Before TACHA, BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and KANE,** Senior District Judge.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT1

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of these appeals. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Defendant-appellant Wes Winters, Jr., owns and operates a park for manufactured residential homes in Albuquerque, New Mexico. He was sued by the United States on behalf of Clyde and Judy Mercer and Susan Anderson2 for violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601-3631(Act). Specifically, defendant was charged with refusing to rent or negotiate for the rental of, or otherwise making unavailable a dwelling to a person because of familial status, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 3604(a); making statements with respect to the rental of a dwelling indicating preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make such a preference, limitation, or discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 3604(c); and interfering with persons in their attempts to exercise their rights or assist others in exercising their rights granted or protected under 42 U.S.C. 3604, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 3617. After a three-day trial to the court, the court found against the defendant on all particulars and entered a four-part judgment against him. The first part of the judgment ordered defendant to pay compensatory and punitive damages to plaintiffs-intervenors. R. Vol. IV, tab 200 at 1-2. Part II of the judgment permanently enjoined defendant from

(1) [r]efusing to rent or negotiate for the rental of, or otherwise making unavailable a dwelling to a person because of familial status; (2)[m]aking statements with respect to the rental of a dwelling indicating preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make such a preference, limitation, or discrimination; and (3) interfering with persons in their attempts to exercise their rights or assist others in exercising their rights granted or protected under 42 U.S.C. 3604.

Id. at 2-3. Part III of the judgment specified a timetable by which defendant was required to take certain ameliorative actions, id. at 3-4, and part IV required defendant to maintain records by which his compliance with the injunction could be monitored and to submit this information to counsel for the United States biannually for a period of three years from the date of the order. Id. at 4. The court retained jurisdiction of the action "for all purposes," id. at 5, and later amended the order to grant attorneys' fees to plaintiffs-intervenors, id., tab 230.

Defendant challenges the court's legal determinations and appeals the subsequent award of fees. Because we find no error on the part of the district court, we affirm.

We note initially that no final order has been entered in this case. Our first task, therefore, is to inquire into our own jurisdiction. McGeorge v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 871 F.2d 952, 953 (10th Cir.1989)(identifying duty of court to determine its own jurisdiction). Ordinarily, only final orders of the district court are appealable. 28 U.S.C. 1291. However, courts of appeals also have jurisdiction over interlocutory orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions...." 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). While defendant does not explicitly argue that the court erred in imposing the permanent injunction, he does urge that certain evidence was improperly excluded from his trial, that the park, as a "new" development, was statutorily exempt from the provisions of the Act, and that his evidence of nondiscrimination was not properly credited. Because the issues defendant raises on appeal formed the basis for the injunction, they are also within our jurisdiction. See Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 916 F.2d 1486, 1491 (10th Cir.1990)(recognizing jurisdiction over matters closely related to the grant of an injunction), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 960 (1991); cf. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 874 F.2d 1346, 1351 (10th Cir.1989)(finding jurisdiction to review "all reasons underlying the district court's denial of the injunction").

Defendant's first contention is that the district court erred in refusing to allow him to call certain witnesses and to enter certain documentary evidence at trial. "Where a trial judge excludes evidence and the offering party has interposed a proper objection at trial, we will reverse only if the exclusion is an abuse of discretion that results in 'manifest injustice to the parties.' " Thompson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., No. 93-7054, 1994 WL 415153, at * 6 (10th Cir. Aug. 9, 1994)(quoting Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 11 F.3d 957, 960 (10th Cir.1993)). Defendant apparently wished to call "HUD inspectors" and expert witnesses familiar with the Fair Housing Act to testify. See Appellant's Br. at 1. Defendant, however, fails to explain what their testimony would have been and how it would have changed the outcome of his trial. With reference to defendant's wish to introduce certain drafts of HUD documents produced during the investigatory phase of this case, we note that such materials are rarely subject to civil discovery, see FTC v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 27 (1983), and that even if they had been admitted, defendant has not shown that they would have changed the result here by verifying the existence of facilities specifically designed for older people beyond those typical facilities provided in many adult communities. Defendant has therefore failed to demonstrate the manifest injustice required for us to reverse the district court on these evidentiary issues.