Filed: Apr. 05, 1999
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 5 1999 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk LARRY D. SCARBROUGH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 98-5099 (D.C. No. 96-CV-440-EA) KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner (N.D. Okla.) of Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before BRORBY , EBEL , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 5 1999 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk LARRY D. SCARBROUGH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 98-5099 (D.C. No. 96-CV-440-EA) KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner (N.D. Okla.) of Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before BRORBY , EBEL , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 5 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
LARRY D. SCARBROUGH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 98-5099
(D.C. No. 96-CV-440-EA)
KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner (N.D. Okla.)
of Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , EBEL , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Larry D. Scarbrough appeals from an order of the district court
affirming the Commissioner’s determination that he is not entitled to benefits.
We affirm.
We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether his factual
findings were supported by substantial evidence in light of the entire record and
to determine whether he applied the correct legal standards. See Castellano v.
Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994).
Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Id. (quotations omitted). In the course of
our review, we may “neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for
that of the agency.” Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.,
933 F.2d 799,
800 (10th Cir. 1991).
Mr. Scarbrough alleged disability due to back problems arising from
an on-the-job accident. The administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that
Mr. Scarbrough was not disabled at step five of the five-step sequential process,
see Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988), as he retained the
residual functional capacity to perform light work.
On appeal, Mr. Scarbrough argues that t he ALJ failed to shift the burden
to the Commissioner at step five and thus failed to require the Commissioner to
prove that Mr. Scarbrough could perform light work. He also contends that the
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ALJ relied on an incorrect onset date, failed to consider his preexisting neck
impairment, ignored the treating physician’s opinion, and “lumped” all the
evidence together rather than considering Mr. Scarbrough’s impairments in
distinct periods of time. Finally, he asserts that the ALJ’s pain and credibility
determinations were not based on substantial evidence.
We decline to address Mr. Scarbrough’s contention that t he ALJ failed
to shift the burden to the Commissioner at step five as he did not raise that
argument to the district court. See Crow v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 323, 324 (10th Cir.
1994) . We also decline to address Mr. Scarbrough’s contentions that the ALJ
applied the wrong onset date and “lumped” all the evidence together. Those
arguments also were not raised below.
Mr. Scarbrough argues the ALJ ignored his treating physician’s opinion
regarding his disability status. The record shows that Mr. Scarbrough’s treating
physician, Dr. Vosburg, did not see Mr. Scarbrough after his laminectomy nor did
he opine that Mr. Scarbrough was disabled from all work. We issued a show
cause order to counsel regarding whether sanctions should be imposed due to
counsels’ misstatements of the facts. Upon consideration of counsels’ response,
the order is discharged. However, counsel are cautioned about misstating the
facts in briefs to this court and drawing unwarranted conclusions from the facts
in an effort to benefit their client. Advocacy for their client must be tempered by
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counsels’ responsibilities as officers of this court. Sanctions may be imposed for
future violations.
Mr. Scarbrough contends the ALJ failed to consider the impact of his neck
impairment. Mr. Scarbrough broke his neck in 1983. He later returned to heavy
labor and performed that work until 1990 when he first injured his back. In
1991, a physician noted that Mr. Scarbrough had no evidence of degenerative
disc disease or arthritis of the neck. As he presented no evidence that his neck
injuries had worsened since he last performed heavy labor, the ALJ had no need
to consider whether Mr. Scarbrough’s neck injury was disabling.
Mr. Scarbrough asserts the ALJ erred in his credibility assessment and
thereby erred in his pain determination and in the hypothetical he presented to the
vocational expert . “Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the
finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by
substantial evidence.” Diaz v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 898 F.2d
774, 777 (10th Cir. 1990).
The record shows that Mr. Scarbrough made excellent progress after his
laminectomy in 1993. The record supports the ALJ’s determination that
Mr. Scarbrough’s complaints of pain were not fully credible. See Kepler v.
Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995) (ALJ should consider extensiveness of
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medical and nonmedical attempts to obtain relief and frequency of medical
contacts in assessing credibility).
As the ALJ found Mr. Scarbrough’s testimony on the extent of his
limitations was neither completely credible nor supported by substantial evidence,
he was not required to accept all his testimony as to his physical limitations in his
hypothetical. See Evans v. Chater , 55 F.3d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1995) (ALJ’s
hypothetical questions to vocational expert “must include all (and only) those
impairments borne out by the evidentiary record”).
Upon review of the record, we determine that the ALJ’s decision was
supported by substantial evidence and no error occurred. The judgment of
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma is
AFFIRMED. The show cause order of March 18, 1999 is DISCHARGED.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Circuit Judge
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