Filed: Apr. 07, 1999
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 7 1999 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk In re: MICHAEL GEORGE WEBER and EDLYNA FRANCES WEBER, Debtors. MICHAEL GEORGE WEBER, Appellant, No. 98-3009 v. D. Kansas INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE OF (D.C. No. CV-97-4084-DES) THE UNITED STATES, Appellee. WILLIAM H. GRIFFIN, Trustee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * * This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, a
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 7 1999 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk In re: MICHAEL GEORGE WEBER and EDLYNA FRANCES WEBER, Debtors. MICHAEL GEORGE WEBER, Appellant, No. 98-3009 v. D. Kansas INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE OF (D.C. No. CV-97-4084-DES) THE UNITED STATES, Appellee. WILLIAM H. GRIFFIN, Trustee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * * This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, an..
More
F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 7 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
In re: MICHAEL GEORGE WEBER
and EDLYNA FRANCES WEBER,
Debtors.
MICHAEL GEORGE WEBER,
Appellant, No. 98-3009
v. D. Kansas
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE OF (D.C. No. CV-97-4084-DES)
THE UNITED STATES,
Appellee.
WILLIAM H. GRIFFIN,
Trustee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Before ANDERSON and MCWILLIAMS , Circuit Judges, and COOK , ** District
Judge.
Michael George Weber appeals from a district court decision affirming the
bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to
hear Weber’s challenge to a priority claim by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
for certain amounts of child support it seeks to collect under 26 U.S.C. § 6305(a).
We affirm.
Weber’s former wife assigned at least some of her child support rights to
the state of Nebraska in exchange for welfare benefits. Nebraska sought the
assistance of the IRS in collecting the debt from Weber, under the procedures of
26 U.S.C. § 6305(a), which provides in relevant part:
Upon receiving a certification from the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, under section 452(b) of the Social Security Act with
respect to any individual, the Secretary shall assess and collect the
amount certified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in
the same manner, with the same powers, and [with exceptions not
applicable here] subject to the same limitations as if such amount
were a tax imposed by subtitle C the collection of which would be
jeopardized by delay . . . .
After Weber declared bankruptcy, the IRS filed a proof of claim in the amount of
$46,149.45.
The Honorable H. Dale Cook, United States District Judge for the
**
Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation.
-2-
Weber challenged the claim, but the bankruptcy court held that it could not
hear his challenges, citing 26 U.S.C. § 6305(b), which provides as follows:
No court of the United States, whether established under article I or
article III of the Constitution, shall have jurisdiction of any action,
whether legal or equitable, brought to restrain or review the
assessment and collection of amounts by the Secretary under
subsection (a), nor shall any such assessment and collection be
subject to review by the Secretary in any proceeding. This
subsection does not preclude any legal, equitable, or administrative
action against the State by an individual in any State court or before
any State agency to determine his liability for any amount assessed
against him and collected, or to recover any such amount collected
from him, under this section.
The district court agreed and affirmed. Our review on this question of law is de
novo. See Rushton v. State Bank of S. Utah (In re Gledhill) ,
164 F.3d 1338, 1340
(10th Cir. 1999).
Weber at some point convinced Nebraska that the $46,149.45 amount
originally submitted for IRS collection should be reduced to $16,015.73. Since
the filing of briefs in this case, the IRS has amended its proof of claim to match
the $16,015.73 amount. Nevertheless, Weber still argues that he does not owe
even that amount to the state of Nebraska for child support, and claims that the
bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to hear his arguments on this point.
Weber recognizes that the plain language of § 6305(b) prevents all federal
courts, including bankruptcy courts, see Fullmer v. United States (In re Fullmer) ,
962 F.2d 1463, 1468-70 (10th Cir. 1992), from hearing any challenges to “the
-3-
validity [or] amount of a properly certified child support assessment.”
Id. at
1469 n.8. He claims instead that the $16,015.73 amount was not properly
certified, and argues that § 6305(b) does not prevent federal courts from requiring
compliance with certification procedures.
Weber raises numerous arguments in an attempt to support his invalid
certification theory. In his opening brief, he argues that Nebraska has failed to
amend its certification request, that its submissions do not reflect its own
subsequent corrections to the amount Weber owes, and that such inaction violates
45 C.F.R. § 303.71(g)(i). As far as we can discern from the information provided
to us by Weber, this claim has been rendered moot by Nebraska’s recent action to
amend the certification request and by the IRS’ amended proof of claim.
Weber has raised additional invalid certification arguments both in his
reply brief and at oral argument. He argues (1) that the $16,015.73 amount is not
in fact a nondischargeable debt for child support, but is instead a dischargeable
claim for “excess welfare benefits,” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2; (2) that an
agreement with his former spouse settling claims for child support precludes any
such claims by Nebraska ; and (3) that Nebraska’s representations regarding
Weber’s child support obligations are fraudulent, see id at 3. Weber waived these
issues by not raising them in his opening brief. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Mhoon ,
31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994). We nevertheless note that these
-4-
arguments are of no avail. They do not challenge compliance with certification
procedures; rather, these are challenges to the validity of the claim, to which
§ 6305(b) applies. We therefore do not decide whether § 6305(b) bars claims that
certification procedures have not been followed, because Weber’s attempts to
characterize his arguments as such are unconvincing.
Without directly challenging the constitutionality of § 6305(b), see
Appellant’s Br. at 9-10, Weber claims he has been denied due process. We do not
agree, especially given the fact that Weber does not specifically claim to have
pursued all available state remedies and makes no serious legal argument that
state remedies are inadequate. We note in this regard that should Weber avail
himself further of state procedures, the IRS concedes that “[w]hile Weber pursues
his remedies against the State of Nebraska, the United States is precluded from
collecting by operation of the automatic stay in the Chapter 13 case. See 11
U.S.C. § 362.” Appellee’s Br. at 29.
Weber claims that Nebraska has consented to federal court jurisdiction in
this matter. We need not decide if that is so, for Nebraska’s consent could not
confer the jurisdiction that § 6305(b) denies.
-5-
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
-6-