Filed: May 18, 2000
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 18 2000 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 99-3312 v. (D.C. No. 99-CR-10036-02-WEB) (Kansas) TREVOR A. WELLS, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, EBEL, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determ
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 18 2000 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 99-3312 v. (D.C. No. 99-CR-10036-02-WEB) (Kansas) TREVOR A. WELLS, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, EBEL, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determi..
More
F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 18 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 99-3312
v. (D.C. No. 99-CR-10036-02-WEB)
(Kansas)
TREVOR A. WELLS,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, EBEL, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Trevor A. Wells was indicted for his participation in a scheme to defraud a
bank in Witchita, Kansas, with his girlfriend and co-defendant, Shauntell Polite.
Ms. Polite, an employee of NationsBank, used her position to transfer money out
of customer accounts and into accounts set up by Mr. Wells, Ms. Polite, and her
father, Clifton Polite. Mr. Wells pled guilty to one count of bank fraud. At his
sentencing hearing, the district court denied Mr. Wells’ request for a reduction
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) based on his role in the offense as a minor
participant. He appeals and we affirm.
The Sentencing Guidelines allow the district court to grant a two-level
reduction if it finds that the defendant’s role in the offense, while not minimal,
makes him substantially less culpable than most other participants. See. U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.2(b) comment. (n.3 & backg’d). The burden of proof is on the defendant to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to a reduction of
his offense level. See United States v. Santisteven,
39 F.3d 250, 253-54 (10th Cir.
1994). The Sentencing Commission recognized that “[t]he determination whether
to apply . . . subsection (b) . . . involves a determination that is heavily dependant
upon the facts of the particular case.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (backg’d).
We review the district court’s decision for clear error because the court’s
determination that Mr. Wells was more than a minor participant is a finding of
fact. See United States v. Onheiber,
173 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 1999).
-2-
Mr. Wells argued at his sentencing hearing and in his objections to the
Presentence Report that his only role in the offense consisted of spending the
money put into his account by Ms. Polite. He claims that because he had no part
in accessing the customer accounts or transferring the funds, he should have been
considered a minor participant. The district court disagreed, finding that Mr.
Wells’ offense involved discussing the fraud scheme with Ms. Polite, opening an
account, obtaining an ATM card, and repeatedly checking on and withdrawing
illegally transferred money out of the account. The court placed particular
emphasis on the fact that Mr. Wells alone spent the $17,000 he withdrew from the
account.
“The commentary to section 3B1.2 makes it clear that we look to
culpability, not status or position . . . .” United States v. Donaldson,
915 F.2d
612, 615 (10th Cir., 1990); cf.
Onheiber, 173 F.3d at 1258 (“[A] defendant is not
necessarily entitled to a sentence reduction under 3B1.2 solely because he can
show that he was a middleman.”). In this case, the offense was a two-stage
transaction: Ms. Polite transferred the funds into Mr. Wells’ account, and Mr.
Wells withdrew the funds. Ms. Polite may have had more knowledge of and
access to the bank’s customer account computer files, but the district court found
that Mr. Wells actively participated in the scheme and exclusively benefitted from
the proceeds. Mr. Wells has shown us nothing to persuade us the district court’s
-3-
factual findings related to his culpability are clearly erroneous.
AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Chief Judge
-4-