Filed: Jul. 11, 2001
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 11 2001 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 00-1514 v. (D.C. No. 00-CR-307-1) (D. Colo.) RUBEN CORRAL-CARAVEO, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before EBEL, KELLY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. In order to preserve the issue for Supreme Court review, Ruben Corral- Caraveo (“Corral-Caraveo”) appeals his sentence for illegal re-entry on the ground that it
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 11 2001 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 00-1514 v. (D.C. No. 00-CR-307-1) (D. Colo.) RUBEN CORRAL-CARAVEO, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before EBEL, KELLY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. In order to preserve the issue for Supreme Court review, Ruben Corral- Caraveo (“Corral-Caraveo”) appeals his sentence for illegal re-entry on the ground that it ..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 11 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 00-1514
v.
(D.C. No. 00-CR-307-1)
(D. Colo.)
RUBEN CORRAL-CARAVEO,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL, KELLY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
In order to preserve the issue for Supreme Court review, Ruben Corral-
Caraveo (“Corral-Caraveo”) appeals his sentence for illegal re-entry on the
ground that it violates Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2000), even though
he concedes that his appeal is foreclosed by binding Supreme Court and Tenth
Circuit precedent. See Opening Brief at 4, 7, 9-10. We AFFIRM.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore submitted without oral argument. This Order and Judgment is not
binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
On July 25, 2000, the Government indicted Corral-Caraveo for illegal re-
entry in violation of 8 U.S.C. §1326(a). (Doc. 10.) The indictment did not allege
a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (increasing maximum sentence to 20 years in
prison if deportation was subsequent to a conviction of an aggravated felony) ,
nor did it mention that sub-section. On August 18, 2000, Corral-Caraveo and his
lawyer signed a plea agreement in which Corral-Caraveo agreed to plead guilty to
one count of illegal re-entry in return for the Government recommending that
Corral-Caraveo be sentenced at the bottom of the applicable guideline range.
(Doc. 16 at 1.) The plea agreement listed, as “elements of the offense of
conviction,” only the elements of illegal re-entry; it did not list Corral-Caraveo’s
prior conviction of an aggravated felony. (Doc. 16 at 2.) The plea agreement did,
however, state that “the maximum statutory penalty for the offense is: not more
than 20 years in prison” (Doc. 16 at 2) and “[Sentencing Guideline]
§2L1.2(b)(1)(B) applies because the defendant was previously deported after
conviction for an aggravated felony.” (Doc. 16 at 5.)
Corral-Caraveo pled guilty under the terms of the plea agreement on
September 7, 2000. (Supp. Vol. 1 at 17.) Before accepting his guilty plea, the
court explained to Corral-Caraveo that “the maximum term is twenty years”
(Supp. Vol. 1 at 9) and under the Guidelines he was “subject to a sentence from
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77 to 96 months.” (Supp. Vol. 1 at 10.) Corral-Caraveo affirmed that he
understood the terms of the proposed sentence. (Supp. Vol. 1 at 10.)
On October 30, 2000, Corral-Caraveo filed an objection to the imposition
of a sentence greater than two years. (Doc. 23.) He argued that “[w]hile the
Supreme Court has previously held that the prior aggravated felony is a
sentencing factor under § 1326, see Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
523 U.S.
224 (1998), that decision has been limited, or alternatively abrogated, by the more
recent decision of Apprendi v. New Jersey, [
530 U.S. 466 (2000)].” (Doc. 23 at
1.) At sentencing, on December 4, 2000, Corral-Caraveo conceded that United
States v. Martinez-Villalva,
232 F.3d 1329, 1332 (10th Cir. 2000), was directly on
point and disposed of his argument. (Vol. 2 at 5.) Accordingly, the court
overruled his objection and sentenced him to 96 months imprisonment, followed
by three years supervised release. (Vol. 2 at 12-13.)
“We are bound by [Almendarez-Torres] to hold that the fact of defendant’s
prior felony conviction is not an element of the offense with which he was
charged by indictment, but is, instead, a sentencing factor.” United States v.
Martinez Villalva,
232 F.3d 1329, 1332 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 235); see also United States v. Dorris,
236 F.3d
582, 587 (10th Cir. 2000) (rejecting defendant’s efforts to challenge the
continuing validity of Almendarez-Torres), cert. denied,
121 S. Ct. 1635 (2001).
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“Consequently, the indictment in this case, which did not separately charge
defendant with a prior aggravated felony conviction, did not violate defendant’s
constitutional rights.”
Martinez-Villalva, 232 F.3d at 1332.
Corral-Caraveo has preserved this issue for appeal to the United States
Supreme Court. We AFFIRM his sentence.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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