Filed: Apr. 02, 1999
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 2 1999 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk JOHN R. CHERMOK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 98-3075 (D.C. No. 95-CV-2243) WAL-MART STORES, INC., (D. Kan.) Defendant-Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before BRORBY , EBEL , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 2 1999 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk JOHN R. CHERMOK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 98-3075 (D.C. No. 95-CV-2243) WAL-MART STORES, INC., (D. Kan.) Defendant-Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before BRORBY , EBEL , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral a..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 2 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JOHN R. CHERMOK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 98-3075
(D.C. No. 95-CV-2243)
WAL-MART STORES, INC., (D. Kan.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , EBEL , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff, a Kansas resident, filed this diversity action seeking damages for
personal injury caused by allegedly negligent acts of an employee of defendant, a
South Carolina corporation. The district court granted defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, holding that because plaintiff was a statutory employee of
defendant under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-503(a), he was limited to workers
compensation and was precluded as a matter of law from claiming third-party
negligence against defendant. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.
Plaintiff was employed as a truck driver by Gainey Transportation, Inc. In
May 1993, he drove from Gainey’s Kansas City, Kansas, facility to Neosho,
Missouri. Pursuant to a contract between Gainey and defendant, he picked up a
trailer loaded by Sunbeam Outdoor Products with gas grills and then drove to
defendant’s distribution center in Lauren, South Carolina. Upon plaintiff’s
arrival, an employee of defendant began to unload the truck with a slip loader.
Plaintiff assisted him, at the direction of both Gainey and defendant. During the
unloading, plaintiff was struck on the head, neck, and shoulder area by boxes of
the product which fell from the slip loader.
Plaintiff filed for and received workers compensation in the State of Kansas
against Gainey. He also commenced this third-party negligence action, which the
district court decided in favor of defendant on summary judgment.
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We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. See Kaul v. Stephan ,
83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary
judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
. . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Because this is a
diversity case, we review the district court’s determinations of state law de novo.
See Salve Regina College v. Russell ,
499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991).
Plaintiff argues that he was not a statutory employee under § 44-503(a) and
is therefore not precluded from bringing a third-party negligence claim against
defendant. Plaintiff contends that he was not a statutory employee because the
work he was doing at the time of his injury was not “necessarily inherent in and an
integral part of [defendant’s] business as to ordinarily have been done by
employees of [defendant].” Appellant’s Br. at 9.
The Kansas Workers Compensation Act provides an exclusive remedy for an
employee injured while performing work for his employer. See Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 44-501(b). The Act applies to both direct and statutory employees and
employers. Section 44-503(a), which defines statutory employers and employees,
see Aetna Life & Cas. v. Americas Truckway Sys., Inc. , 929 P.2d 807, 811 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1997), provides in part:
Where any person (in this section referred to as principal) undertakes
to execute any work which is a part of the principal’s trade or
business or which the principal has contracted to perform and
contracts with any other person (in this section referred to as
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contractor) for the execution by or under the contractor of the whole
or any part of the work undertaken by the principal, the principal
shall be liable to pay to any worker employed in the execution of the
work any compensation under the workers compensation act which
the principal would have been liable to pay if that worker had been
immediately employed by the principal . . . .
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-503(a). Thus, an injured worker cannot sue his statutory
employer in negligence for damages. See Selle v. Boeing Co. , 840 P.2d 542, 543
(Kan. Ct. App. 1992).
Courts apply the following tests to determine if the work giving rise to the
employee’s injury is a part of the principal’s trade or business under § 44-503(a):
(1) [I]s the work being performed by the independent contractor and
the injured employee necessarily inherent in and an integral part of
the principal’s trade or business? (2) is the work being performed by
the independent contractor and the injured employee such as would
ordinarily have been done by the employees of the principal?
If either of the foregoing questions is answered in the
affirmative the work being done is part of the principal’s trade or
business, and the injured employee’s sole remedy against the
principal is under the [Workers] Compensation Act.
Bright v. Cargill, Inc. , 837 P.2d 348, 356 (Kan. 1992) (quotations omitted). When
applying these tests, no formula or list of factors is deemed controlling. See
Rodriquez v. John Russell Constr. ,
826 P.2d 515, 518 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991).
We agree with the district court that plaintiff was a statutory employee of
defendant under both tests. Unloading trailers is “necessarily inherent in and an
integral part of” defendant’s business of selling merchandise. Also, because
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plaintiff and defendant’s employee both were engaged in the unloading of the
truck, this is a type of work ordinarily performed by defendant’s employees.
Plaintiff maintains that the language “necessarily inherent in and an integral
part of” contemplates that the work be more than incidental or minor. We
disagree. No case law establishes such a requirement. Cf. Rodriquez , 826 P.2d at
518 (no requirement that work undertaken be primary work of principal
contractor; work need only be part of principal contractor’s overall operations).
Also, the Act is to be liberally construed, whether or not it is desirable for the
employee. See id. at 519. 1
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Circuit Judge
1
The district court also determined that regardless of whether Kansas or
South Carolina law applied, plaintiff’s exclusive remedy was workers
compensation. Plaintiff does not make any argument regarding South Carolina
law on appeal. Apparently, he has abandoned any such argument. See Swanson
ex rel. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L , 135 F.3d 694, 702-03 (10th
Cir. 1998). Nonetheless, after reviewing South Carolina law, we agree with the
district court’s determination that workers compensation is also the exclusive
remedy under South Carolina law.
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