Filed: Jun. 16, 1999
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 16 1999 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk GILBERT YBARRA and MICHAEL BOWNDS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, No. 98-2189 v. (D.C. No. CIV-96-838-LH) (D. N.M.) AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before PORFILIO , McKAY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges. Plaintiffs Gilbert Ybarra and Michael Bownds appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Amo
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 16 1999 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk GILBERT YBARRA and MICHAEL BOWNDS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, No. 98-2189 v. (D.C. No. CIV-96-838-LH) (D. N.M.) AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before PORFILIO , McKAY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges. Plaintiffs Gilbert Ybarra and Michael Bownds appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Amoc..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 16 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
GILBERT YBARRA and MICHAEL
BOWNDS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
No. 98-2189
v. (D.C. No. CIV-96-838-LH)
(D. N.M.)
AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PORFILIO , McKAY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs Gilbert Ybarra and Michael Bownds appeal from the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Amoco Production
Company on their claim for negligent failure to warn relating to their exposure to
the chemical Selexol while working at an Amoco facility. 1
Reviewing the district
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
(continued...)
court’s decision de novo under the same standards it applied, see Wolf v.
Prudential Ins. Co. , 50 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir. 1995), we conclude there is a
factual dispute regarding the adequacy of Amoco’s warnings and reverse.
Amoco operates a carbon dioxide recovery plant near Sundown, Texas, and
hired Hydroblast Corporation in June 1994 to pressure test the tubes in its heat
exchanger system to determine the presence of and locate any leaks in the system.
Selexol is a chemical solvent used in the heat exchangers to maximize carbon
dioxide recovery. Plaintiffs, Hydroblast employees, were part of a crew sent to
the plant to do the testing with air pressure. During the testing, Selexol was
blown from the tubes, drenching plaintiffs and allegedly causing their injuries. In
June 1996, plaintiffs brought this diversity action against Amoco and Union
Carbide Corporation, the manufacturer of Selexol, raising strict liability and
negligence claims involving the design, manufacture and sale of the chemical, and
a negligence claim for failure to adequately warn of the danger posed by the
chemical. Subsequently, plaintiffs and Union Carbide settled, and plaintiffs
dropped their claims involving the design, manufacture and sale of Selexol.
Amoco moved for summary judgment on the remaining failure-to-warn
claim, which the district court granted. Applying Texas law, the court concluded
1
(...continued)
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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that the claim was governed by the principles applicable to the respective
responsibilities of an owner or occupier of land and an independent contractor
employed to do work on the premises. Quoting Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Henry ,
416 S.W.2d 390, 394 (Tex. 1967), the court noted the general principle that
[w]hile an owner owes a duty to employees of an independent
contractor to take reasonable precautions to protect them from hidden
dangers on the premises or to warn them thereof, an adequate
warning to or full knowledge by the independent contractor of the
dangers should and will be held to discharge the landowner’s
alternative duty to warn the employees.
Appellant’s App. at 142. The court then held that Amoco had provided adequate
warnings to Tom Miller, the owner and manager of Hydroblast, regarding the
danger posed by Selexol, and thus was relieved from the further burden of
warning plaintiffs directly.
Plaintiffs raise three arguments on appeal. First, they contend that by
preventing Hydroblast from cleaning the tubes before testing them, which they
claim is Hydroblast’s normal procedure, Amoco assumed control of at least part
of the operations and thus altered the duty of care it owed plaintiffs. See, e.g. ,
Redinger v. Living, Inc. , 689 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. 1985). Second, they contend
that because an Amoco employee at the plant assured the Hydroblast crew before
they began the testing that there was nothing in the tubes that could hurt them,
Amoco’s warnings as a whole were inadequate. Third, they contend that certain
regulations promulgated by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration
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(OSHA) should be imposed to expand the duty owed plaintiffs by Amoco. We
address only the second argument on the merits. 2
Plaintiffs do not challenge the district court’s finding that Amoco
adequately warned Hydroblast’s Miller of the dangers associated with the Selexol
system at the Amoco facility. Instead, they contend there is a factual dispute
regarding whether these warnings were invalidated or modified by statements
made by an Amoco employee to Randy Hinds, Hydroblast’s crew foreman, when
the crew arrived at the facility to begin the testing. 3
According to Hinds, when the crew got to the site, he told an unidentified
Amoco employee that ordinarily they “lanced” the tubes before testing them, a
process by which they cleaned out any debris and chemicals that may be in the
tubes. He asked the employee whether Amoco wanted them to lance the tubes,
2
In its response brief, Amoco contended that plaintiffs failed to raise their
first argument in the district court and that we therefore should not consider it on
appeal. In their reply brief, plaintiffs did not respond to this argument, nor have
they ever identified where in the record they raised this argument, as required by
10th Cir. R. 28.2(c)(2) (formerly Rule 28.2(b)), and from our review of the
record, it does not appear that they did raise it below. We leave to the district
court whether plaintiffs may assert this argument on remand, should they wish to.
As to plaintiffs’ third argument, it is so perfunctorily presented that we will
not address it. See Murrell v. Shalala , 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994);
National Commodity & Barter Ass’n, Nat’l Commodity Exch. v. Gibbs ,
886 F.2d
1240, 1244 (10th Cir. 1989).
3
Although at the summary judgment hearing, the district court questioned
the parties concerning the effect of the employee’s statement, it did not address
this issue in ruling in Amoco’s favor.
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which would be an additional cost over the pressure testing, and the employee
told him no. He then asked whether there was anything in the tubes that could
harm them, which he said he would always ask of employees at the various
facilities at which Hydroblast worked, and the employee again replied no. On the
basis of this response, Hinds decided not to require the crew to wear “slicker
suits,” protective coveralls designed to keep any harmful chemicals from coming
in contact with the wearer’s skin. The crew proceeded with the testing wearing
only face or eye protection, and the testing somehow resulted in Selexol being
blown out of the tubes and drenching three of the Hydroblast crew members,
including plaintiffs. Plaintiffs contend that the statement by the facility
employee, that there was nothing in the tubes that could harm the Hydroblast
crew, essentially negated or amended the more formal warnings Amoco had given
to Miller, thus raising a factual dispute regarding the adequacy of the warnings.
See Jordan v. Geigy Pharmaceuticals , 848 S.W.2d 176, 182 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992)
(adequacy of warning is question of fact).
In response, Amoco first contends that because plaintiffs “cite no legal
authority for the proposition that a comment such as the one at issue can
invalidate all previous warnings provided to a contract employer,” we should not
consider this argument on appeal. Appellee’s Br. at 15. We do not agree that
plaintiffs needed to cite legal authority to support the commonsense principle that
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warnings are not inviolable and may be altered or modified by subsequent actions.
There may be questions about the validity or effect of this alleged modification of
Amoco’s earlier warnings, such as whether the facility employee had the authority
to amend the earlier warnings or whether Hinds’ reliance on his statement was
reasonable, but these are questions neither Amoco nor the district court has
addressed.
Amoco primarily argues that the employee’s statement is irrelevant because
it did not proximately cause plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. See, e.g. , Doe v. Boys
Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc. , 907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. 1995) (proof of
proximate causation includes showing that “act or omission was a substantial
factor in bringing about injury, without which the harm would not have
occurred”) (quotation omitted). 4
It frames the dispute at this point as, what
caused Hydroblast’s crew foreman Hinds not to require the crew to wear the
slicker suits. 5
(Plaintiffs do not dispute Amoco’s contention, supported by expert
testimony, that wearing slicker suits or washing the chemical off their bodies soon
after being exposed to it would have prevented their injuries.) Amoco contends
4
Although Amoco raised the issue of proximate causation in the district
court, the court did not specifically address it in its ruling.
5
Plaintiffs also contend that plaintiff Bownds testified that he would have
worn a slicker suit if not for the Amoco employee’s statement, but the record does
not support this contention. The causation inquiry thus focuses solely on what
caused Hinds not to require the crew to wear the protective suit.
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that notwithstanding the statement by the facility employee, Hinds would have
required his crew to wear slicker suits if he had been advised, as he is deemed to
have been advised under Texas law, of the warnings Amoco gave to Miller.
Hinds testified in his deposition that he had neither been warned of the
dangers of Selexol nor even heard of the chemical prior to the accident. He stated
that he knew at the time of the employee’s statement that the best sources of
information regarding the potential dangers of Selexol were Miller and the
applicable material safety data sheet containing warnings regarding Selexol, but
he simply did not think about seeking additional information. He also testified
that had he known of the dangers associated with the use of Selexol, he would
have required the crew to wear the protective slicker suits. See Appellants’ App.
at 70, 104. 6
6
The material safety data sheet for Selexol, which had been provided to
Miller, described precautions to be taken in handling the chemical, stated that it
causes skin irritation, and warned that users should avoid contact with skin and
clothing and wash thoroughly after handling. As to the warnings regarding
Selexol, Hinds testified as follows:
Q. Am I correct that one way by which you can avoid contact with
your skin and clothing is to wear a slicker suit?
A. Right.
Q. And I gather that if you had read or been informed of these
warnings before you worked on the Selexol exchanger that you
would have seen to it that your men would have worn a slicker
(continued...)
-7-
This evidence does not prove, however, that the statement by the facility
employee was immaterial for summary judgment purposes, as Amoco contends.
Its proximate cause argument suffers from the same frailty as its earlier argument-
6
(...continued)
suit?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You, yourself, would have worn a slicker suit as well?
A. Yes, sir.
Id. at 104.
Q. Page 4-13 of Exhibit 4, there is a longer explanation of the
Selexol solvent system?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the next page it tells you what the hazards are and as to
this particular system, the hazards are flammability, pressure,
temperature, toxicity, electrical shock, rotating equipment and
chemical burns. Is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. If you had seen or if Mr. Miller had told you what was in this
Exhibit 4, it [sic] you had been told that the hazards in there
involved toxicity and chemical burns, would you have done
anything differently out at the Amoco plant in June of ‘94?
A. Yes. I would have made them wear their slicker suits.
Id. at 70.
-8-
-the presumption that its formal warnings to Miller and could not be affected by
subsequent actions. Hinds did not say--or more accurately, speculate about--what
he would have done had he been aware of the dangers of Selexol, but then been
told by an Amoco employee at the facility at the time they were to begin testing
that there was nothing in the tubes that could harm them. Amoco thus has not met
its burden of showing that there are no factual disputes regarding what
proximately caused plaintiffs’ injuries.
Viewing the facts in plaintiffs’ favor, the employee’s statement may be
considered to have modified the prior, more formal warnings Amoco gave to
Miller, and thus creates a factual dispute regarding the adequacy of Amoco’s
warnings. Because of the existence of this factual dispute, the district court erred
in granting summary judgment in favor of Amoco. Accordingly, the judgment is
VACATED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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