Filed: Jan. 28, 2002
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 28 2002 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk WESLEY I. PURKEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 01-3269 CHARLES SIMMONS, Kansas Secretary (D.C. No. 00-CV-3380-GTV) of Corrections; DAL OVERTON, Parole (D. Kan.) Officer at Kansas City & Wichita Parole Offices; DAN DAVIDSON, Parole Officer at Kansas City Parole Office; MAURICE HOLMAN, Parole Officer at Kansas City Office; CHRIS LANSFORD, Parole Officer at Kansas City
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 28 2002 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk WESLEY I. PURKEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 01-3269 CHARLES SIMMONS, Kansas Secretary (D.C. No. 00-CV-3380-GTV) of Corrections; DAL OVERTON, Parole (D. Kan.) Officer at Kansas City & Wichita Parole Offices; DAN DAVIDSON, Parole Officer at Kansas City Parole Office; MAURICE HOLMAN, Parole Officer at Kansas City Office; CHRIS LANSFORD, Parole Officer at Kansas City ..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 28 2002
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
WESLEY I. PURKEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 01-3269
CHARLES SIMMONS, Kansas Secretary (D.C. No. 00-CV-3380-GTV)
of Corrections; DAL OVERTON, Parole (D. Kan.)
Officer at Kansas City & Wichita Parole
Offices; DAN DAVIDSON, Parole
Officer at Kansas City Parole Office;
MAURICE HOLMAN, Parole Officer at
Kansas City Office; CHRIS LANSFORD,
Parole Officer at Kansas City Parole
Office; JOHN DOE, Parole Officer at
Kansas City & Wichita Parole Office;
JOHN SNOWDELL, Parole Officer at
Wichita Parole Office; and RAY
JOHNSON, Administrative Director for
Mirror, Inc., Kansas City, Missouri, sued
in their individual and official capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before HENRY, BRISCOE and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Wesley Purkey, a state prisoner appearing pro se, appeals the district
court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
After being imprisoned for approximately seventeen years, Purkey was released on
parole on March 1, 1997. While on parole, he allegedly began using a variety of drugs.
Purkey alleges he repeatedly contacted his parole officers and requested placement in an
inpatient drug rehabilitation program, but defendants took no action. In October 1998,
while still on parole and working as a plumber, he murdered an elderly woman.
According to Purkey, he was under the influence of crack cocaine at the time. He pled
guilty to the murder and is currently serving a life sentence.
The essence of Purkey’s complaint is that defendants, who are various officials
employed by or otherwise connected with the Kansas Department of Corrections, were
deliberately indifferent to his substance abuse problem and failed to ensure that he
received proper treatment while he was on parole. Purkey alleges he would not have
committed the murder and would not currently be imprisoned if it were not for
defendants’ deliberate indifference. Purkey alleges he is entitled to four categories of
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damages arising out defendants’ alleged misconduct: (1) damages for the physical and
mental suffering he endured as a result of his substance abuse problem while on parole,
(2) damages arising out of his current inability to financially support his spouse and
children, (3) damages resulting from the loss of freedom he has endured as a result of his
murder conviction and sentence, and (4) punitive damages. The district court dismissed
Purkey’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. The court noted that plaintiff had “identified no authority
for a constitutional right to treatment, nor has the court’s research identified such a right.”
ROA, Doc. 4 at 3.
After reviewing the record on appeal, we conclude the district court properly
dismissed Purkey’s complaint. Like the district court, we have found no authority
establishing that a parolee has a federal constitutional right to drug or alcohol
rehabilitation treatment. Cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
489 U.S.
189, 200 (1989) (noting that the government’s “affirmative duty to protect arises not from
[its] knowledge of the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of intent to help
him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own
behalf”); Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (discussing the government’s
obligation under the Eighth Amendment “to provide medical care for those whom it is
punishing by incarceration”) (emphasis added). Further, it is clear that state corrections
and parole officials have no duty to a parolee to prevent him or her from committing
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further crimes and being sent back to prison. Cf.
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202 (concluding
that social workers and other local officials “had no constitutional duty to protect [the
child] against his father’s violence”); Martinez v. California,
444 U.S. 277, 284-85 (1980)
(concluding that state parole officials’ release of parolee, who later killed third party, was
deemed too attenuated to support claim that officials deprived plaintiff’s decedent of life
within meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment). Thus, Purkey’s murder conviction and
his sentence of imprisonment are not the “legally cognizable result of [the defendants’
alleged] misconduct.” Zahrey v. Coffey,
221 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2000). Instead, it is
Purkey who is responsible for his own predicament.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue
forthwith. Purkey is reminded he must continue making partial payments of filing fees
until paid in full.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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