Filed: May 06, 2013
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: of appeal to the district court's dismissal of his case. Thus, we hold DeLong's filing was timely.2, This total exhaustion requirement directed federal courts, to dismiss mixed petitions without prejudice so petitioners could, return to federal court after exhausting their state law claims.
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-1131
JOSEPH DELONG,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
THOMAS DICKHAUT,
Respondent, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Thompson, Circuit Judge,
Souter,* Associate Justice,
and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
Charles W. Rankin, with whom Michelle Menken and Rankin &
Sultan were on brief, for appellant.
Jennifer L. Sullivan, Assistant Attorney General, with whom
Martha Coakley, Attorney General, was on brief, for appellee.
May 6, 2013
*
The Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the
Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM. Before this Court on appeal is the dismissal
of Petitioner Joseph DeLong's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas
corpus petition. After careful review, we remand to the district
court. We begin by outlining the procedural posture of DeLong's
case.
DeLong was convicted by a jury in Massachusetts state
court on two indictments charging him with unarmed robbery, and
sentenced to concurrent terms of fifteen to twenty years'
imprisonment. DeLong filed a motion for a new trial, alleging
ineffectiveness of trial counsel and requesting an evidentiary
hearing; he later filed an amended motion claiming newly discovered
evidence--a surveillance tape and still photographs--was
exculpatory and warranted a new trial, or at minimum an evidentiary
hearing on his motion. The court denied DeLong's motion for a new
trial, finding the evidence was reasonably discoverable at the time
of trial. DeLong appealed the judgments and the denial of his
motion for new trial.
The Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the convictions
but found DeLong had made an adequate showing to warrant an
evidentiary hearing on the newly discovered photographic and video
evidence. The Appeals Court remanded the matter to the trial court
for an evidentiary hearing. Following the evidentiary hearing, the
trial court again denied the motion for a new trial; DeLong
appealed and the Appeals Court subsequently affirmed. DeLong then
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sought further appellate review of his motion for a new trial with
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), arguing ineffective
assistance of counsel and violations of his right to due process.
The SJC denied his application. DeLong applied again to the SJC
for further appellate review of the Appeals Court's affirmance of
his convictions, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, denial
of his right to fair trial, and reversible error. The SJC also
denied this request.
DeLong then filed, pro se, a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal
habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts.
His petition raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and
violations of his right to due process.1 On November 14, 2011,
respondent Thomas Dickhaut moved for dismissal on the ground that
DeLong's petition contained unexhausted claims. Although the
parties disagree as to precisely which claims were exhausted, it is
undisputed that some claims in DeLong's habeas petition had not
been previously raised before the Massachusetts state courts.
On November 30, 2011, the district court granted
Dickhaut's motion in an electronic order, which stated only:
"Motion allowed. This case is dismissed as it contains both
exhausted and unexhausted claims. Ros[e] v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,
1
DeLong also moved for appointment of counsel, but this
motion was denied.
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518-519 (1982) . . . ." The case was dismissed on December 1,
2012.
On December 21, 2012, the district court received from
DeLong a handwritten motion for extension of time to oppose
respondent's motion to dismiss, dated December 1, 2012. The
district court denied his motion as moot, as the case had already
been dismissed. DeLong then sent a handwritten notice of appeal
listing the denial of his motion for extension of time and the
order denying this motion as moot, dated December 28, 2011. He
mistakenly sent his appeal to this court, which we received on
January 3, 2012, and transmitted to the district court. The notice
of appeal was docketed by the district court clerk as an appeal
from both the district court's order denying the motion for
extension of time and the order dismissing the case. DeLong also
sent a letter to the clerk of the district court, dated December
28, 2011, stating he had not received any notification from the
court regarding the dismissal of his case and requesting any
written decisions or rulings in his case.
On February 1, 2012, this court ordered the district
court to issue or deny a certificate of appealability (COA) for its
final order, which the district court ultimately denied stating,
"this appeal would be frivolous." DeLong then sought and was
granted by this court a COA to appeal from the dismissal of his
mixed habeas petition on the ground he was not given the option to
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delete his unexhausted claims and proceed only with his exhausted
claims. We now review the district court's dismissal of DeLong's
§ 2254 petition.
I. Jurisdiction
We first need to address the preliminary issue of
jurisdiction. Specifically, Dickhaut challenges our jurisdiction
in this matter, arguing DeLong failed to file an appropriate notice
of appeal to the district court's dismissal of his case. Recall,
if you will, that on December 28, DeLong filed a handwritten notice
of appeal. In this notice, DeLong stated his appeal consisted of
the district court's denial of his motion for extension of time,
ruling the motion denied as moot. It is Dickhaut's position that
even though DeLong's notice may have properly evidenced an
intention to appeal the district court's denial of his motion for
extension of time, it did not properly appeal the December 1 order
dismissing his habeas petition. DeLong counters that his December
28 notice of appeal adequately evidenced an intention to appeal all
adverse rulings of the district court, including the dismissal of
his case, and was timely filed. In order to determine if we have
jurisdiction to entertain this appeal we must determine whether
DeLong's notice of appeal was timely filed and provided sufficient
indication of his intention to appeal the district court's December
1 dismissal of his petition. See Campiti v. Matesanz, 333 F.3d 317,
319-20 (1st Cir. 2003).
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We first address whether DeLong's notice was timely
filed. The district court dismissed DeLong's habeas petition on
December 1, 2011 and DeLong's notice of appeal was not docketed
until January 3, 2012, more than thirty days later, ordinarily
considered untimely. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). However, under
the "prison mailbox" rule, an inmate confined in a correctional
institution may file a notice of appeal by depositing it in the
institution's internal mail system on or before the last day of
filing. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1). "Timely filing may be shown by
a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746" that "set[s]
forth the date of deposit and state[s] that first-class postage was
prepaid." Id. DeLong dated his notice of appeal December 28,
2011, and sent it along with an affidavit (which he swore was true
under penalty of perjury) and a certificate of service that stated
the notice was mailed by first-class mail, postage prepaid.
Applying the "prison mailbox" rule, we deem the notice of appeal
filed on December 28, 2011, the date DeLong deposited it in prison
mail system, which was within thirty days of the December 1
dismissal of his case. Thus, we hold DeLong's filing was timely.
See United States v. Correa-Torres,
326 F.3d 18, 21-22 (1st Cir.
2003).
Having found the filing timely, we turn next to the
content of DeLong's appeal. A notice of appeal must "designate the
judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed." Fed. R. App. P.
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3(c)(1)(B). We construe this rule liberally, and consider the
notice in the context of the record in its entirety to ascertain
whether petitioner's intent to appeal was "sufficiently manifest."
See Markel Am. Ins. Co., v. Díaz-Santiago, 674 F.3d 21, 26 (1st
Cir. 2012). But liberal construction does not excuse noncompliance
with Rule 3, which "is fatal to an appeal." Smith v. Barry,
502
U.S. 244, 248 (1992).
Here, DeLong's notice of appeal challenges the district
court's order denying his motion for extension of time as moot, a
ruling based on the prior dismissal of his case. We examine
DeLong's notice of appeal in the context of the record as a whole
and note that the letter he sent to the district court clerk along
with the notice clearly referenced the December 1 dismissal of his
case. See Markel Am. Ins. Co., 674 F.3d at 26. DeLong's letter
explained he was not aware of the dismissal of his case until
December 27, when he received the denial of his motion for
extension of time as moot. We find DeLong's notice of appeal
"plainly evidences an intention to appeal" the district court's
entire order, which specifically mentioned the motion for extension
of time and indirectly referenced the dismissal of his case. See
Campiti, 333 F.3d at 320. Although the notice does not directly
cite the December 1 order, Rule 3 "buttressed by latitude for a pro
se litigant forgives . . . 'informalit[ies] of form.'"
Id.
(alteration in original)(quoting Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(4)). We
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conclude DeLong's intent to appeal the dismissal of his case was
sufficiently manifest.
Having determined DeLong timely filed a notice that
plainly evidenced his intent to appeal, this court has
jurisdiction.
II. Dismissal of the Mixed Petition
We now direct our attention to the district court's
dismissal of DeLong's petition, which we review for abuse of
discretion. Nowaczyk v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 299 F.3d 69,
74-75 (1st Cir. 2002). Respondent argues a district court has
authority to dismiss a habeas petition containing both exhausted
and unexhausted claims outright, and doing so is not an abuse of
discretion. DeLong counters that although district courts retain
discretion to summarily dismiss mixed petitions, that practice is
disfavored in this circuit.
Prior to Congress' enactment of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEPDA), the Supreme Court held
a federal district court must dismiss mixed habeas petitions
containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Lundy, 455 U.S.
at 522. Petitioners who submit mixed petitions are entitled to
resubmit a petition with only exhausted claims, or to exhaust the
remainder of their claims.
Id. at 520.2 We have held that where
2
This "total exhaustion" requirement directed federal courts
to dismiss mixed petitions without prejudice so petitioners could
return to federal court after exhausting their state law claims.
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a petition is deemed mixed, the best practice is for the district
court to give the petitioner an opportunity to dismiss the
unexhausted claims. Clements v. Maloney, 485 F.3d 158, 168-69 (1st
Cir. 2007). And then, if the petitioner declines to dismiss the
unexhausted claims, "the district court should dismiss the entire
petition without prejudice."
Id. at 169. We have recommended that
district courts advise petitioners of the option, under Lundy, to
abandon any unexhausted claims and consider this the "wiser
practice." Neverson v. Farquharson,
366 F.3d 32, 43 (1st Cir.
2004).
A district court also has the option to stay the mixed
petition and hold it in abeyance while the petitioner exhausts the
unexhausted claims, then lift the stay and adjudicate the petition
once all claims are exhausted.3 Rhines, 544 U.S. at 275-76. But
"stay and abeyance is only appropriate when the district court
determines there was good cause for the petitioner's failure to
Lundy, 455 U.S. at 520. The Supreme Court imposed this requirement
fourteen years before Congress enacted AEDPA, at a time when there
was no statute of limitations on the filing of a habeas petition.
Rhines v. Weber,
544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005).
3
Congress included in AEDPA the "total exhaustion"
requirement as well as a one-year statute of limitations for filing
exhausted claims in a federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. §§
2254(b)(1)(A), 2244(d). To address the problems posed by the
interplay of these two provisions, the Supreme Court approved the
"stay and abeyance" procedure, noting that under AEDPA, petitioners
who bring mixed petitions "run the risk of forever losing their
opportunity for any federal review of their unexhausted claims."
Rhines, 544 U.S. at 275.
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exhaust" and even so, it would be an abuse of discretion for the
district court to grant a stay when the "unexhausted claims are
plainly meritless."4 Id. at 277.
Here, respondent moved to dismiss the case, relying on
Lundy to argue a habeas corpus petition should be dismissed where
it contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Without giving
DeLong the opportunity to delete his unexhausted claims, the
district court granted respondent's motion and dismissed the case,
stating: "This case is dismissed as it contains both exhausted and
unexhausted claims." This brief order cited only Lundy and
included no explanation of the court's basis for dismissal.
It is undisputed that DeLong presented a mixed habeas
petition to the district court, although there is some disagreement
as to which claims are unexhausted. While we recognize that the
district court could not have adjudicated DeLong's mixed petition
as presented and had discretion to dismiss the petition, the best
practice would have been to allow DeLong to delete his unexhausted
claims, rather than summarily dismiss his petition. See Clements,
485 F.3d at 168-69. And although the district court also had
discretion to dismiss the mixed petition instead of granting a stay
4
In contrast, it would likely be an abuse of discretion for
a district court to dismiss a mixed petition instead of granting a
stay where: there is good cause for the failure to exhaust; the
"unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious"; and there is no
indication of "intentionally dilatory litigation tactics" by the
petitioner. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278.
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and abeyance, dismissal would have been an abuse of discretion
unless the unexhausted claims were clearly meritless. See Rhines,
544 U.S. at 278.
On the record before us, it is unclear whether the court
evaluated the unexhausted claims and deemed them meritless or
simply followed the respondent's argument for dismissal under
Lundy. We must be able to figure out what the district court judge
found and the basis for the findings to the extent necessary to
permit effective appellate review. See United States v. Van, 87
F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996). We cannot do that here, given that the
district court's order includes no indication of the basis for
dismissal. Under no circumstance could we affirm the district
court's dismissal "on the basis of a discretion the court did not
exercise." Clair Recreation Ctr. v. Flynn,
897 F.2d 623, 624
(1990). And so we see no choice but to vacate and remand the case
to the district court for reconsideration of its decision in light
of this opinion. See United States v. Medina,
167 F.3d 77, 80 (1st
Cir. 1999). No costs are awarded.
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