Filed: Feb. 21, 2001
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 21 2001 TENTH CIRCUIT _ PATRICK FISHER Clerk ADRIAN DARRYLE GIPSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. No. 00-6305 (W.D. Okla.) JAMES L. SAFFLE, Director, Department of (D.Ct. No. 99-CV-1870-M) Corrections of Oklahoma, Respondent-Appellee. _ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before BRORBY, KELLY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument w
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 21 2001 TENTH CIRCUIT _ PATRICK FISHER Clerk ADRIAN DARRYLE GIPSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. No. 00-6305 (W.D. Okla.) JAMES L. SAFFLE, Director, Department of (D.Ct. No. 99-CV-1870-M) Corrections of Oklahoma, Respondent-Appellee. _ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before BRORBY, KELLY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument wo..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 21 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________ PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ADRIAN DARRYLE GIPSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 00-6305
(W.D. Okla.)
JAMES L. SAFFLE, Director, Department of (D.Ct. No. 99-CV-1870-M)
Corrections of Oklahoma,
Respondent-Appellee.
____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, KELLY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Appellant Adrian Darryle Gipson, a state inmate appearing pro se, appeals
the district court’s decision dismissing as untimely his federal habeas petition
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We deny Mr. Gipson’s request for a
certificate of appealability 1 and dismiss his appeal.
Mr. Gipson received an eighty-year sentence following his state conviction
for first degree burglary after former conviction of two or more felonies. After
filing an unsuccessful direct state appeal and failing to file any action for state
post-conviction relief, Mr. Gipson filed his federal habeas petition pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254. In his § 2254 petition, Mr. Gipson acknowledged his petition was
untimely filed, but asserted extraordinary circumstances beyond his control
existed which warranted the equitable tolling of the limitation period.
Specifically, Mr. Gipson claimed his appellate counsel failed to timely inform him
of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals decision issued October 10, 1997,
which affirmed his conviction and sentence. According to Mr. Gipson, his
attorney did not inform him of the decision until August 28, 1999.
1
Mr. Gipson filed a notice of appeal, in which he requested a certificate of
appealability. The district court did not issue a ruling on Mr. Gipson’s request. Under
our Emergency General Order of October 1, 1996, we deem the district court’s failure to
issue a certificate of appealability within thirty days after filing of the notice of appeal as
a denial of a certificate.
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The district court referred the matter to a magistrate judge, who issued a
thorough and well-reasoned Report and Recommendation, which recommended
denying Mr. Gipson’s petition as untimely. The magistrate judge determined Mr.
Gipson’s conviction became final January 9, 1998, and the one-year limitation
period for filing his federal habeas petition under § 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)
expired January 9, 1999. Because Mr. Gipson filed no state post-conviction
action, the magistrate judge determined no statutory tolling of the limitation
period occurred, thereby making Mr. Gipson’s November 30, 1999 petition
untimely. The magistrate judge also concluded that, even if Mr. Gipson’s
attorney failed to timely notify him of the disposition of his direct appeal, no
extraordinary circumstance existed to warrant the equitable tolling of the one-year
limitation period because Mr. Gipson failed to 1) show he diligently pursued his
judicial remedies or 2) assert his innocence. Finally, after construing Mr.
Gipson’s petition liberally, the magistrate judge also considered and rejected Mr.
Gipson’s argument that the one-year limitation period should be equitably tolled
based on his unsupported claim of incompetency. After reviewing Mr. Gipson’s
objections to the Report and Recommendation, the district court adopted the
magistrate judge’s recommendation in its entirety and denied his petition as
untimely.
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On appeal, Mr. Gipson raises the same argument rejected by the district
court, i.e., that equitable tolling of the limitation period is warranted because his
attorney failed to timely advise him of the disposition of his direct appeal. In
support, Mr. Gipson relies on two Fifth Circuit cases, Phillips v. Donnelly, 216
F.3d 508, 510-11 (5th Cir. 2000) and Fisher v. Johnson,
174 F.3d 710, 713-15
(5th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 5, 2000) (No. 00-7464), which
he contends this court must follow in granting him a certificate of appealability.
We review de novo the legal basis for the district court’s denial of Mr.
Gipson’s petition. See Rogers v. Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied,
528 U.S. 1120 (2000). In applying this standard, and after careful
review of the entire record, we agree with the magistrate judge’s thorough and
well-reasoned assessment that Mr. Gipson untimely filed his § 2254 petition and
no tolling is warranted. Therefore, in the interests of judicial economy, we
decline to duplicate the same analysis here, other than to note the magistrate
judge properly applied the law of this circuit. As to Mr. Gipson’s reliance on two
Fifth Circuit cases to support his appeal, they represent non-binding, non-
precedential authority, which this Circuit is not required to follow. See Garcia by
Garcia v. Miera,
817 F.2d 650, 658 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 959
(1988). Moreover, the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Fisher actually supports the
-4-
denial of Mr. Gipson’s petition because no equitable tolling was warranted. See
Fisher, 174 F.3d at 714-15.
In order for this court to grant Mr. Gipson a certificate of appealability and
proceed to the merits of his appeal, Mr. Gipson must make a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253. In this case, he fails to
make such a showing as it is clear jurists of reason would not find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. See Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Accordingly, for substantially the same reasons provided in the magistrate
judge’s February 29, 2000 Report and Recommendation, and the district court’s
August 22, 2000 Order, we deny Mr. Gipson’s request for a certificate of
appealability and DISMISS his appeal. We further deny Mr. Gipson’s request to
proceed in forma pauperis.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
-5-
