Filed: May 17, 2002
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 17 2002 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 01-2259 (D.C. No. CR-01-117-LH) RICARDO FLORES-VENEGAS, (D. New Mexico) Defendant - Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before EBEL, BALDOCK and HARTZ, Circuit Judges. Defendant-Appellant Ricardo Flores-Venegas challenges the district court’s refusal to depart downward when sentencing him for illegally reentering t
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 17 2002 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 01-2259 (D.C. No. CR-01-117-LH) RICARDO FLORES-VENEGAS, (D. New Mexico) Defendant - Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before EBEL, BALDOCK and HARTZ, Circuit Judges. Defendant-Appellant Ricardo Flores-Venegas challenges the district court’s refusal to depart downward when sentencing him for illegally reentering th..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 17 2002
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 01-2259
(D.C. No. CR-01-117-LH)
RICARDO FLORES-VENEGAS, (D. New Mexico)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL, BALDOCK and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Ricardo Flores-Venegas challenges the district court’s
refusal to depart downward when sentencing him for illegally reentering the
United States following deportation for an aggravated felony, in violation of
8 U.S.C. § 1326. Flores-Venegas offered four grounds to justify a downward
departure: 1) his juvenile status at the time of the underlying aggravated felony;
2) his cultural assimilation; 3) his agreement not to contest the Government’s
effort to have him deported again; and 4) a combination of these factors.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
It is well-settled that “courts of appeals cannot exercise jurisdiction to
review a sentencing court’s refusal to depart from the sentencing guidelines
except in the very rare circumstance that the district court states that it does not
have any authority to depart from the sentencing guideline range for the entire
class of circumstances proffered by the defendant.” United States v. Castillo, 140
F.3d 874, 887 (10th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Fortier,
180 F.3d 1217,
1231 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that this “rule has been stated countless times”).
“This exception does not apply when a sentencing court concludes under the
defendant’s particular circumstances that it does not have the authority to depart.”
Castillo, 140 F.3d at 887 (emphasis omitted). Crucially, this court must “treat
ambiguous statements made by district judges as though the judge was aware of
his or her legal authority to depart but chose instead, in an exercise of discretion,
not to depart.”
Fortier, 180 F.3d at 1231. “Accordingly, unless the judge’s
language unambiguously states the judge does not believe he has authority to
downward depart, we will not review his decision.”
Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Flores-Venegas argues that, in this case, “the sentencing court’s statements
regarding its authority demonstrate that it believed it did not have the discretion
to consider the factors put forth by Mr. Flores-Venegas, either individually or
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together.” (App’t Br. at 9.) The statements focused on by Flores-Venegas
occurred during the following exchange at the sentencing hearing:
Defendant. Coun.: I believe my reasoning is set out in my motion [for
a downward departure] . . . . He’s reentry of a
deported alien. He’s going to be deported as a
result of this and go back to Mexico. The problem
is he doesn’t even speak much Spanish. He’s going
to be going back to Mexico where he has no family.
Everyone’s here. They’re in the courtroom for him.
He has his family here, his wife.
This was all a result of a charge when he was a juvenile,
though he was sentenced as an adult. It even has a
juvenile number, his conviction. He’s not the typical
defendant that stands before this Court on a reentry. He is
different. He’s been suffering because he has nowhere to
go there. What we expect from him I do not know. He
was sent there after serving this offense that he was
convicted of at age 17, no family there. He came back to
his family. He’s done wrong. He knows he’s done wrong,
and he readily admitted his error. . . . Your Honor, for
these reasons we believe that the – that he does not fit the
typical defendant and that a downward departure would be
warranted in this case.
Court: Well, I don’t think he fits the typical defendant. He
certainly fits the same role as many of the defendants that
we see, where they basically spent their life in the United
States, but then they’re going to be deported. I mean, it’s
– your story is not the first one that I have heard. What
you’re talking about is a Congressional action, not judicial
action. Your motion for downward departure will be
denied. . . .
....
Court: . . . . You’re caught on the horns of a dilemma. I don’t –
I don’t have any idea what to tell you, because, as I say,
it’s a legislative matter, not a judicial matter at this stage
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of the game. You’ll be remanded to the custody of the
United States Marshals.
(Tr. 2-5.)
A defendant’s extensive ties to the United States have been recognized as a
potential ground for departure where he is convicted of illegal reentry, but only
under “extraordinary circumstances.” United States v. Lipman, 133 F.3d 726, 730
(9th Cir. 1998). Admittedly, the court’s rejection of the departure request,
coupled with its statement that Flores-Venegas does not “fit[ ] the typical
defendant” would seem to suggest that the court thought it lacked authority even
to depart under unusual circumstances. However, the court followed that
statement by asserting that Flores-Venegas’s circumstances are not unusual, as
“many of the defendants that we see . . . spent their life in the United States.”
(Tr. 3.) These subsequent statements suggest that the district court did not find
that Flores-Venegas presented a sufficiently extraordinary case to justify a
downward departure.
The court’s references to the need for legislative action, rather than judicial
action, reasonably could be interpreted as referring to the Commission’s decision
not to provide a departure for defendants who illegally reenter the country
because they have lived most of their lives in the United States. The
Commission’s failure to recognize departure on this ground does not, however,
prevent the district court from departing on such a ground under unusual
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circumstances. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 109 (1996) (recognizing
that, as long as ground has not been prohibited by Guidelines, departure is
permissible if case is outside “heartland” of cases governed by particular
Guideline). The district court’s statements are, at a minimum, ambiguous
evidence that the district court may have realized that it had authority to depart
based on Flores-Venegas’s ties to this country, but only under extraordinary
circumstances, and concluded that such circumstances were not shown. In this
regard, the district court did not unambiguously state that it lacked authority to
depart for the entire class of circumstances at issue – i.e., for all defendants who
illegally reentered the country because of their ties to the country – but only that
the facts of Flores-Venegas’s case did not justify such a departure under the
Guidelines as currently written.
Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction over the district court’s rejection
of Flores-Venegas’s departure request, and this appeal is DISMISSED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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