Filed: Jun. 16, 1999
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 16 1999 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk CHARLES MELVIN TORRENCE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. No. 99-3087 (D.C. No. 96-3249-DES) ROBERT D. HANNIGAN; CARLA J. (D. Kan.) STOVALL, Respondents-Appellees. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before ANDERSON, KELLY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, the panel has determined oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 16 1999 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk CHARLES MELVIN TORRENCE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. No. 99-3087 (D.C. No. 96-3249-DES) ROBERT D. HANNIGAN; CARLA J. (D. Kan.) STOVALL, Respondents-Appellees. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before ANDERSON, KELLY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, the panel has determined oral argument would not materially assist the determination of t..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 16 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
CHARLES MELVIN TORRENCE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 99-3087
(D.C. No. 96-3249-DES)
ROBERT D. HANNIGAN; CARLA J. (D. Kan.)
STOVALL,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, KELLY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, the panel has determined
oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See
Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). Therefore, the case is ordered
submitted without oral argument.
Charles M. Torrence, a state prisoner appearing pro se, seeks a certificate
of appealability to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
habeas petition. As Torrence has failed to make a “substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), we deny a certificate of
appealability and dismiss the appeal.
I.
Torrence pleaded guilty in state court to one count of aggravated robbery,
in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3427, and he was sentenced to a term of five
to twenty years’ imprisonment. His “motion to amend, or alter or modify
judgment of conviction and sentence” pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-259(f) was
denied, and his subsequent appeal to the Kansas Court of Appeals was dismissed
because it was untimely filed. He did not seek review with the Kansas Supreme
Court.
Torrence filed a habeas petition in state court pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 60-1507, asserting both facial and “as applied” challenges to the
constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted. The issues were
identical to the claims he attempted to raise on direct appeal. The court denied
relief and the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, holding Torrence’s
failure to raise the issues in a timely direct appeal precluded him from obtaining
relief in a habeas petition. He sought review with the Kansas Supreme Court,
which was denied.
Torrence filed the instant federal habeas petition asserting the same
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grounds as in his state habeas petition. The federal district court denied the
petition on the merits
II.
We need not reach the merits of Torrence’s petition to uphold the district
court’s ruling. See United States v. Sandoval ,
29 F.3d 537, 542 n.6 (10th Cir.
1994) (“We are free to affirm a district court decision on any grounds for which
there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied
upon by the district court.”). A state prisoner has no right to federal habeas relief
unless he “has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Torrence did not exhaust his available remedies. 1
“The
exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the federal issue has been properly
presented to the highest state court, either by direct review of the conviction or in
a postconviction attack.” Dever v. Kansas State Penitentiary ,
36 F.3d 1531, 1534
(10th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). Although Torrence appealed his conviction
and sentence to the Kansas Court of Appeals, he filed his notice of appeal beyond
the jurisdictional time limit set forth in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3608. An untimely
1
Although the state did not explicitly raise this point before the district
court, the issue was not waived. Indeed, following enactment of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, “[a] State shall not be
deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance
upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the
requirement.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) (emphasis added).
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appeal that is rejected by the state appellate court on that basis is not considered
to have been “properly presented.” See Hoggro v. Boone ,
150 F.3d 1223, 1227
n.4 (10th Cir. 1998).
In his state habeas petition, Torrence reiterated the arguments he had raised
in his untimely direct appeal. Both the Kansas Court of Appeals and the Kansas
Supreme Court refused to consider his claims on the merits based on his failure to
assert the arguments in a timely direct appeal. The Kansas Court of Appeals
noted a prisoner cannot use § 60-1507 as a substitute for direct appeal of
constitutional errors unless exceptional circumstances justify the failure to raise
such matters on direct appeal, citing Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 183(c)(3). Torrence did not
demonstrate or claim any such exceptional circumstances in state court.
Generally, when a petitioner fails to exhaust his state court remedies, his
federal habeas petition will be dismissed without prejudice to provide an
opportunity to return to state court to pursue those remedies. Demarest v. Price ,
130 F.3d 922, 939 (10th Cir. 1997). This rule does not apply, however, if the
state court would now find the claims procedurally barred on independent and
adequate state procedural grounds. Coleman v. Thompson ,
501 U.S. 722, 735 &
n.1 (1991). Torrence’s failure to seek timely review of his federal claims in state
court constitutes a failure to exhaust available state court remedies. His claims
are thus procedurally defaulted for purposes of federal habeas review.
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The Supreme Court has recognized one narrow exception to the procedural
default rule for petitioners who can establish “cause for the default and actual
prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that
failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”
Id. at 750. The miscarriage of justice prong is explicitly tied to the petitioner’s
actual innocence. Schlup v. Delo ,
513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995). Torrence has not
alleged or demonstrated cause and prejudice for his default. Nor has he
articulated any facts suggesting he actually may be innocent.
Torrence’s application for a certificate of appealability is DENIED and his
appeal is DISMISSED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Submitted for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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