Filed: Nov. 10, 1997
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 10 1997 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk ROGER M. THREATT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 97-6039 KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner, (D.C. No. CIV-96-402-C) Social Security Administration, * (W.D. Okla.) Defendant-Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT ** Before KELLY, McKAY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ r
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 10 1997 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk ROGER M. THREATT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 97-6039 KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner, (D.C. No. CIV-96-402-C) Social Security Administration, * (W.D. Okla.) Defendant-Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT ** Before KELLY, McKAY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ re..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 10 1997
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ROGER M. THREATT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 97-6039
KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner, (D.C. No. CIV-96-402-C)
Social Security Administration, * (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
Before KELLY, McKAY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), Kenneth S. Apfel is substituted for
John J. Callahan, former Acting Commissioner of Social Security, as the
defendant in this action.
**
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Claimant Roger Threatt appeals from the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner’s decision denying his claim for disability insurance benefits at
step five of the five-part process for determining disability, see 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520. Through an administrative law judge (ALJ), the Commissioner found
that claimant could perform the full range of light work limited by the need to
avoid repetitive stooping, lifting, or climbing and prolonged sitting or standing.
The only issue properly before us on appeal is whether the Commissioner erred in
concluding that claimant did not have a significant limitation in his ability to
reach and then compounded the error by failing to pose a hypothetical question
containing such a limitation to the vocational expert. 1 We review the
Commissioner’s decision to determine whether factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence and whether correct legal standards were applied. See
Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.,
26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir.
1994).
Claimant contends that two pieces of evidence--a report by Dr. Bradley,
who treated claimant from November 1990 to February 1991, and a functional
capacity assessment by an occupational health evaluator--identified his inability
1
Claimant also contends on appeal that the ALJ failed to recognize his
limitation in twisting and rotating, but he did not raise this issue in his objections
to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. He therefore failed to
preserve this issue for appeal. See Soliz v. Chater,
82 F.3d 373, 375-76 (10th Cir.
1996).
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to reach as a significant limitation. He also contends that the ALJ erred by
relying on the fact that neither Dr. Bradley nor Dr. Rosacker, who had treated
claimant from April 1989 to August 1993, identified any limitation in claimant’s
ability to reach to counter what he contends is contrary evidence.
Dr. Bradley had checked a box on a “physical capacities form” indicating
that claimant could reach only occasionally. However, on the same form, he also
checked boxes indicating that claimant had no restrictions in using his hands for
repetitive movements including grasping, pushing and pulling, and fine
manipulation, and Dr. Bradley released claimant for full-time work without
further limitation or comment regarding claimant’s ability to reach. Moreover, as
the ALJ noted, none of Dr. Bradley’s narrative reports noted any limitation in
claimant’s ability to reach.
Based on tests performed in August 1989 (which the ALJ misidentified as
being done in August 1991), an occupational health evaluator found claimant’s
ability to work limited due to “difficulty with reaching across to left of midline
repetitively or over shoulder height, or below waist.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at
197. However, the evaluator concluded that, despite these and other limitations
not relevant here, claimant “should now be able to secure work as a bench
repairman or assembler with sedentary to light physical demands.”
Id.
Additionally, an assessment by the same occupational health center in November
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1991 did not identify any limitations on claimant’s ability to reach and concluded
that claimant’s “observed performance places him within the light work level
category.”
Id. at 190.
In his decision, the ALJ found that claimant had “no limitations in normal
reaching,” which he indicated was “within arm’s reach.”
Id. at 41. This finding
is supported by substantial evidence. We reject claimant’s contention that the
ALJ improperly used the absence of evidence as evidence when he relied on the
fact that in their narrative reports, neither Dr. Bradley nor Dr. Rosacker identified
any limitation in claimant’s ability to reach. There was minimal evidence that
claimant’s ability to reach was limited, and the fact that claimant’s treating
physicians never identified any such limitation in their extensive narrative reports
covering a four-year period is significant and probative. Moreover, to the extent
the ALJ’s decision can be read as finding claimant was limited by an inability to
do “abnormal” reaching, that limitation was appropriately considered during
questioning of the vocational expert. The vocational expert testified, consistent
with the occupational health evaluator’s assessment, that with an ability to reach
“within the normal arm’s length span as one sits at a work site,” there were a
variety of jobs claimant could perform. See
id. at 41, 78.
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We conclude that the ALJ’s finding regarding claimant’s ability to reach
and its effect on his ability to work is supported by substantial evidence. The
judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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