Filed: Aug. 28, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: months he served for a state drug offense. Laws Ann., 3, Based on a total offense level of 40, and a Criminal History, Category of II, the Guidelines sentencing range is 324 to 405, months. Appellant waived, his right to appeal if the court sentenced him within the 240- to, 348-month range.
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-1793
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
MIKE GRACIANI-FEBUS,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. José A. Fusté, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Thompson, Lipez, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
Irma R. Valldejuli on brief for appellant.
Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Velez, United States Attorney, Nelson
Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate
Division, and John A. Matthews II, Assistant United States
Attorney, on brief for appellee.
August 28, 2015
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Appellant Mike Graciani-Febus was
sentenced to 360 months imprisonment for his involvement in a
racketeering drug enterprise that resulted in the murder of two
innocent bystanders. On appeal, he argues that the court failed to
avoid an unwarranted sentence disparity when it imposed a higher
sentence on him in comparison to the sentences imposed on his co-
defendants. He also argues his sentence should be vacated because
the district court failed to adjust his sentence to reflect the six
months he served for a state drug offense. Because we find that
appellant's sentence was not unjustly disparate, and that the
district court properly calculated appellant's sentence pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, we affirm.
I.
A. Statement of Facts1
Graciani-Febus was a member of a criminal organization in
the metropolitan area of San Juan, Puerto Rico called La
Organizacion de Narcotraficantes Unidos ("Organization of United
Drug Traffickers"), known as "La ONU." La ONU controlled all drug
sales within several public housing projects and regularly engaged
in violent acts to protect and expand its control over drug points.
In his role within La ONU, appellant participated in a conspiracy
1
Because appellant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement,
the relevant facts are taken from the plea agreement, unchallenged
portions of the presentence investigation report, and the change of
plea and sentencing hearings. See United States v. Dávila-González,
595 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2010).
-2-
to possess with intent to distribute large quantities of drugs. In
furtherance of this conspiracy, appellant served as a seller and
enforcer for La ONU, carrying weapons to protect drug points in the
housing projects, and committing several shootings in furtherance
of drug sales.
On July 7, 2010, appellant, along with other members of
La ONU, participated in a shootout with a rival drug-trafficking
organization from Jardines de Paraíso at the Trujillo Alta
Expressway during which two bystanders, Blanca Nanette de los
Santos Barbosa and Manuel Medina Rivera, were killed. Six-hundred
rounds of ammunition were fired. The shots that killed the victims
came from the area where appellant and other members of La ONU were
shooting. Appellant admitted that he participated in the shootout
in an attempt to maintain and expand his position within La ONU.
In June 2011, appellant was arrested by the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico and charged with possession with the intent to
distribute controlled substances, in violation of Article 401 of
the Puerto Rico Controlled Substances Act, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 24,
§ 2401. He was sentenced to four years imprisonment.
B. Procedural History
Six months after his sentencing on the Commonwealth
charge, appellant was charged with thirty-two co-defendants in a
thirty-three count indictment brought by a grand jury in the
-3-
District of Puerto Rico.2 Count One charged appellant with
knowingly and intentionally conspiring to violate the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), by engaging in narcotics distribution and acts
of violence, including murder and attempted murder. Appellant pled
guilty to Count One pursuant to a plea agreement.
At his sentencing hearing, appellant argued that his
prior state conviction for possession with intent to distribute
controlled substances constituted relevant conduct for the charged
conspiracy and that his sentence should be reduced to reflect the
six months he already had served for that conviction. The district
court rejected that argument, noting that the prior state offense
was not the basis for increasing appellant's offense level. The
district court imposed a sentence of 360 months imprisonment,3 to
run concurrently with appellant's state sentence. Judgment was
entered on May 21, 2013. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
II.
A. Sentence Disparity
Appellant argues that in sentencing him to 360 months,
the district court imposed a sentence that was unjustifiably long
in comparison to those imposed on his co-defendants, whom he argues
2
Appellant was charged in seven of the 33 counts.
3
Based on a total offense level of 40, and a Criminal History
Category of II, the Guidelines sentencing range is 324 to 405
months.
-4-
were more culpable generally in the RICO drug enterprise and, in
particular, with respect to the July 7 murders. He asserts that the
district court failed to provide any explanation for the disparate
sentencing.4
Appellate review of a sentence is a two-step process.
United States v. Politano, 522 F.3d 69, 72 (1st Cir. 2008). We
first decide if the district court made any procedural errors "such
as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines
range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider
the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on
clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence - including an explanation for any deviation from
the Guidelines range."
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gall
v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). Where the district
court has committed no such error, we evaluate "the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence actually imposed and review the
sentence for abuse of discretion."
Id.
In determining an appropriate sentence, a district court
is directed by statute to consider various factors, including "the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant," "the kinds of sentences
4
Appellant correctly asserts that the waiver of appeal clause
contained in his plea agreement is inapplicable. Appellant waived
his right to appeal if the court sentenced him within the 240- to
348-month range. Because he was sentenced to 360 months, the waiver
of appeal provision does not apply.
-5-
available," "the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range
established" by the Sentencing Guidelines, and "the need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). While an appraisal of sentencing disparity "primarily
targets disparities among defendants nationally," United States v.
McDonough, 727 F.3d 143, 165 (1st Cir. 2013), district courts "have
discretion, in appropriate cases, to align codefendants' sentences
somewhat in order to reflect comparable degrees of culpability,"
Martin v. United States,
520 F.3d 87, 94 (1st Cir. 2008).
Where a defendant receives a sentence within the
Guidelines range, the district court's explanation of the sentence
need not "be precise to the point of pedantry," United States v.
Turbides–Leonardo, 468 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2006), and "brevity is
not to be confused with inattention,"
id. at 42; see also Rita v.
United States,
551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007) ("[W]hen a judge decides
simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will
not necessarily require lengthy explanation.").
Imposing a sentence within the Guidelines, the district
court considered appellant's role in the murder of two innocent
bystanders:
THE COURT: I have discussed with you the
particulars of the case here. I have discussed
here what really motivates the sentence, the
killing of two innocent victims, a single
mother police officer, young woman with small
kids who is reporting to work in Hato Rey West
-6-
Precinct here in Hato Rey, leaving home early
in the morning to make a miserable check,
miserable salary as a police officer. And she
gets caught in the middle of this firing
between competing gangs in the middle of the
expressway and gets murdered, killed
instantly, along with another person in
another car who happened to be a librarian.
People who had no ax to grind in this thing.
Completely innocent people. Completely
innocent people.
Appellant argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it sentenced two co-defendants to terms of
imprisonment twelve months shorter than he received. Three co-
defendants pled guilty pursuant to an identical plea agreement,
each agreeing to a sentence recommendation between 240 and 348
months. Appellant contends he had a lesser role within La ONU and
less criminal responsibility than two of those co-defendants, Luis
Joel Rosario Santiago and Carlos O'Neill Serrano, because they
participated in the murder of another individual, in addition to
the murders of the two innocent bystanders, and the same level of
culpability as the third co-defendant, Angel Garcia Velasquez, who
received 348 months.5
The record demonstrates that the district court did in
fact consider appellant's specific role in the context of the whole
case and imposed the sentence accordingly:
5
Santiago was sentenced to 348 months and Serrano was
sentenced to 365 months.
-7-
THE COURT: You have to look - you have to look
that this is a huge case. Certain individuals
for this same type of conduct went to trial.
They are going to be sentenced by me or by
Judge Smith, probably me. I have sentenced
others. And I have to look at the whole
picture. And I have a good idea of where
everybody fits in this. And I cannot in good
judgment and conscience follow the
recommendation. I am not going to impose a
life term. I am not going to make a variance
for life. I am not going to impose 404 months
or 405 months, but I cannot do what you're
asking me to do . . . . [Appellant] admits the
participation. And he admits he did it to
maintain and increase his position in the
organization.
The court went on to state that "[a]ny human being, any human
being, whether you have a fifth grade [level of education]6 or
whatever you have, must have some sort of internal light that tells
you that this is totally wrong. . . . Anybody who leaves 600
shells of spent ammunition of various calibers, including AK-47s,
in the place, in the scene of a dual murder like this one, I think
that demonstrates a complete disregard for human life, and a
complete disregard for civility. . . . My assessment is he was one
of those who participated in the brutal murder of two innocent
human beings that had no reason to die . . . ."
Significantly, appellant's co-defendants were not
similarly situated. Although they were also responsible for the
killing of two innocents, his co-defendants all had a CHC of I.
6
Appellant had a fifth-grade level of education.
-8-
Appellant had a CHC of II. The applicable Guidelines range for CHC
II is 324 to 405 months. The applicable Guidelines range for CHC I
is 292 to 365. We have previously held that a difference in
criminal history is a reasonable basis upon which a sentencing
court can impose differing sentences. See United States v. Pierre,
484 F.3d 75, 90 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that appellant was not
similarly situated to his co-defendants because, among other
reasons, his "criminal history included incidents that
distinguished him from his co-conspirators"); see also United
States v. Saez,
444 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that a
sentencing disparity explained by material differences in various
defendants' criminal histories was not "unwarranted" within the
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)). Furthermore, in imposing its
sentence, the court noted that appellant had a CHC of II and
stated, "I make reference to my comments on criminal history and on
brushes with the law, because truly the Criminal History Category
II is not representative of what this man's history has been in the
context of encounters with the law."
That Luis Joel Rosario Santiago and Carlos O'Neill
Serrano participated in the murder of a third individual, a rival
gang member, is certainly reprehensible, but the court seemed more
focused on the fact that the co-defendants shared responsibility
for killing two innocent people. What differentiated appellant from
the co-defendants was his higher CHC. That CHC affects sentencing
-9-
both in the starting point for choosing a reasonable sentence --
the Guidelines -- and in evaluating the § 3553(a) factors. See 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (directing courts to consider the
"circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant").
The sentencing transcript thus reveals that the district
court evaluated appellant's particular role in the conspiracy and
the murders, his prior criminal conduct, arrived at its within-the-
Guidelines sentence in reliance on that evaluation, and provided an
adequate explanation of its sentence. Accordingly, the sentence is
both substantively and procedurally reasonable. See United States
v. Carrasco-de-Jesús, 589 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2009) (stating that
"a sentencing court's ultimate responsibility is to articulate a
plausible rationale and arrive at a sensible result"). There was no
unwarranted disparity in the sentence imposed.
B. Sentence Adjustment to Reflect Time Served for State Conviction
Appellant contends that the district court committed a
procedural error when it refused to apply U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 and
adjust his sentence to credit the six months he had already served
for his state drug charge.
We review de novo appellant's argument that the district
court erred when it declined to reduce his sentence by six months.
See United States v. Serunjogi, 767 F.3d 132, 142 (1st Cir. 2014)
-10-
(stating that we review de novo the sentencing court's
interpretation or application of the Guidelines).
The applicable version of Guidelines § 5G1.3(b) provides
for an adjustment of an appellant's sentence if: "[1] a term of
imprisonment resulted from another offense that is relevant conduct
to the instant offense . . . and [2] that [other offense] was the
basis for an increase in the offense level for the instant
offense."7 The record and the Sentencing Guidelines reveal that
appellant's prior state conviction was not the basis for an
increase in the offense level for the instant offense and, hence,
the district court did not err in failing to credit his time
served.
The guideline for an 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) offense is found
in U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1(a)(2), which states that offenses involving
unlawful conduct relating to RICO have the base offense level
applicable to the underlying racketeering activity. Because the
underlying activity at issue here is possession with intent to
distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), the applicable guideline is U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. The
cross reference for this section provides that if a victim was
killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18
U.S.C. § 1111, U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 (First Degree Murder) is
7
Appellant was sentenced in May 2013. The November 2012
version of the Guidelines therefore applies.
-11-
applicable. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(d)(1). Section 2A1.1 specifies a base
offense level of 43. Appellant accepted responsibility for his
involvement in the criminal activity, and he thus received a three
level adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 3E1.1(a) and (b), giving
him a total offense level of 40.
Appellant's offense level was thus based on his
participation in the murders of Blanca Nanette de los Santos
Barbosa and Manuel Medina Rivera. The district court was correct in
finding U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 inapplicable because appellant's prior
state conviction for drug distribution had no impact on his offense
level.
III.
In arriving at its 360-month sentence, the district court
made an individualized assessment of appellant's role in the
conspiracy and murders, imposed its sentence in reliance on that
assessment, and provided an adequate explanation for its sentence.
Furthermore, the district court did not err when it declined to
adjust appellant's sentence to reflect the six months he had served
for his state drug conviction. Accordingly, we affirm its judgment.
So ordered.
-12-
