Filed: Jan. 13, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: and note were assigned to Fannie Mae.an explanation for denying her Rule 60 motion.district court was required to provide reasoning for its decision.3 [T]he effect of the New Hampshire court's final judgment on, [Giroux's] federal action is determined by applying New, Hampshire's res judicata law.
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 15-1270
SHAREL L. GIROUX,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, its Successor & Assigns,
and MERSCORP HOLDINGS INC., its Successor & Assigns,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Thompson, Circuit Judges.
Michael J. DiCola, on brief for appellant.
Phoebe N. Coddington and Winston & Strawn, LLP, on brief for
appellees.
January 13, 2016
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Sharel
Giroux filed suit against Defendants-Appellees Federal National
Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") and MERSCORP Holdings, Inc.,
seeking an order enjoining the foreclosure sale of her home. The
district court dismissed her claim, finding that it was barred on
res judicata grounds in light of a similar case that she had
brought in Belknap Superior Court in New Hampshire and which had
been dismissed. Giroux moved to vacate the district court's
judgment under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
request which the district court summarily denied. Giroux solely
appeals the denial of her Rule 60 motion, contending that the
district court was required to provide reasoning for its order
under Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 599 F.3d 79 (1st Cir.
2010). We affirm.
I.
In January 2007, Giroux executed a promissory note with
American Home Mortgage Corporation ("AHMC"), secured by a mortgage
on her home held by Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems,
Inc. ("MERS") as nominee for AHMC. In November 2008, the mortgage
and note were assigned to Fannie Mae. In August 2011, Giroux
filed suit in Belknap Superior Court, contending that Fannie Mae,
Bank of America Corporation,1 MERS, and BAC Home Loans Servicing,
1 During the superior court proceeding, Bank of America, N.A.
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LP, lacked sufficient rights to enforce, transfer, or assign the
note. Her claim was dismissed for lack of standing. Giroux
subsequently appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, which
affirmed the decision of the superior court.
A foreclosure sale was scheduled for January 7, 2014.
On January 6, Giroux filed a new complaint against Fannie Mae and
MERSCORP Holdings2 in Merrimack Superior Court in New Hampshire
seeking to enjoin the sale. The action was removed to the United
States District Court for the District of New Hampshire on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction. In June 2014, the district court
dismissed Giroux's action, explaining that, because her most
recent claims could have been brought before the Belknap Superior
Court, her action was barred on res judicata grounds. In October,
Giroux filed a motion to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the district court
subsequently denied in a one-word order. She appeals that
decision here.
began acting as successor by merger to Bank of America Corporation.
We refer to both entities as Bank of America.
2 MERSCORP Holdings is the parent company of MERS. MERS,
https://www.mersinc.org/about-us/about-us (last visited Dec. 30,
2015).
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II.
1. Standard of Review
"[R]elief under Rule 60(b) is extraordinary in nature
and . . . motions invoking that rule should be granted sparingly."
Karak v. Bursaw Oil Corp., 288 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2002). A
party seeking redress under Rule 60(b)
must persuade the trial court, at a bare
minimum, that [her] motion is timely; that
exceptional circumstances exist, favoring
extraordinary relief; that if the judgment is
set aside, [s]he had the right stuff to mount
a potentially meritorious claim or defense;
and that no unfair prejudice will accrue to
the opposing parties should the motion be
granted.
Id. "[O]ur review is limited to the denial of the contested motion
itself; we may not consider the merits of the underlying judgment."
Ojeda-Toro v. Rivera-Méndez,
853 F.2d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1988).
Given the district court's familiarity with the record and
proceedings below, we review the district court's decision to grant
or deny relief under Rule 60(b) for an abuse of discretion.
Id.
"Abuse occurs when a material factor deserving significant weight
is ignored, when an improper factor is relied upon, or when all
proper and no improper factors are assessed, but the court makes
a serious mistake in weighing them." Bouret-Echevarría v.
Caribbean Aviation Maint. Corp.,
784 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 2015)
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(quoting Indep. Oil & Chem. Workers of Quincy, Inc. v. Procter &
Gamble Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir. 1988)).
Rule 60 is separated into six subsections, each of which
"describes a particular basis for relief from judgment." Ungar,
599 F.3d at 83. Giroux seeks relief under three of these
subsections, which are described in more detail herein.
2. Analysis
Under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
a "court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Giroux contends that the district court erred in failing to provide
an explanation for denying her Rule 60 motion. She relies on this
Court's decision in Ungar in support of her argument that the
district court was required to provide reasoning for its decision.
But Ungar is inapposite: Ungar concerned "whether there is a
categorical rule that a party whose strategic choices lead to the
entry of a default judgment is precluded as a matter of law from
later obtaining relief" under Rule 60 and had nothing to do with
the absence of a written decision. 599 F.3d at 81. Indeed, the
Ungar court stated that "there is no ironclad rule requiring an
in-depth, multi-factored analysis in every case."
Id. at 86.
Moreover, this Court does not require that a district court provide
an explanation when denying Rule 60 motions and has affirmed
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summary denials of these motions. See, e.g., Ofori v. Ruby
Tuesday, Inc., 205 F. App'x 851, 852 (1st Cir. 2006) (affirming
summary denial of Rule 60(b) motion where "[e]ach of the arguments
presented . . . was previously presented to and fully considered
by the district court"); Stokes v. Merson,
38 F. App'x 622, 622
(1st Cir. 2002) ("The summary denial of relief under Rule 60(b)
was not an abuse of discretion."); Lepore v. Vidockler, 792 F.2d
272, 275 (1st Cir. 1986) (affirming "summary disposition" of Rule
60(b) motion). Further, a review of the record reveals that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
Giroux's claim lacked merit, even if it declined to offer a
rationale. See
Lepore, 792 F.2d at 275 ("There was ample support
for the result reached by the district court, and although an
opinion explaining the court's rationale is always welcome, the
absence of an opinion gives us no pause in this case.").
a. Rule 60(b)(2)
Rule 60(b)(2) provides relief for litigants who present
"newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b)." In her Rule 60 motion, Giroux explains that Paragraph
22 of her mortgage requires that a lender provide notice containing
certain information to the borrower before proceeding with
foreclosure, and that, after the district court issued its order
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dismissing the case, Giroux received a letter from Bank of
America's attorney stating that Bank of America was unable to
locate the Paragraph 22 notice. But Giroux was aware that the
Paragraph 22 notice was missing when this case was pending before
the Merrimack Superior Court. Indeed, in her Rule 60 motion,
Giroux asserted that she had received a letter from Fannie Mae's
foreclosure counsel in December 2013 stating that "[w]e do not
have a copy of the notice at this time" and that she submitted an
affidavit to the Merrimack Superior Court averring that she did
not recall receiving the notice. Further evidence corroborating
these allegations does not warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(2).
See Morón-Barradas v. Dep't of Educ. of the Commonwealth of P.R.,
488 F.3d 472, 482 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding that new evidence "which
at best is merely cumulative" of previously submitted materials
does not satisfy Rule 60(b)(2)); U.S. Steel v. M. DeMatteo Constr.
Co.,
315 F.3d 43, 52 (1st Cir. 2002) ("A party is entitled to
relief, under Rule 60(b)(2), . . . where . . . the evidence is not
merely cumulative or impeaching.").
b. Rule 60(b)(3)
A party may seek relief under Rule 60(b)(3) where a
litigant can demonstrate "fraud (whether previously called
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an
opposing party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). Giroux alleges that
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the mere fact that the defendants intended to proceed with the
foreclosure absent the requisite Paragraph 22 notice evinces that
"the foreclosure is fraudulent and illegal." To satisfy Rule
60(b)(3), Giroux "must demonstrate misconduct -- such as fraud or
misrepresentation -- by clear and convincing evidence" and "'show
that the misconduct foreclosed full and fair preparation or
presentation of [her] case.'" Karak, 288 F.3d at 21 (quoting
Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc.,
862 F.2d 910, 923 (1st Cir. 1988)).
Not only do Giroux's conclusory allegations fall far short of clear
and convincing evidence, she does not assert that this allegedly
fraudulent act affected or was in any way related to litigation of
her action. See Roger Edwards, LLC v. Fiddes & Son Ltd.,
427 F.3d
129, 134 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that Rule 60(b)(3) is concerned
with instances of "litigation-related fraud").
c. Rule 60(b)(6)
Rule 60(b)(6) is a "catch-all provision" that
"authorizes the district court to grant relief from judgment for
'any other reason that justifies relief.'" Ungar, 599 F.3d at 83
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6)). "The high threshold required
by Rule 60(b)(6) reflects the need to balance finality of judgments
with the need to examine possible flaws in the judgments." Bouret-
Echevarría, 784 F.3d at 42. In her Rule 60 motion, Giroux
analogizes to this Court's refusal, in Ungar, to impose a bar to
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Rule 60(b)(6) relief for certain default judgments. She contends
that Ungar required the district court to analyze her action on a
discretionary basis rather than categorically barring it on res
judicata grounds. But, by its terms, the reasoning in Ungar was
limited to instances of "willful defaults" in the context of Rule
60, 599 F.3d at 84, and does not extend to all instances where
litigants' claims are subject to procedural bars. 3 At most,
Giroux's arguments under Rule 60(b)(6) recite issues already
raised in her complaint and opposition to the motion to dismiss.
Such arguments are foreclosed under Rule 60: Giroux "may not use
Rule 60(b) as a substitute for a timely appeal" and therefore "may
not raise the question of whether the dismissal of [the Belknap
action] precluded the relitigation of the same issues in a later
case."
Ojeda-Toro, 853 F.2d at 28-29. Ultimately, Giroux does
not show any "exceptional circumstances justify[ing] extraordinary
relief" under Rule 60(b)(6).
Bouret-Echevarría, 784 F.3d at 43.
3 "[T]he effect of the New Hampshire court's final judgment on
[Giroux's] federal action is determined by applying New
Hampshire's res judicata law." Torromeo v. Town of Fremont, N.H.,
438 F.3d 113, 116 (1st Cir. 2006). Insofar as Giroux's contention
could be interpreted as a suggestion that New Hampshire res
judicata law must be applied on an individualized "case-by-case
basis," Giroux has "failed to explain why [her] case is
exceptional."
Id. at 117 n.4 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
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III.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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