Filed: Apr. 24, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: A person is guilty of assault in the third, degree when: (1) With intent to cause physical, injury to another person, he causes such, injury to such person or to a third person;Fish, 758 F.3d at 6.under which prong of the statute Villanueva was convicted.conviction.underlying the plea.
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 14-1217
14-1787
FREDY VILLANUEVA,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
PETITIONS FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Kayatta and Barron, Circuit Judges.
Eduardo Masferrer and Masferrer & Associates, P.C. on
brief for petitioner.
Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Division, Terri J. Scadron, Assistant Director, Office of
Immigration Litigation, and Corey L. Farrell, Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, on brief for respondent.
April 24, 2015
LYNCH, Chief Judge. This is a petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determination that petitioner
Fredy Villanueva is ineligible for consideration for discretionary
relief from removal under a special program. The BIA's result
depends on an analytical error, and petitioner is eligible for
consideration. We remand so that petitioner may be considered for
discretionary relief.
In June 2009, Villanueva, a native of El Salvador living
in the United States, was charged with removability for being a
non-citizen present in the United States without being admitted or
paroled. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Villanueva sought
relief from removal by requesting review of an earlier denial of
his application for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254a. The TPS statute affords undocumented immigrants
protection from removal from the United States upon a determination
by the Attorney General that conditions in the individual's home
country prevent his or her safe return. Shul-Navarro v. Holder,
762 F.3d 146, 147 (1st Cir. 2014). The Attorney General designated
El Salvador for TPS in 2001 because of a disruption of living
conditions in El Salvador resulting from a series of earthquakes
that occurred that year. See Designation of El Salvador Under
Temporary Protected Status Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 14,214 (Mar. 9,
2001); see also
Shul-Navarro, 762 F.3d at 147.
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A non-citizen is ineligible for TPS if he or she has been
convicted of an "aggravated felony." See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i); id. § 1254a(c)(2)(B)(ii). After an
October 2011 hearing, the Immigration Judge (IJ) denied
Villanueva's application for TPS on the ground that he had a 2006
conviction for third-degree assault under Connecticut law, which
the IJ determined was a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16,
and therefore an "aggravated felony." See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F) (defining "aggravated felony" to include "a crime
of violence (as defined in [18 U.S.C. § 16], but not including a
purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment [is]
at least one year"). The BIA affirmed the IJ's ruling and later
denied Villanueva's motion for reconsideration.1
Villanueva now petitions for review of the BIA's
decisions, arguing that the agency erred in its determination that
1
The first BIA decision endorsed the IJ's reasoning on the
"crime of violence" issue in two pages of analysis, but ended its
opinion with the following non-sequitur: "As the respondent has
failed to show that he has not been convicted of a felony or two
misdemeanors committed in the United States, he has not shown
eligibility for TPS." Villanueva argues, and the government does
not dispute, that third-degree assault under Connecticut law is not
a "felony" for purposes of the TPS statute (which is defined
differently from an "aggravated felony" for purposes of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F)) because it does not carry a possible punishment
of more than one year imprisonment. See 8 C.F.R. § 1244.1. The
BIA's order on reconsideration makes clear that the ground for its
denial of Villanueva's TPS application was its holding that
Villanueva had been convicted of an "aggravated felony," as defined
in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), not a holding that Villanueva's prior
conviction was a "felony" under the TPS statute.
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his conviction for third-degree assault under Connecticut law
constituted a "crime of violence." Applying de novo review to the
BIA's analytical method, see United States v. Fish, 758 F.3d 1, 4
(1st Cir. 2014), "including its determination that a non-citizen's
criminal conviction is grounds for removal," Patel v. Holder,
707
F.3d 77, 79 (1st Cir. 2013), we agree with Villanueva.
Accordingly, we vacate the BIA's decision and remand this case to
the agency for further proceedings.
The statute of conviction, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-61,
provides as follows:
A person is guilty of assault in the third
degree when: (1) With intent to cause physical
injury to another person, he causes such
injury to such person or to a third person; or
(2) he recklessly causes serious physical
injury to another person; or (3) with criminal
negligence, he causes physical injury to
another person by means of a deadly weapon, a
dangerous instrument or an electronic defense
weapon.
Id. § 53a-61(a). Third-degree assault is a misdemeanor under
Connecticut law.
Id. § 53a-61(b). However, it carries a maximum
one-year term of imprisonment, see
id., meaning that it would
constitute an "aggravated felony" within the meaning of the TPS if
it qualifies as a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16. See 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).2
2
The conviction is not a "felony" within the meaning of
the TPS statute because that definition requires the crime to be
punishable by a term of imprisonment strictly greater than one
year. See 8 C.F.R. § 1244.1; see also supra note 1.
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Section 16 defines the term "crime of violence" as
follows:
(a) an offense that has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person or property of
another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and
that, by its nature, involves a substantial
risk that physical force against the person or
property of another may be used in the course
of committing the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 16. The parties agree that, because third-degree
assault is a misdemeanor under Connecticut law, only subsection (a)
of § 16 is at issue.
In determining whether a past conviction fits within the
definition of a "crime of violence," we generally apply the
"categorical approach," under which we examine the elements of the
predicate crime and determine whether those elements are
categorically the same as, or narrower than, the "generic offense"
described by the federal statute. See Descamps v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013); see also
Fish, 758 F.3d at 5-6.
However, if a statute is "divisible," -- that is, "if it
sets forth one or more elements of a particular offense in the
alternative" -- we may apply the "modified categorical approach."
Fish, 758 F.3d at 6. Under the modified categorical approach, we
may examine certain documents in the record of conviction, such as
the indictment, plea agreement, and plea colloquy, in order to
determine under which prong of the divisible statute the defendant
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was actually convicted, and then ask whether that particular crime
categorically falls within the generic offense. See United States
v. Carter, 752 F.3d 8, 19 (1st Cir. 2014);
Patel, 707 F.3d at 80-
81; see also
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281; Shepard v. United
States,
544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005).
If those documents are inconclusive, then we must discard
the modified categorical approach and determine whether all of the
alternative means of committing the predicate crime fit within the
federal definition of the generic offense. See Fish, 758 F.3d at
15 (noting that, if there is "no indication" in the record "as to
whether the charge was under a particular subdivision" of a
criminal statute, the court must determine whether the "minimum
criminal conduct" encompassed by the statute qualifies as a crime
of violence (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The BIA and the government agree that the Connecticut
assault statute does not categorically fit within the definition of
a "crime of violence" because it criminalizes reckless conduct in
subsection (2) and negligent conduct in subsection (3). See
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2004) (explaining that "[t]he
key phrase in § 16(a) -- the 'use . . . of physical force against
the person or property of another' -- most naturally suggests a
higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental
conduct" (alteration in original));
Fish, 758 F.3d at 9-10 & n.4
(holding that "section 16(b) does not reach reckless conduct" and
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collecting cases from other circuits holding that reckless conduct
cannot constitute a crime of violence under § 16). The BIA, using
the modified categorical approach, adopted the IJ's finding that
Villanueva was convicted under subsection (1) of the Connecticut
statute, which requires intent to cause physical injury and actual
causation of that injury. The BIA then held that this subsection
constitutes a "crime of violence" under § 16(a). The government's
brief echoes this line of argument.
We disagree with the first proposition and do not reach
the second. The modified categorical approach cannot resolve this
case because it is not established from the record of conviction
under which prong of the statute Villanueva was convicted.
Accordingly, given that the entirety of the Connecticut statute
does not qualify as a "crime of violence," we cannot conclude that
Villanueva was convicted of a crime of violence. We do not reach
the analytically later question of whether a conviction under the
first prong of the Connecticut statute would qualify as a crime of
violence.3
The BIA's conclusion that Villanueva was convicted under
subsection (1) of the statute was based on a statement by what it
3
In Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 2003),
the Second Circuit answered this question in the negative.
Id. at
193-97. The BIA has reached a contrary conclusion. See In re
Martin, 23 I. & N. Dec. 491, 498-99 (B.I.A. 2002). The government
also suggests that there is tension between our decision in United
States v. Nason,
269 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2001), and Chrzanoski.
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says was the "respondent's attorney" at the plea colloquy that
"apparently [the respondent] got into an altercation with [the
victim] and he said the [respondent] kicked him in the head causing
a large bump." But an examination of the plea colloquy in its
entirety reveals that the BIA misread the colloquy. At the
beginning of the plea hearing, the court asked for the "[f]actual
basis for the assault," and the prosecutor (not Villanueva's
attorney) responded:
It was January 11, 2006 in the town of South
Windsor, Your Honor, at Nutmeg Recycling.
Apparently he . . . got into an altercation
with a Samuel [INDECIPHERABLE] and he said
that the defendant kicked him in the head
causing a large bump. It was like an argument
on the loading docks there.
Villanueva's attorney then initially asked if his client could
enter an Alford plea to the assault charge, and asked the court to
explain the consequences of an Alford plea to his client. The
following colloquy ensued:
THE COURT: All right. Fredy, the State just
indicated on the record what are things
happened [sic] that constitute the assault in
the third degree. Under the Alford plea you
disagree with some of those facts, but after
talking to [your attorney] you come to the
conclusion that if you go to trial you could
be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. So
basically you're asking the Court to accept
your plea without admitting all the facts so
you could dispose of this matter by the offer
that's been made on the record. Is that what
you want to do?
MR. VILLANUEVA: Well [SPANISH]
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THE COURT: Sí or no?
MR. VILLANUEVA: Um . . . Um . . . It's not
clear for me now 'cause I don't understand
what she's talking.
THE COURT: Pass it to go out and talk to
[your attorney].
After a break in which the court conducted other
business, Villanueva and his attorney returned to continue the plea
hearing. Villanueva's attorney asked the court "if we could vacate
the prior pleas and elections including the ones that were just
entered under the Alford plea because what I'd like to do is submit
a nolo plea, Your Honor. So I've explained that to him." The
court agreed and then addressed Villanueva: "All right. And you
understand you have a criminal conviction for assault in the third
degree. By submitting a nolo plea the Court will make a finding of
guilty." Villanueva responded affirmatively.
"[T]he facts revealed by the plea colloquy are not
sufficient to identify which crime . . . is the crime of
conviction." Patel, 707 F.3d at 83 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). The record does not establish that
Villanueva agreed to the prosecutor's version of events. He pled
nolo contendere only to an undifferentiated generic reference to
the statute. His attorney was originally going to have Villanueva
enter an Alford plea (under which Villanueva would admit guilt but
not the underlying facts), but then, after a break necessitated by
Villanueva's inability to understand the proceedings and the nature
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of the charges against him, the attorney asked the court to "vacate
the prior pleas and elections" and to allow Villanueva to enter a
plea of nolo contendere to third-degree assault. The court
obliged, and there was no further discussion of the facts
underlying the plea. In short, the plea colloquy does not
establish that Villanueva admitted to an intentional assault under
subsection (1) of the Connecticut statute, and so the BIA erred in
concluding that he was convicted under that subsection. Cf. id. at
82-83.
Because the parties agree that third-degree assault, as
defined by Connecticut law, is not categorically a crime of
violence, see Leocal, 543 U.S. at 9;
Fish, 758 F.3d at 9-10 & n.4,
we hold that Villanueva's conviction does not render him ineligible
for TPS. Accordingly, we vacate the BIA's decision and remand this
case to the agency so it may determine whether Villanueva warrants
TPS relief as a matter of discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1244.2.
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