Filed: Apr. 22, 1999
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 22 1999 TENTH CIRCUIT _ PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 98-4115 (D. Utah) JOSE LUIS HERNANDEZ- (D.Ct. No. 98-CR-80-S) BUSTAMONTE, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before BRORBY, EBEL, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determina
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 22 1999 TENTH CIRCUIT _ PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 98-4115 (D. Utah) JOSE LUIS HERNANDEZ- (D.Ct. No. 98-CR-80-S) BUSTAMONTE, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before BRORBY, EBEL, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determinat..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 22 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________ PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 98-4115
(D. Utah)
JOSE LUIS HERNANDEZ- (D.Ct. No. 98-CR-80-S)
BUSTAMONTE,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, EBEL, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Appellant Jose Luis Hernandez-Bustamonte appeals his seventy-month
sentence after pleading guilty to re-entry into the United States as an alien
following deportation for a felon conviction, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Mr.
Hernandez-Bustamonte, through his attorney’s Anders’ brief, 1 challenges the
computation of his sentence based on: (1) a 16-level enhancement for his prior
felony conviction for possession of cocaine, which he claims is not an
“aggravated” felony for the purpose of sentencing under United States Sentencing
Guideline § 2L1.2; and (2) a one-point criminal history assessment for a previous
conviction for burglary, which he claims should not be considered since it
involved domestic violence and excessively increased his criminal history. In a
pro se filing, Mr. Hernandez-Bustamonte also claims violation of his
constitutional rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3161 because his indictment occurred
thirty days after his initial arrest for distribution of a controlled substance. We
affirm Mr. Hernandez-Bustamonte’s conviction and sentence.
We review the district court’s legal interpretation of the Sentencing
1
See Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Mr. Hernandez-
Bustamonte’s counsel also filed a motion to withdraw after determining this appeal is
frivolous, thereby compromising his ability to effectively and ethically represent him.
Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel dated 12/7/98. We grant counsel’s motion to
withdraw.
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Guidelines de novo. United States v. Aranda-Hernandez,
95 F.3d 977, 981 (10th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
520 U.S. 1144 (1997). Applying this standard of review,
we note that a conviction for possession of a controlled substance constitutes an
aggravated felony for the purposes of United States Sentencing Guideline
§ 2L1.2.
Aranda-Hernandez, 95 F.3d at 981-82; United States v. Cabrera-Sosa,
81 F.3d 998, 1000 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 218 (1996). Therefore, the
district court properly applied Mr. Hernandez-Bustamonte’s prior felony
conviction for possession of cocaine in enhancing his sentence under § 2L1.2.
Mr. Hernandez-Bustamonte next claims the district court improperly
assessed a criminal history point for his burglary conviction. He argues the
burglary and related assault should not be considered because they are based on a
domestic dispute with his ex-wife. However, the record shows, and his counsel
acknowledges, the Probation Officer demonstrated the assessment’s merit at the
sentencing hearing and Mr. Hernandez-Bustamonte made no further objection and
accepted the one point-assessment. Because he failed to challenge the
presentencing report on this conviction at the sentencing hearing, Mr. Hernandez-
Bustamonte waived his right to challenge the assessment of a criminal history
point, absent a demonstration of plain error. United States v. Saucedo,
950 F.2d
1508, 1518 (10th Cir. 1991). On appeal, Mr. Hernandez-Bustamonte has made no
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such showing of error, and therefore, we conclude the district court properly
applied a criminal point for the burglary conviction.
Finally, Mr. Hernandez-Bustamonte claims violation of his constitutional
rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), because his indictment for re-entry into the
United States as an alien occurred thirty days after his initial arrest for
distribution of a controlled substance. We review de novo compliance with the
requirements of the Speedy Trial Act, including § 3161. United States v. Mora,
135 F.3d 1351, 1354 (10th Cir. 1998). Section 3161(b) of the Act requires an
indictment be filed within thirty days from the date of the individual’s arrest. 18
U.S.C. § 1361(b).
On review of the record, we note that state authorities arrested Mr.
Hernandez-Bustamonte on January 4, 1998 for distribution of a controlled
substance. However, his arrest for this drug matter is unrelated to his illegal re-
entry violation and does not trigger the period during which the indictment for his
illegal re-entry must occur. Rather, authorities did not learn of Mr. Hernandez-
Bustamonte’s illegal re-entry status until he admitted to it on February 6, 1998.
Based on his admission and the results of a preliminary investigation, a grand jury
issued an indictment against Mr. Hernandez-Bustamonte on February 11, 1998,
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for violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The Immigration and Naturalization Service
then filed a detainer against Mr. Hernandez-Bustamonte on February 18, 1998.
Thus, the indictment occurred five days after admission and discovery of his
illegal alien status and six days prior to issuance of the detainer. No violation of
18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) occurred.
For these reasons, Mr. Hernandez-Bustamonte’s conviction and sentence
are AFFIRMED.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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