Filed: Dec. 20, 1999
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT _ MARK FRANCIS CARRIER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. No. 99-1137 (D. Colo.) RICHARD MARR; KEN SALAZAR, (D.Ct. No. 96-D-1419) Attorney General of Colorado, Respondents-Appellees. _ ORDER Filed December 27, 1999 Before BRORBY, EBEL, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. This matter is before the court on appellant’s motion to delete footnote number three from the order and judgment filed on December 20, 1999. The motion is granted. A copy of the revised order and jud
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT _ MARK FRANCIS CARRIER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. No. 99-1137 (D. Colo.) RICHARD MARR; KEN SALAZAR, (D.Ct. No. 96-D-1419) Attorney General of Colorado, Respondents-Appellees. _ ORDER Filed December 27, 1999 Before BRORBY, EBEL, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. This matter is before the court on appellant’s motion to delete footnote number three from the order and judgment filed on December 20, 1999. The motion is granted. A copy of the revised order and judg..
More
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________
MARK FRANCIS CARRIER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 99-1137
(D. Colo.)
RICHARD MARR; KEN SALAZAR, (D.Ct. No. 96-D-1419)
Attorney General of Colorado,
Respondents-Appellees.
____________________________
ORDER
Filed December 27, 1999
Before BRORBY, EBEL, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
This matter is before the court on appellant’s motion to delete footnote
number three from the order and judgment filed on December 20, 1999. The
motion is granted. A copy of the revised order and judgment is attached.
Entered for the Court
Patrick Fisher, Clerk of Court
By:
Keith Nelson
Deputy Clerk
F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 20 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
__________________________ Clerk
MARK FRANCIS CARRIER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 99-1137
(D. Colo.)
RICHARD MARR; KEN SALAZAR, (D.Ct. No. 96-D-1419)
Attorney General of Colorado,
Respondents-Appellees.
____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, EBEL, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Appellant Mark Francis Carrier appeals the district court’s decision
dismissing his petition, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as a “mixed petition.”
We grant Mr. Carrier a certificate of appealability 1 and remand his petition to the
district court for further determination.
Mr. Carrier is serving sentences for two counts of attempted second degree
murder and crime of violence following the stabbing of his wife and her father.
People v. Carrier, 791 P.2d at 1204, 1205 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990). Mr. Carrier
unsuccessfully challenged his state convictions in a state direct appeal and state
post-conviction proceeding. In both proceedings, the Colorado Court of Appeals
affirmed his convictions and the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari
review.
Mr. Carrier then filed his federal habeas corpus petition raising four issues,
including claims of: (1) prosecutorial misconduct and (2) denial of due process
through admission of testimony concerning his alleged prior threats and assaults
on his wife. The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of all of his claims as
1
We construe the appeal as Mr. Carrier’s request to this court for a certificate of
appealability. See United States v. Riddick, 104 F.3d 1239, 1241 n.2 (10th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds, United States v. Kunzman,
125 F.3d 1363 (10th Cir. 1997).
-2-
unexhausted, finding Mr. Carrier did not raise his federal constitutional claims in
the state courts. Prior to the district court’s disposition, Mr. Carrier moved for
voluntary dismissal of two of his claims, leaving for the district court’s
disposition only his claims of prosecutorial misconduct and denial of due process
in admission of testimony on his prior abuse and assault. The district court
granted his motion and issued a decision dismissing his petition without
prejudice, finding it a “mixed petition, [which] contains both an exhausted and an
unexhausted claim.
Specifically, the district court determined the magistrate judge erred in
finding Mr. Carrier failed to exhaust his state remedies on his claim the court
denied him due process by admitting testimony on his prior abuse and assault of
his wife. Having found Mr. Carrier exhausted this claim, the district court
nevertheless agreed with the magistrate judge that he failed to exhaust his state
remedies with respect to his prosecutorial misconduct claim. Using similar
reasoning as the magistrate judge, the district court determined that while Mr.
Carrier raised his prosecutorial misconduct claim before the state court, he failed
to allege violation of his federal constitutional due process rights with respect to
this claim. While Mr. Carrier quoted the general standards for prosecutorial
misconduct, contained in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), the
-3-
district court determined the Berger language did not set forth any principles of
federal constitutional law, but merely articulated the principle that prosecutors are
obliged to seek justice and not use improper means to obtain convictions.
Accordingly, the district court held Mr. Carrier failed to explicitly mention any
violation of his due process rights as to this issue, or otherwise alert the state
court of his federal constitutional claim. In so holding, the district court reasoned
that Mr. Carrier’s reposturing of his prosecutorial misconduct claim in federal
court as a federal constitutional claim did not cure the error of failing to present
that claim to the state court.
On appeal, Mr. Carrier sets forth an exhaustive discussion renewing his
argument his quotation from the Berger case on prosecutorial misconduct
sufficiently alerted the state court of his federal constitutional claim.
Specifically, he argues his reference to Berger should have fully informed the
state court of his federal due process claim because: (1) other courts have used
Berger in the context of federal constitutional prosecutorial misconduct cases; 2
and (2) he advised the state court the prosecutor’s misconduct denied him a fair
trial. Alternatively, for the first time on appeal, he contends he exhausted his
2
We note the cases on which Mr. Carrier rely are inapposite or constitute
nonbinding, nonprecedential authority.
-4-
prosecutorial misconduct claim because Colorado’s standard of review on direct
appeal is nearly the same as federal constitutional standard of review for such
claims. Mr. Carrier also argues the merits of his prosecutorial misconduct claim
on appeal.
We review the legal basis for the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Carrier’s
§ 2254 petition de novo. See Rogers v. Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir.
1999), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 5, 1999) (No. 99-6954). A district court
must dismiss “mixed petitions” containing both exhausted and unexhausted
claims. Rose v. Lundy,
455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982). To exhaust his state remedies,
Mr. Carrier must have fairly presented his federal claim to the state courts. See
Picard v. Connor,
404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). Exhaustion is not satisfied by
“raising one claim in the state courts and another in the federal courts.”
Id. at
276. If Mr. Carrier wishes to claim a state’s ruling denied him of due process of
law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must state so “not only in
federal court, but in state court.” See Duncan v. Henry,
513 U.S. 364, 366
(1995).
-5-
In this case, after the jury adjourned, Mr. Carrier’s attorney asked for a
curative jury instruction and “mistrial” based on the prosecutor’s closing remarks
during the trial. The trial court denied his request. Mr. Carrier next raised the
issue of “prosecutor misconduct” in his petition for writ of certiorari to the
Colorado Supreme Court in his post-conviction appeal. In his discussion on
prosecutorial misconduct, he not only referred to the elements of prosecutorial
misconduct contained in the Berger case, 3 but more importantly ended by stating
the prosecutor’s improper comments “affected the fairness of the trial.” No
3
Specifically, Mr. Carrier recited the following language from Berger:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor –
indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one.
....
[I]mproper suggestions, insinuations, and, especially, assertions of personal
knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused when they should
properly carry none.
Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
-6-
matter how inartfully pleaded, we believe, under these particular facts, Mr.
Carrier sufficiently alerted the state court of his federal constitutional due process
claim. Thus, we must disagree with the district court’s conclusion Mr. Carrier did
not present his federal claim to the state court for the purposes of exhaustion.
Having found Mr. Carrier exhausted his prosecutorial misconduct claim, we
decline to address his argument concerning the similarity of Colorado’s standard
of review on direct appeal to the federal constitutional standard of review for
such claims, or consider the merits of his claims prior to a determination by the
district court.
Because Mr. Carrier exhausted his two claims before the state court and
therefore, his petition is not a “mixed” petition, we grant Mr. Carrier a certificate
of appealability and REMAND his petition to the district court for further
determination.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
-7-
