, and where three of its forty-plus members are defendants in ongoing state civil proceedings brought not by the Attorney General but by private parties. The district court found that Younger abstention was appropriate in these circumstances. Mass. Delivery Ass'n v. Coakley, 797 F.Supp.2d 164, 176 (D.Mass.2011). We reverse that determination and hold that Younger abstention is inappropriate and the federal courts should exercise jurisdiction. We remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The suit by the Massachusetts Delivery Association (MDA) asserts that a state law is pre-empted as to motor carriers under the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA), Pub.L. No. 103-305, 108 Stat. 1569 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.), which expressly pre-empts state attempts to regulate
The state law challenged as unconstitutional is part of a state statutory scheme meant to enhance protections for those whom the state considers to be "employees," in contrast to independent contractors. See Somers v. Converged Access, Inc., 454 Mass. 582, 911 N.E.2d 739, 749 (2009). This provision was initially enacted in 1990 as "[an act] enhancing the enforcement of labor laws." 1990 Mass. Legis. Serv. 464. Amended in 2004, the law currently provides:
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148B.
Subsection (a) provides that individuals performing services shall be deemed employees, unless all of the requirements outlined in the three subsections are satisfied. See Somers, 911 N.E.2d at 747 ("The failure of the employer to prove all three criteria set forth above suffices to establish that the individual in question is an employee.").
Section 148B governs whether an individual is deemed an employee for purposes of various wage and employment laws, chapters 62B, 149, 151 and 152 of the Massachusetts General Laws.
If an employing entity improperly classifies an employee as an independent contractor under § 148B,
The MDA alleges that its members must change their fundamental business model—the use of independent contractor delivery drivers—to comply with the state statute or risk penalties. No other state, the MDA alleges, has made unlawful this use of the historic business model. The Massachusetts law, it says, would force motor carriers to use only employees as delivery drivers, which would drive up costs, and adversely affect prices, routes, and services. Not only is the law expressly pre-empted but it also imposes an impermissible burden on interstate commerce, according to the MDA.
For businesses in interstate commerce involving transportation, Congress, concerned both with the states imposing undue burdens and with the national interest in uniform rules, has expressly preempted certain state regulations. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 14501(a)(1) (pre-emption of state regulations relating to motor carriers of passengers); id. § 14501(b)(1) (pre-emption of state regulations relating to freight forwarders and brokers); id. § 14501(d)(1) (pre-emption of state regulations relating to pre-arranged ground transportation); id. § 41713 (pre-emption of state regulations relating to air carriers).
Congress enacted such a pre-emption provision as part of the FAAAA:
Id. § 14501(c)(1). "Motor carrier" is defined as "a person providing motor vehicle transportation for compensation." Id. § 13102(14).
In enacting this provision, Congress found that state regulation of intrastate transportation of property had "imposed an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce," as well as "an unreasonable cost on the American consumers," and thus "certain aspects of the State regulatory process should be preempted." FAAAA § 601(a), 108 Stat. at 1605. The conference report explained that "preemption legislation is in the public interest as well as necessary to facilitate interstate commerce. State economic regulation of motor carrier operations causes significant inefficiencies, increased costs, reduction of competition, inhibition of innovation and technology and curtails the expansion of markets." H.R.Rep. No. 103-677 (1994), 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1715, 1759 (Conf.Rep.).
This federal pre-emption provision relating to motor carriers is substantially identical to a provision pre-empting state regulation of air carriers enacted in 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 41713, and the two statutes are often interpreted in pari materia. See DiFiore v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 646 F.3d 81, 85-86 & n. 4 (1st Cir.2011), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 761, 181 L.Ed.2d 483 (2011). These pre-emption provisions are "broad but vague," and have been the subject of considerable litigation. Id. at 86.
The MDA is a non-profit trade organization formed to support businesses involved in the delivery service industry. The MDA has over forty member businesses,
The MDA brought suit against Martha Coakley, the Attorney General of Massachusetts, in her official capacity, on September 7, 2010. The complaint, as amended, alleges that § 148B(a)(2) would require delivery companies to classify their drivers as employees, rather than independent contractors, and that this would have a variety of dramatic effects on the operations of the delivery companies' businesses, including driving some out of business and increasing costs to consumers. The MDA alleges that subsection (a)(2) of the state law is pre-empted under the FAAAA and the Supremacy Clause.
In a separate theory of unconstitutionality, the MDA's complaint also alleges that the relevant portion of the statute imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce, in violation of the Commerce Clause. The complaint requests a declaratory judgment that subsection (a)(2) of the Massachusetts law is pre-empted by the FAAAA and the Commerce Clause with respect to motor carriers engaged in interstate commerce, and a permanent injunction preventing the Attorney General from enforcing that
On October 22, 2010, the Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis of Younger abstention. The crux of the Attorney General's argument was that three businesses which are MDA members were defendants in ongoing state civil suits brought by private parties under § 148B,
The parties agree that there is no state litigation against the MDA on this issue and that the three state suits are the only ongoing state proceedings involving any of the MDA's members. One of the MDA's four board members (and its vice president) is the president and director of City Express, an entity which is one of the state-court defendants.
The MDA opposed the motion, raising a variety of independent arguments as to why Younger abstention was inapplicable. The first several arguments, which revolve around the postures and the parties in this and in the state suits, are that (1) Younger does not apply where the state suits are civil actions brought by private parties, (2) the relief sought by the MDA would not substantially interfere with the ongoing state proceedings, (3) the MDA is not a party to any ongoing state proceedings, and is not sufficiently closely related to any such party to be treated as the same for Younger purposes, and (4) the MDA is neither required to nor would it have any opportunity to raise its pre-emption challenge in the state suits. In addition, the MDA makes other arguments: (5) the Commonwealth's interest in the state suits is insufficient to justify Younger abstention, (6) because it is "readily apparent" that § 148B is pre-empted, an exception to Younger applies, and (7) the penalties imposed for violations of § 148B provide another exception to Younger.
The district court granted the Attorney General's motion to dismiss on Younger grounds. Mass. Delivery Ass'n, 797 F.Supp.2d at 176. The MDA appealed.
Our review of whether the conditions for Younger abstention are met is de novo.
The normal rule is that the federal courts must exercise their jurisdiction and decide cases brought before them. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996) ("We have often acknowledged that federal courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress."). There are limited exceptions to that rule; one is the Younger doctrine. See generally id. at 716-17, 116 S.Ct. 1712 (describing the various types of abstention, including Younger abstention). The doctrine is judicially created and takes its name from Younger v. Harris, a case involving an underlying state criminal prosecution against a defendant who then filed suit in federal court to attack the state statute on which his criminal prosecution was brought. 401 U.S. at 38-39, 91 S.Ct. 746.
The Younger doctrine reflects a "longstanding public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings," and is based on two conceptual foundations. Id. at 43, 91 S.Ct. 746. First, it is based on a notion that "courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied relief." Id. at 43-44, 91 S.Ct. 746. This concern applies to injunctive relief and also, at least typically, to requests for declaratory relief, where the same parties are involved and the federal plaintiff is a state-court party. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971) ("Ordinarily... the practical effect of the two forms of relief will be virtually identical...."); Rio Grande, 397 F.3d at 70-71. Second, and more importantly, Younger rests upon basic notions of federalism and comity, and also on a related desire to prevent unnecessary duplication of legal proceedings. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. 746.
Younger abstention has extended far beyond its original roots of non-interference with state criminal prosecutions. In Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982), the Court set forth three general guidelines, which we have since described in a series of cases: Younger applies "when the requested relief would interfere (1) with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) that implicates an important state interest; and (3) that provides an adequate opportunity for the federal plaintiff to advance his federal constitutional challenge." Rossi v. Gemma, 489 F.3d 26, 34-35 (1st Cir.2007).
The question of whether "interference" exists is a "threshold issue." Id. at 35; see also Rio Grande, 397 F.3d at 70 ("Younger applies only when the relief asked of the federal court `interfere[s]' with the state proceedings." (alteration in original) (quoting Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716, 116 S.Ct. 1712)); Green v. City of Tucson, 255 F.3d 1086, 1093-94 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (explaining that Younger requires not only that the three guidelines be satisfied, but also that "the federal relief sought would interfere in some manner
The first prong, that there must be an "ongoing state judicial proceeding," in actuality involves assessment of a complex of issues. The proceeding must be "judicial in nature," as opposed to, for instance, legislative proceedings. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans (NOPSI), 491 U.S. 350, 370, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989). Even then, Younger does not extend to all judicial proceedings. While the doctrine originated in the context of ongoing criminal proceedings, see Younger, 401 U.S. at 38-39, 91 S.Ct. 746, it has been extended by the Court to only two types of civil proceedings: (1) enforcement actions to which the state is a party, Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975) (explaining that a state-initiated nuisance proceeding "is more akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil cases"), and (2) civil actions involving "administration of a State's judicial system," Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977), such as a court's contempt proceedings, id., and the ability to enforce a valid state-court judgment, Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 13, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987).
Moreover, the state judicial proceeding must be "ongoing," which involves an assessment of which suits were filed when, and how far along those suits have progressed. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975) (holding that even where a federal suit is filed first, if the state suit is brought before "any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court, the principles of Younger v. Harris should apply in full force").
Importantly, Younger does not typically apply where the federal-court plaintiff is not itself a party to the state-court proceedings. The Supreme Court made this clear in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 928-29, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975), where it held that while two corporations (who were not state-court defendants) had similar interests and were somewhat related to a third corporation which was a state-court defendant, the two were not barred by Younger from bringing suit.
The second prong requires that the state-court proceedings "implicate important state interests." Middlesex Cnty., 457 U.S. at 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515. This too may involve subsidiary inquiries, which we need not explore here. The third prong requires that there be "an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise" the federal issue. Id.
Even if all these requirements are met, and they have not been here, abstention is still not proper in certain "extraordinary circumstances" or "unusual situations." Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54, 91 S.Ct. 746. The Supreme Court has indicated that a "facially conclusive claim" of pre-emption is "[p]erhaps" such an exception to the Younger doctrine. NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 367, 109 S.Ct. 2506. We have held that such a facially conclusive claim is a valid exception. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Medley, 572 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir.2009) (citing Chaulk Servs., Inc. v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 70 F.3d 1361, 1370 (1st Cir.1995)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1059, 175 L.Ed.2d 884 (2010). We need not get into this branch of the analysis here.
We conclude that Younger does not permit the state Attorney General to succeed in this attempt to preclude federal
The Attorney General pushes the Younger doctrine further than the Supreme Court or this court has ever extended it. While it is not an absolute that because the MDA is not a party to the state-court proceedings it may not be subjected to Younger, it would be an unjustified extension of Younger to treat the MDA as if it were such a party. At the very least, such an extension of Younger cannot be justified because there is no interference. Our holding is also consistent with the caselaw of the other circuits. To the extent the circuits have permitted non-parties to state proceedings to nevertheless be subject to Younger under some circumstances, those circumstances are not present here. For related reasons specified below, federal court adjudication of this suit would not interfere with the ongoing state proceedings. We need not address the other arguments the MDA makes.
The Attorney General's argument is based on the premise that the MDA and any of its individual members should be treated, for Younger purposes, as standing in each other's shoes.
Distinct parties are typically treated separately for purposes of Younger abstention. This is illustrated by Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974). There, the Court held that when two protesters were warned to discontinue handbilling or they would be arrested, and one continued and was arrested and prosecuted, and the other was not arrested but could fear prosecution, the latter could maintain a federal suit and was not barred by Younger. The Court explained that "[t]he pending prosecution of petitioner's handbilling companion does not affect petitioner's action for declaratory relief." Id. at 471 n. 19, 94 S.Ct. 1209. This conclusion accords with the Court's statement about "our `deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court,'" Richards v. Jefferson County, Alabama, 517 U.S. 793, 798, 116 S.Ct. 1761, 135 L.Ed.2d 76 (1996) (quoting 18 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 4449, at 417 (1981)), and the principle that federal court abstention from the exercise of otherwise-proper jurisdiction "remains `the exception, not the rule,'" NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 359, 109 S.Ct. 2506 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)).
The Supreme Court has addressed in two cases whether distinct but very closely related parties should be treated the same for purposes of Younger abstention, but those cases do not lead us to extend Younger to the circumstances presented here. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975).
In Hicks, two employees of an adult business were prosecuted for showing an obscene movie, and several of the obscene tapes were seized from the business. 422 U.S. at 335-36, 95 S.Ct. 2281. The Court found that the business whose employees were criminally prosecuted was barred from bringing suit by Younger, as the federal suit would have interfered with the state criminal prosecution, id. at 348, 95 S.Ct. 2281, but its reasons do not establish the principle the Attorney General advances. It is true the Court stated the business "had a substantial stake in the state proceedings, so much so that they sought federal relief, demanding that the state statute be declared void and their films be returned to them. Obviously,
Hicks must be understood in the context of Doran, which was decided six days later. There, three corporations operated topless bars, only one of which was criminally prosecuted under a new ordinance. 422 U.S. at 924-25, 95 S.Ct. 2561. The Court found that the corporation which the state criminally prosecuted could not bring suit due to Younger. Id. at 929, 95 S.Ct. 2561. More significantly for our purposes, the Court found that the other two corporations, who had similar, perhaps even identical interests, could bring suit and Younger did not apply. Id. at 931, 95 S.Ct. 2561. The Court explained:
Id. at 928-29, 95 S.Ct. 2561.
As a second reason not to engage in Younger abstention, the Doran Court explained that neither declaratory nor injunctive relief could interfere "with enforcement of contested statutes or ordinances except with respect to the particular federal plaintiffs, and the State is free to prosecute others who may violate the statute." Id. at 931, 95 S.Ct. 2561.
Doran makes clear that an alignment of interests among similar but distinct parties is not per se enough, even when the state proceeding is a criminal prosecution and so the state's interest in non-interference is at its height. If two businesses were not barred from pursuing a federal suit despite having interests and representation in common with a state-court criminal defendant, as was the case in Doran, it is difficult to see how an industry association with some interests in common with a few of its members who are state-court civil defendants would be barred by Younger from pursuing its own federal suit. Doran explained that the parties must be "so closely related" to justify treating them the same before they may all "be subject to the Younger considerations which govern any one of them." Id. at 928, 95 S.Ct. 2561.
There is no doubt that the MDA is legally distinct from its members, each complying with the formalities established by state law. The MDA and each of its members have their own interests, which may at times be similar to those of some or all of the members, but which may not be the same. Some members may have interests distinct from or even adverse to other members. It is likely that the MDA is responsive to a majority of its members,
Under these circumstances, neither Hicks nor Doran, justifies treating the MDA the same as its members who are state-court defendants for Younger purposes. Hicks involved (1) a close employer-employee relationship between the federal-court plaintiff and state-court defendant, (2) a particular piece of property at issue in both proceedings, and (3) a federal action that "sought to interfere with the pending state prosecution." 422 U.S. at 348-49, 95 S.Ct. 2281. Here, none of those circumstances is present: there is no such relationship, no particular piece of property at issue, and, as is explained below, no risk of interference.
Some circuits applying Hicks have found Younger applicable to non-parties where the federal-court plaintiff's right was "derivative" of the right of a state-court defendant, finding the interests of the parties to be "intertwined" in such circumstances. See Citizens for a Strong Ohio v. Marsh, 123 Fed.Appx. 630, 635 (6th Cir.2005) ("Younger abstention may also be appropriate for non-parties to the state action when `[s]uccess on the merits ... is entirely derivative' of the rights of the state action parties." (alterations in original) (quoting Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 83 (2d Cir.2003)); D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1230 (10th Cir.2004) ("[W]hen in essence only one claim is at stake and the legally distinct party to the federal proceeding is merely an alter ego of a party in state court, Younger applies."); Spargo, 351 F.3d at 83 (Younger applies where the federal-court plaintiff's claim is "entirely derivative of whatever rights that" the state-court defendant may have (internal quotation mark omitted)); Stivers v. Minnesota, 575 F.2d 200, 203 (8th Cir.1978) (Younger applies to non-party where "[t]he only [federal-court] standing ... demonstrated ... arises from the alleged impact" of the challenged action on the state-court defendants).
We need not comment on whether we agree these cases were properly decided, as even assuming they were, their rationale does not apply here. As explained above, the MDA members who are not state court defendants—the vast majority of MDA's members—have an interest in determining the constitutionality of the state law. The MDA itself has a distinct interest in challenging the Ordinance.
Doran also does not extend to the circumstances present here. There, the Court stated that there "may be some circumstances" where parties are "so closely related" in terms of "ownership, control, and management" to be treated the same for Younger purposes. 422 U.S. at 928-29, 95 S.Ct. 2561. The MDA and its members, who are state-court defendants, on the facts present here are not "so closely related" to justify treating them the same under Younger: only a small fraction of MDA members are state-court defendants, and the Attorney General makes no claim of any substantial ownership, management, or control between the state-court defendants and the MDA.
Indeed, those circuits to have applied Doran to non-defendants have only found organizations to be sufficiently closely related if the degree of ownership, management or control is substantial and involves at least a majority interest. See Cedar Rapids Cellular Tel., L.P. v. Miller, 280 F.3d 874, 882 (8th Cir.2002) (applying Younger to a non-party in whom a state-court defendant had "a controlling interest"); Warmus v. Melahn, 62 F.3d 252, 256 (8th Cir.1995) (applying Younger where the non-party individual was the "beneficial owner, officer and director" of the state-court defendant corporation), vacated on other grounds, 517 U.S. 1241, 116 S.Ct. 2493, 135 L.Ed.2d 187 (1996).
Not all circuits agree with even that formulation. See Bickham v. Lashof, 620 F.2d 1238, 1244 (7th Cir.1980) (finding the interests of a corporation, which was the state-court defendant, and "its sole shareholder" to be insufficiently intertwined to justify applying Younger to the shareholder).
We need not decide whether we agree with the first line of cases because no such ownership or control relationship is present here.
Further, the one circuit which has addressed a more analogous situation has held that Younger does not apply in such circumstances. See Citizens for a Better Env't, Inc. v. Nassau County, 488 F.2d 1353, 1360-61 (2d Cir.1973) (holding that Younger does not bar an organization's challenge to anti-solicitation ordinances notwithstanding pending proceedings against its members because the organization's interests lie in the future applicability of the ordinances).
Significantly, the circuits are in accord that the application of Younger to
In sum, neither the Supreme Court nor the other circuits have extended Younger abstention to these facts.
It is also clear on these facts that there is no real risk of interference with the three ongoing private civil actions in the state courts. Younger abstention is based, in large measure, on the "seriousness of federal judicial interference with" ongoing state-court proceedings. Huffman, 420 U.S. at 603, 95 S.Ct. 1200; accord Maymó-Meléndez v. Álvarez-Ramírez, 364 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.2004) ("Younger is ... built around the principle that ... federal courts should refrain from issuing injunctions that interfere with ongoing state-court litigation...."). As a result, where "neither declaratory nor injunctive relief can directly interfere" with the ongoing state proceedings, there is no basis for Younger abstention. Doran, 422 U.S. at 931, 95 S.Ct. 2561; accord Rio Grande, 397 F.3d at 70 ("Younger applies only when the relief asked of the federal
Nothing in the MDA's requested relief would interfere with the three state-court proceedings involving its members. The prospective injunctive relief sought pertains solely to the Attorney General, and would only preclude the Commonwealth, not private parties, from bringing suit under § 148B(a)(2) with respect to motor carriers engaged in interstate commerce.
The declaratory relief sought would also not cause any interference with the state-court proceedings. It is true that the MDA seeks a general declaration that subsection (a)(2) is pre-empted with respect to motor carriers engaged in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has made clear that is not a basis to invoke Younger. In Steffel and in Doran, the outcomes of the federal suits would create judicial precedent which might or might not coincide with the determinations made by the state courts as to other parties under the same state statutes. That did not warrant Younger abstention.
Indeed, the Court in NOPSI made clear that even though "the federal court's disposition of such a case may well affect, or for practical purposes pre-empt, a future— or, as in the present circumstances, even a pending—state-court action," such an effect was insufficient to give rise to Younger abstention. 491 U.S. at 373, 109 S.Ct. 2506; see also Rio Grande, 397 F.3d at 71 ("[T]he mere possibility of inconsistent results in the future is insufficient to justify Younger abstention."); Green, 255 F.3d at 1097 (explaining that "the `mere potential for conflict in the results of adjudications,' is not the kind of `interference' that merits federal court abstention" (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976))).
Beyond that, there is another reason there is no interference here. As a practical matter, the "[s]tate courts are not bound by the dictates of the lower federal courts, although they are free to rely on the opinions of such courts when adjudicating federal claims." Evans v. Thompson, 518 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2008) (citing Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring)); accord Steffel, 415 U.S. at 482 n. 3, 94 S.Ct. 1209 (Rhenquist, J., concurring) (explaining that a federal declaratory judgment "would not be accorded the stare decisis effect in state court that it would have in a subsequent proceeding within the same federal jurisdiction. Although the state court would not be compelled to follow the federal holding, the opinion might, of course, be viewed as highly persuasive."); Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 361 (5th Cir.1998) ("[T]he Louisiana state courts are not bound by Fifth Circuit precedent when making a determination of federal law."); Bromley v. Crisp, 561 F.2d 1351, 1354 (10th Cir.1977) (en banc) (holding that state courts "may express their differing views on the retroactivity problem or similar
As a matter of state law, Massachusetts state courts do not regard the pronouncements of lower federal courts as binding. ACE Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 437 Mass. 241, 770 N.E.2d 980, 986 n. 8 (2002) ("Although we are not bound by decisions of Federal courts (other than the United States Supreme Court) on matters of federal law, `we give respectful consideration to such lower Federal court decisions as seem persuasive.'" (citation omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hill, 377 Mass. 59, 385 N.E.2d 253, 255 (1979))); Commonwealth v. Montanez, 388 Mass. 603, 447 N.E.2d 660, 661 (1983) ("Though we always treat their decisions with deference, we are not bound by decisions of Federal courts except the decisions of the United States Supreme Court on questions of Federal law."). Thus, should the district court issue a declaratory judgment on remand finding the state statute pre-empted, that judgment would not be binding on Massachusetts state courts and litigation by private parties may proceed. That said, a defendant may seek to enforce the declaratory judgment in federal court should the Attorney General continue to bring actions under the statute in state court despite the declaratory judgment.
The Attorney General does not argue that a federal decision could result in collateral estoppel effects that would amount to interference with the state proceedings. Even if such collateral estoppel effects were present, they would not suffice to justify Younger abstention. Rio Grande, 397 F.3d at 71 ("Normal res judicata effects of federal actions on state actions ... are of course not enough to trigger Younger.").
Given this lack of any interference with the state-court proceedings, Younger abstention is inapplicable.
The district court erred as a matter of law in dismissing the suit based on Younger abstention. We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Chapter 149 is entitled "Labor and Industries" and contains a wide variety of provisions relevant to the employment relationship, including a requirement that employees be paid weekly or bi-weekly. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148.
Chapter 151 is entitled "Minimum Fair Wages," and contains a variety of provisions establishing minimum wage and overtime pay requirements. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, §§ 1, 1A.
Chapter 152 is entitled "Workers' Compensation" and addresses that subject.
Our conclusion here is also not in tension with our decision in Rio Grande which held that there was no interference with parallel state proceedings brought by the federal plaintiffs as to other issues. 397 F.3d at 71. In discussing why a plaintiff with pending state-court proceedings was not subject to Younger, we noted that "interference also clearly exists where the plaintiff is seeking a declaratory judgment that a prosecution, or the statute serving as its basis, is illegal or unconstitutional." Id. at 70. Because the plaintiff was not subject to state prosecution, that condition was not met. The attempt to transpose the language regarding interference as to the plaintiff in Rio Grande to the particular context present here thus fails.