Filed: Apr. 06, 1999
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 6 1999 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk JIMMY DON RIGGS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. No. 98-2041 (D.C. No. CIV-97-1001-BB/LCS) CHARLES CRANDELL, Warden, (D. N.M.) Central Arizona Detention Center; ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Respondents-Appellees. JERRY LEON ELLIS, JR., Petitioner-Appellant, v. No. 98-6045 (D.C. No. CIV-97-1117-T) RON WARD, (W.D. Okla.) Respondent Appellee. CEDRICK
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 6 1999 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk JIMMY DON RIGGS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. No. 98-2041 (D.C. No. CIV-97-1001-BB/LCS) CHARLES CRANDELL, Warden, (D. N.M.) Central Arizona Detention Center; ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Respondents-Appellees. JERRY LEON ELLIS, JR., Petitioner-Appellant, v. No. 98-6045 (D.C. No. CIV-97-1117-T) RON WARD, (W.D. Okla.) Respondent Appellee. CEDRICK L..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 6 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JIMMY DON RIGGS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 98-2041
(D.C. No. CIV-97-1001-BB/LCS)
CHARLES CRANDELL, Warden, (D. N.M.)
Central Arizona Detention Center;
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Respondents-Appellees.
JERRY LEON ELLIS, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 98-6045
(D.C. No. CIV-97-1117-T)
RON WARD, (W.D. Okla.)
Respondent Appellee.
CEDRICK L. JACOBS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 98-6078
(D.C. No. CIV-97-1327)
TOM C. MARTIN, Warden, (W.D. Okla.)
Respondent-Appellee.
THOMAS HALVERSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
No. 98-6073
v. (D.C. No. 97-CV-1449)
(W.D. Okla.)
OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent-Appellee.
JOHN WARREN MUNN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
No. 98-6057
v. (D.C. No. 97-CV-1312)
(W.D. Okla.)
H.N. SCOTT; ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE
OF OKLAHOMA,
Respondents-Appellees.
KEVIN K. OGDEN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
No. 98-2094
v. (D.C. No. CIV-97-1021-MV)
(D. N.M.)
RON LYTLE, Warden; ATTORNEY
GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF
NEW MEXICO,
Respondents-Appellees.
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ALVIN LYNN ALEXANDER,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 98-6221
(D.C. No. 98-CV-99)
v. (W.D. Okla.)
H.N. SCOTT,
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON , KELLY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate records, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cases are
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
These companioned appeals all share a common issue: whether the
habeas corpus petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 are time-barred
in light of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 101, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2244(d)(1)-(d)(2) (West Supp. 1998)). AEDPA amended § 2254, adding
a one-year statute of limitations for filing habeas corpus petitions. The
limitations period generally begins to run from the date on which a prisoner’s
direct appeal from his conviction became final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
In light of the retroactivity problems that might arise for prisoners whose
convictions became final before the effective date of AEDPA (April 24, 1996),
this court, like the other circuits, created a grace-period. We held that for
petitioners whose convictions became final before the effective date of AEDPA,
the one-year limitations period does not begin to run until April 24, 1996,
see Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 1998), and those petitions
must be filed before April 24, 1997, see United States v. Simmonds ,
111 F.3d 737,
746 (10th Cir. 1997) (§ 2255), to be within the one-year limitations period.
We have also held that the tolling provision set forth in § 2244(d)(2),
which provides that the limitations period is tolled during the time that a
properly filed application for state post-conviction relief is pending, applies to
the judicially-created grace period for prisoners whose convictions became final
before the effective date of AEDPA. Hoggro, 150 F.3d at 1226. In each of these
appeals, the district court entered its order dismissing the petitions as time-barred
before we resolved the issue of the applicability of the tolling provision in the
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grace-period in Hoggro. We will discuss the factual scenario and analyze each
appeal separately in light of our decision in Hoggro.
98-2041
Contrary to the magistrate judge’s finding in this case, petitioner submitted
his § 2254 petition to prison officials for mailing on July 9, 1997, and, therefore,
that is the filing date. 1
See Hoggro , 150 F.3d at 1226 n.3 (applying Houston v.
Lack , 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988), to habeas petition). Appellees concede that
July 9, 1997 is the date on which the § 2254 petition was filed. Appellees’ Supp.
Br. at 1. Contrary to appellees’ representation in their supplemental brief, neither
the district court nor the magistrate judge applied the tolling provision in this
case. Therefore, we must remand this case to the district court in light of Hoggro ,
with specific instructions that it apply the tolling provision in determining
whether the § 2254 petition is time-barred. The district court is instructed to
recognize that the petition was filed on July 9, 1997. Further, the district court
must address petitioner’s argument that the tolling period should begin on
April 14, 1997, the date he delivered his state post-conviction petition for filing,
rather than April 21, 1997, the date the petition was received by the state court.
1
The magistrate judge referred to the § 2254 petition filing date as July 28,
1997, the date the petition was file-stamped by the Clerk of the District Court.
This was error.
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Finally, the district court should consider the effect, if any, of petitioner’s
contention that he did not receive the New Mexico Supreme Court’s denial of his
petition for writ of certiorari, which was entered by the court on July 3, 1997,
until July 7, 1997. All of these matters must be carefully considered because the
timeliness of the petition is within a matter of days, and petitioner’s success on
any one of these arguments could make the difference in his § 2254 petition
being timely or time-barred.
The application of a certificate of appealablity is GRANTED , and the case
is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment.
98-6045
In light of Hoggro , we must reverse the district court’s conclusion that the
tolling provision did not apply to the judicially created grace period. Petitioner’s
state post-conviction proceedings began on March 28, 1997, and the denial of
state post-conviction relief was affirmed on June 17, 1997. Thus, the limitations
period for the filing of the § 2254 petition was tolled for 82 days during the
pendancy of the state post-conviction proceedings. Accordingly, the date by
which the § 2254 petition must have been filed was July 14, 1997. Petitioner
filed his § 2254 petition on July 8, 1997. The petition was timely filed after
application of the tolling provision.
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This court granted a certificate of appealability on April 6, 1998.
We REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of the petition as time-barred,
and we REMAND the case to the district court for further proceedings.
98-6078
In light of our holding in Hoggro , we must reverse the district court’s
conclusion that the tolling provision is not applicable to the judicially created
grace period. Petitioner filed his state post-conviction petition on March 28,
1997, and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of
post-conviction relief on August 6, 1997. Thus, the limitations period was tolled
for the 132 days that the post-conviction proceedings were pending in state court,
resulting in a filing deadline of September 3, 1997. Petitioner filed his § 2254
petition on August 14, 1997, within the limitations period after application of
the tolling provision. Appellee argues, however, that not all the time spent in
state court can be counted toward tolling the limitations period because the
post-conviction application was not “properly filed.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2);
Hoggro , 150 F.3d at 1226 n.4. The district court did not reach this argument
because it held that the tolling provision did not apply.
This court granted a certificate of appealability on April 6, 1998.
We REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of the § 2254 petition as time-barred.
We REMAND this case to the district court in light of Hoggro and for
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consideration of appellee’s argument regarding the amount of time, if any, that
should be tolled. If the district court finds that the state application was properly
filed, the § 2254 petition was timely, and the district court is instructed to proceed
accordingly.
98-6073
In this case the district court concluded that the tolling provision does not
apply to the judicially created grace period. In light of Hoggro , this conclusion
was error. However, even applying the tolling provision in this case does not
save the § 2254 petition from being time-barred. Petitioner filed his state
post-conviction proceeding on March 17, 1997, and the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of relief on July 30, 1997, resulting in
a total of 136 days that the limitations period was tolled. Adding these days to
the April 23, 1997 deadline, petitioner’s § 2254 petition should have been filed
on or before September 7, 1997. Since September 7th fell on a Sunday, petitioner
had until Monday, September 8, 1997. The § 2254 petition was filed on
September 9, 1997, one day after the expiration of the limitations period.
Therefore, the petition was time-barred.
This court granted a certificate of appealability on April 6, 1998. Even
though the district court erred in concluding that the tolling provision did not
apply to the judicially created grace period, we can affirm on any basis supported
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by the record, see United States v. Sandoval , 29 F.3d 537, 542 n.6 (10th Cir.
1994). Because the petition was untimely even after application of the tolling
provision, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the petition as
time-barred.
98-6057
In light of our holding in Hoggro , the district court’s conclusion that the
statutory tolling provision does not apply to the judicially created grace period
was error. We note that the magistrate judge made specific findings regarding
the dates relevant to applying the tolling provision. See Findings and
Recommendation of Magistrate Judge at 4-5. The district court adopted the
magistrate judge’s findings and recommendation in their entirety, see District
Court Order at 2, but it specifically held that the tolling provision did not apply to
the grace period.
We GRANT the application for a certificate of appealability.
We REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of the petition as time-barred, and
we REMAND this case to the district court for application of the tolling
provision. We note that there appears to be some question regarding the amount
of time that petitioner had a “properly filed” post-conviction application pending
in state court, and we are unable to reconcile the magistrate judge’s time
calculations. The district court must make findings on remand regarding the
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amount of time that should be tolled, and it should add that time onto the end of
the judicially created grace period deadline of April 23, 1997.
98-2094
Even though the district court’s order dismissing the § 2254 petition as
time-barred was entered before our decision in Hoggro , the district court adopted
the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the limitations period be tolled while
petitioner’s state court post-conviction application was pending. The state court
post-conviction proceedings in this case were pending for 80 days. Adding the 80
days to the end of the judicially created grace period gave petitioner until July 14,
1997 2 to file his petition. Because the § 2254 petition was filed on August 4,
1997, it was untimely.
We GRANT the application for a certificate of appealability, and we
AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the § 2254 petition as untimely.
98-6221
In light of our holding in Hoggro , the district court’s finding that the
tolling provision did not apply during the judicially created grace period was
error. Even applying the tolling provision, however, petitioner’s § 2254 petition
2
Because the deadline fell on a Saturday (July 12, 1997), petitioner had until
Monday, July 14, 1997, to file the petition.
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was untimely. Petitioner’s state habeas petition was pending in state court from
April 8, 1997, until July 17, 1997, for a total of 101 days. Tolling the limitations
period for 101 days resulted in a filing deadline of August 4, 1997. 3
The § 2254
petition was filed on January 21, 1998, well outside the limitations period.
We GRANT the application for a certificate of appealability, and, because
we can affirm on any basis supported by the record, see Sandoval , 29 F.3d at 542
n.6, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the § 2254 petition as untimely.
Because the fees in this appeal have been paid, we DENY the application to
proceed without prepayment of costs or fees as moot.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
3
Because the deadline fell on a Sunday (August 3, 1997), petitioner had until
Monday, August 4, 1997 to file the petition.
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