Filed: Mar. 17, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Laws Ann.employment discrimination statute), Puerto Rico Law 44, P.R.sales in Puerto Rico and the Caribbean.very personal rights which die with the person. Some courts interpret § 1988 as applying to, the ADA, and, therefore, apply state law to determine whether an, ADA claim is inheritable.
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-1405
JORGE L. VAELLO-CARMONA,
Plaintiff,
LEYDA JEANNETTE MARQUEZ-NAVARRO;
ESTATE OF JORGE L. VAELLO-CARMONA;
NICHOLE JEANNETTE VAELLO-MARQUEZ;
JORGE LUIS VAELLO-MARQUEZ,
Petitioners, Appellants,
v.
SIEMENS MEDICAL SOLUTIONS USA, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Selya, and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Bámily López Ortiz, with whom Lopez Toro was on brief, for
appellants.
Anita Montaner-Sevillano, with whom Patricia M. Marvez-
Valiente and McConnell Valdés LLC were on brief, for appellee.
March 17, 2015
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Leyda Jeannette Marquez-Navarro,
Nichole Jeannette Vaello-Marquez, Jorge Luis Vaello-Marquez, and
the Estate of Jorge L. Vaello-Carmona (collectively, "appellants")
appeal the district court's denial of their motion to substitute
themselves as plaintiffs in this case after the death of plaintiff
Jorge L. Vaello-Carmona.1 The district court ruled that Vaello-
Carmona's employment discrimination claims against defendant
Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. ("Siemens") were not
inheritable and dismissed the case for failure to state a claim.
We agree with appellants that causes of action under
Puerto Rico Law 100, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146 (the general
employment discrimination statute), Puerto Rico Law 44, P.R. Laws
Ann. tit. 1, § 505 (the employment disability discrimination
statute), and Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., are inheritable under Puerto
Rico law. Hence, we vacate the district court's judgment.
I.
Because this case was dismissed below for failure to
state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we recite the facts
as alleged in the complaint. Medina-Velázquez v.
Hernández-Gregorat,
767 F.3d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 2014).
1
Marquez-Navarro is Vaello-Carmona's wife. Nichole Jeannette
and Jorge Luis are their children.
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Vaello-Carmona was an engineer who had worked in various
positions for Siemens since 1991. Siemens is one of the world's
largest providers of healthcare products and services. In January
2008, Vaello-Carmona was promoted to Branch Manager, the highest
position available at Siemens in Puerto Rico and the Caribbean. In
June 2008, Vaello-Carmona suffered a stroke, which required
intensive medical treatment and significantly affected his speech
and mobility. Despite his disability, Vaello-Carmona continued to
work diligently for Siemens. His sales from December 2008 to
September 2009 exceeded the yearly averages in the market by
twenty-five percent and gave Siemens its highest yearly volume of
sales in Puerto Rico and the Caribbean.
On October 13, 2009, Vaello-Carmona was asked to meet
with his supervisor Charles Wood, the Regional Vice President for
Sales, to conduct his performance evaluation for the fiscal year
ending on September 30, 2009. Before Vaello-Carmona was able to
enter the Siemens office that morning, Wood entered his vehicle in
the parking lot and informed Vaello-Carmona that he was fired,
effective immediately. On October 16, 2009, Vaello-Carmona
received a letter from Siemens confirming his dismissal. The
letter stated that Vaello-Carmona had been laid off due to a
significant decline in the market. After his termination, Vaello-
Carmona's physical and mental health deteriorated further, leaving
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him totally disabled at forty-six years old. On February 23, 2010,
Vaello-Carmona began receiving Social Security benefits.
On March 24, 2010, Siemens notified Vaello-Carmona that
the company was going to start recruiting for a position similar to
the one he had previously held. However, the new position required
more travel to the Caribbean islands and Florida. On March 30,
2010, Vaello-Carmona informed Siemens that he could not compete for
the new position because he had become totally disabled and was
receiving Social Security benefits. Notwithstanding, on April 23,
2010, Vaello-Carmona received an offer from Siemens to rehire him
as the Branch Manager for Puerto Rico and the Caribbean. Vaello-
Carmona declined this offer because he was totally disabled.
On July 5, 2011, Vaello-Carmona filed a complaint against
Siemens, alleging disability discrimination in violation of Law
100, Law 44, and Title I of the ADA, and unlawful termination of
employment in violation of Law 80, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185a.
Vaello-Carmona claimed that Siemens fired him because of his
disability, entitling him to compensatory damages, back wages, lost
wages, and punitive damages. Vaello-Carmona died on August 13,
2011, about one month after filing his complaint. On January 11,
2012, appellants moved to substitute themselves in Vaello-Carmona's
position in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a).
On July 9, 2012, the district court denied the motion and
dismissed Vaello-Carmona's complaint. The court held that claims
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pursuant to Law 100, Law 44, and Title I of the ADA were not
inheritable and dismissed those claims with prejudice. Because the
district court had disposed of the only federal claim in this case,
it chose not to take supplemental jurisdiction over the Law 80
claim and dismissed it without prejudice.2 Appellants moved for
reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). On February 14,
2013, the district court denied the motion.
II.
We review de novo a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the
plaintiff's claims.
Medina-Velázquez, 767 F.3d at 108. We examine
whether the complaint states a claim for which relief can be
granted when we construe the well-pleaded facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, accepting their truth and drawing all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.
Id.
The sole questions on appeal are whether employment
discrimination claims under Law 100, Law 44, and Title I of the ADA
survive Vaello-Carmona's death.
A. Law 100 and Law 44
The district court exercised supplemental jurisdiction
over the Law 100 and Law 44 claims. We apply Puerto Rico law to
2
Law 80 "provides a severance pay remedy for an employee
contracted without a fixed term, who is discharged from his/her
employment without just cause." Otero-Burgos v. Inter Am. Univ.,
558 F.3d 1, 1 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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determine whether they are inheritable. See Hoyos v. Telecorp
Commc'ns, Inc.,
488 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007).
Law 100 prohibits discrimination in employment. The
statute provides monetary damages to employees if their employer
discriminates against them on the basis of "age . . . , race,
color, sex, social or national origin, social condition, political
affiliation or political or religious ideology . . . , or for being
a victim or perceived as a victim of domestic violence, sexual
aggression or stalking." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146; see also
Rodriguez Cruz v. Padilla Ayala,
125 P.R. Dec. 486, 508 (1990)
("The legislative history of [Law] 100 shows that its main
objective was to protect employees in the private sector from all
types of discrimination . . . ." (emphasis omitted)). Law 44
protects employees against discrimination on the basis of physical
or mental limitations. The statute provides monetary damages to
employees if their employers "put into effect or use discriminatory
employment procedures, methods, or practices against persons with
any kind of physical, mental or sensory disability just for the
sake of said handicap." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1, § 505. As the
district court stated, "the only noticeable difference between Laws
100 and 44 is that the latter is more specific as to which
employees it protects." Vaello-Carmona v. Med. Solutions USA,
Inc., No. CIV. 11-1637-JAG,
2012 WL 2835536, at *3 (D.P.R. July 9,
2012); see also Rivera Flores v. Cía ABC,
138 P.R. Dec. 1, 5 (1995)
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(explaining how Law 44 incorporates "the remedies, powers, and
procedures" established in Law 100).
Both statutes are silent on whether claims made by an
individual employee against his employer under Law 100 and Law 44
survive the death of the employee. In Sucesión Álvarez v.
Secretario de Justicia,
150 P.R. Dec. 252 (2000), the Puerto Rico
Supreme Court provided guidance on whether a claim under Puerto
Rico law is inheritable. The court held that the amount a deceased
public official accrued in sick leave is transmissible to his
heirs.
Id. at 264. In doing so, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court
delineated which types of claims survive an individual's death and
which do not.
The court first recognized that the Puerto Rico Civil
Code "does not contain a uniform rule about the assets, rights and
obligations that are transmissible by inheritance and those which,
because they are very personal, conclude with the life of their
owner."
Id. at 267 (internal quotation marks omitted). Absent a
uniform statutory rule, the court relied on a treatise by Spanish
commentator José Puig Brutau when setting forth the general
standard for survivorship claims under Puerto Rico law. See
id.
(citing 1 J. Puig Brutau, Fundamentos de Derecho Civil 4463 (2d ed.
1975)). Adopting Puig Brutau's commentary, the court stated:
[T]here are transmissible by inheritance,
among others: the patrimonial rights; the
rights of a partner in capital partnerships;
the quality of partner in a partnership of
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persons; the action to claim legitimate
filiation; the action to contest the juridical
acts or businesses entered into by the
deceased in fraud of the legitimate; the
different modalities of industrial property;
copyright; obligations, except those of a very
personal nature or when the same involve a
non-expendable consideration; funeral
property; [and] the right of the deceased to
obtain indemnification for the damages that
were caused to him during his life.
Id. at 267-68 (emphasis added).
Law 100 and Law 44 provide monetary compensation to an
employee for "damages that were caused to him during his life" due
to discrimination from his employer.
Id. at 268. Therefore,
according to Sucesión Álvarez, claims asserted pursuant to these
antidiscrimination statutes are inheritable under Puerto Rico law.
The district court agreed that "Sucesión Álvarez would
seem to approve of the transmissibility of plaintiff's claims in
this case." Vaello-Carmona,
2012 WL 2835536, at *2. However, the
court found that Law 100 and Law 44 do not survive Vaello-Carmona's
death because rights under these statutes are "very personal
rights."
Id. at *3-4 (internal quotation marks omitted). Siemens
agrees with the district court's analysis and argues that the
Puerto Rico Supreme Court's decisions in Santini Rivera v. Serv
Air, Inc., P.R. Offic. Trans.,
1994 WL 909527 (P.R. 1994), and Cruz
Roche v. De Jesús Colón,
182 P.R. Dec. 313 (2011), support its
position.
-8-
In Santini Rivera, the parents and girlfriend of an
employee, Ramón A. Santini Rivera ("Santini"), appeared as co-
plaintiffs in Santini's lawsuit against his employer, Serv Air,
Inc.
1994 WL 909527. Santini alleged that Serv Air, Inc. violated
Law 100 by denying him positions in the company because of his
national origin and subjecting him to "harassment, persecution,
hounding, and discrimination," which caused him mental anguish and
forced him to quit his job.
Id. His parents and girlfriend
attempted to bring their own cause of action under Law 100 against
Serv Air, Inc. for the harm they experienced as a consequence of
the discrimination suffered by Santini at his workplace.
Id. They
alleged that "they had suffered serious mental anguish when they
saw the depressive state that [Santini] was in."
Id. (Naveira de
Rodón, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Puerto
Rico Supreme Court found that the relatives did not have standing
to bring their own cause of action under Law 100.
Id. The court
stated that Law 100 "has nothing to do . . . with third persons or
with other persons that are not employees. . . . Since the Act
does not apply to [a worker's relatives], it cannot become a source
of rights for said relatives."3
Id. (emphasis in original).
3
The Puerto Rico Supreme Court also held that Santini's
relatives "would have a cause of action under sec. 1802 of the
Puerto Rico Civil Code." Santini Rivera,
1994 WL 909527; see also
id. ("[T]he relatives of an employee who has been a victim of [Law]
100 discriminatory treatment at the hands of his employer have a
cause of action under Civil Code sec. 1802 to be compensated for
the harm resulting from said employment discrimination."). Section
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Similarly, in Cruz Roche, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court
held that the ex-husband of an employee did not have standing to
intervene in his former wife's lawsuit asserting a Law 100 claim,
which concerned conduct that allegedly took place while the couple
was still
married. 182 P.R. Dec. at 324. The court stated that
Law 100 "is very personal in nature; that is, it protects and
benefits only the employee who is discriminated and not the progeny
or the close relatives of the same."
Id. at 320; see also
id. at
324 ("[E]ven though there is a conjugal amount in the lump sum
granted as compensation pursuant to Law No. 100, the cause of
action continues to be very personal while there is no final and
binding judgment that disposes of the action.").
Santini Rivera and Cruz Roche are distinguishable from
the present case. Neither case holds that Law 100 claims assert
"very personal rights" that are not inheritable under Puerto Rico
law. They merely stand for the proposition that relatives of an
aggrieved individual are not entitled to their own cause of action
(or to intervene on their own behalf) under Law 100 because of the
personal nature of Law 100 claims. In this case, appellants do not
attempt to assert their own Law 100 claims. Instead, they seek to
substitute themselves as plaintiffs in order to assert
1802 is a broad tort law that compensates individuals who are
damaged by "an act or omission . . . through fault or negligence."
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141.
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Vaello-Carmona's claims against Siemens. Nothing in Santini Rivera
or Cruz Roche forecloses their ability to do so.
It is true that Sucesión Álvarez states that rights that
"are not transmissible by inheritance" include "those that are very
personal." 150 P.R. Dec. at 268. Because the Puerto Rico Supreme
Court has described Law 100 as "very personal in nature," Cruz
Roche, 182 P.R. Dec. at 320, Siemens contends that Law 100 claims
cannot be inheritable. However, in Widow of Delgado v. Bos. Ins.
Co., the Puerto Rico Supreme Court detailed which "very personal
rights" do not survive an individual's death.
1 P.R. Offic. Trans.
823, 830 (1973). These "very personal rights" include "the right
to usufruct, use, habitation, life annuities, patria potestas,
support, tutorship, personal servitudes, certain labor and services
contracts, the action to dispute legitimacy of child, and the
action granted the donor for causes of ingratitude, and those
rights and obligations which are extinguished by agreement upon the
death of the contractor."
Id. The court concluded that a tort
claim under P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141, "is not in the list of
very personal rights which die with the person."
Id. Similarly,
employment discrimination claims under Law 100 and Law 44 are not
"in the list of very personal rights" that cannot be inherited. To
hold otherwise would be to contradict Sucesión Álvarez's clear
statement that the rights "of the deceased to obtain
indemnification for the damages that were caused to him during his
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life" are
inheritable. 150 P.R. Dec. at 268. Therefore, we hold
that Vaello-Carmona's Law 100 and Law 44 claims survive his death,
and the district court erred when it denied appellants' motion to
substitute themselves as plaintiffs in this case.
B. Title I of the ADA
Vaello-Carmona has also asserted an employment
discrimination claim under Title I of the ADA. When a cause of
action arises from a federal statute, we generally apply federal
law to determine whether that claim survives the plaintiff's death.
See Carlson v. Green,
446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980). The survival of
claims under federal law depends in the first instance on whether
there is an applicable federal survival statute.4 However,
"[t]here is no general survival statute for federal-question
cases," and the ADA is silent as to whether a Title I claim is
inheritable. 7C Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K.
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1954 (3d ed. 2007). Without
statutory guidance, the lower courts are split as to whether to
evaluate the survival of an ADA claim under federal common law or
the law of the state in which the court hears the claim.5 We do
4
For example, Congress explicitly provides that an action
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act will survive the death
of an employee. See 45 U.S.C. § 59 (stating that "[a]ny right of
action given by this chapter to a person suffering injury shall
survive to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of
the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee").
5
The dispute turns on whether 42 U.S.C. § 1988 applies to the
ADA. Section 1988 instructs courts to apply state law when there
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not need to resolve this dispute because the parties agree that
Puerto Rico law should apply to the ADA claim. Therefore, we
assume, without deciding, that Puerto Rico law governs. See, e.g.,
Ji v. Bose Corp.,
626 F.3d 116, 129 (1st Cir. 2010) (assuming,
without deciding, that legal standard applies where "both parties
agree that the standard . . . was correct").
Title I of the ADA protects employees with disabilities
against discrimination. The statute allows for monetary damages to
qualified employees with disabilities if they are discriminated
against "on the basis of disability in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); see also
Rederford v. U.S. Airways, Inc.,
589 F.3d 30, 37 (1st Cir. 2009)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12117) (stating that "Title I of the ADA
explicitly provides for the same remedies available for employment
are legislative gaps in remedies provided for in certain types of
federal civil rights violations. See Robertson v. Wegmann,
436
U.S. 584, 588 (1978). Some courts interpret § 1988 as applying to
the ADA, and, therefore, apply state law to determine whether an
ADA claim is inheritable. See, e.g., Cardella v. CVS Caremark
Corp., No. 3:08-CV-1656-M,
2010 WL 1141393, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar.
25, 2010); Rosenblum v. Colo. Dep't of Health,
878 F. Supp. 1404,
1408-09 (D. Colo. 1994). Others find that the ADA is not among the
enumerated statutes explicitly listed in § 1988, and, hence, apply
federal common law. See, e.g., Kettner v. Compass Group USA, Inc.,
570 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126-33 (D. Minn. 2008); Hanson v. Atl.
Research Corp., No. 4:02-CV-00301-SMR,
2003 WL 430484, at *4 (E.D.
Ark. Feb. 14, 2003). For purposes of § 1988, Puerto Rico is the
functional equivalent of a state.
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discrimination suits in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"
which includes monetary damages).
Just as with Law 100 and Law 44, claims arising under
Title I of the ADA provide monetary compensation to an employee for
"damages that were caused to him during his life" due to
discrimination from his employer. Sucesión
Álvarez, 150 P.R. Dec.
at 268; see also Ruiz Rivera v. Pfizer Pharmaceuticals,
521 F.3d
76, 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (stating that Law 44 is "the Puerto Rico
analogue to the ADA"). Therefore, applying Puerto Rico law, we
hold that Vaello-Carmona's employment discrimination claim under
Title I of the ADA is inheritable.
C. Law 80
After dismissing the Law 100, Law 44, and Title I of the
ADA claims, the district court dismissed Vaello-Carmona's pendent
Law 80 claim without prejudice. Because we conclude the district
court erred with regard to the other claims, we also vacate the
dismissal of the Law 80 claim.
III.
For the reasons stated above, we vacate the district
court's dismissal of Vaello-Carmona's Law 100, Law 44, Law 80, and
Title I of the ADA claims, and remand for proceedings consistent
with this decision.
Costs to appellants.
So ordered.
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