Filed: Oct. 08, 2002
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 8 2002 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk CARL BOWLES, Petitioner - Appellant, No. 02-1227 v. (D.C. No. 00-MK-277) (D. Colorado) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; R.E. HOLT, Warden, Respondents - Appellees. ORDER AND JUDGMENT* Before SEYMOUR, HENRY and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the de
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 8 2002 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk CARL BOWLES, Petitioner - Appellant, No. 02-1227 v. (D.C. No. 00-MK-277) (D. Colorado) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; R.E. HOLT, Warden, Respondents - Appellees. ORDER AND JUDGMENT* Before SEYMOUR, HENRY and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the det..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 8 2002
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
CARL BOWLES,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 02-1227
v. (D.C. No. 00-MK-277)
(D. Colorado)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; R.E.
HOLT, Warden,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before SEYMOUR, HENRY and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
Petitioner Carl Bowles, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Bowles pled guilty in 1965 to kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1201(a), and
was sentenced to life imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2), now repealed.1 Since
that time, Bowles has had a number of federal parole hearings. In late 1995, the Parole
Commission denied Bowles parole and continued him to a presumptive parole date of
October 17, 2005. The Commission noted Bowles’ long and extremely violent criminal
history and concluded there was a “high likelihood” that Bowles would “again commit
new crimes when released.” Bowles appealed the Commission’s decision to the National
Appeals Board, which affirmed. Since then, the Commission has maintained its position
that Bowles will not be paroled earlier than October 17, 2005.
In February 2000, Bowles filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition challenging the
denial of parole. The district court dismissed the petition. On appeal, this court affirmed
in part, but reversed the dismissal of Bowles’ allegations that respondents had (1) illegally
restrained him past his mandatory parole date by classifying him as having a mental
problem such that he would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to others, (2) illegally
ordered a mental health examination without due process, and (3) failed to comply with
the due process requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 4247. Bowles v. United States, 2000 WL
1879113 (10th Cir. 2000) (unpublished).
1
18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) provided: “[T]he court may fix the maximum sentence of
imprisonment to be served in which event the court may specify that the prisoner may
become eligible for parole at such time as the board of parole may determine.”
2
On remand, a magistrate judge concluded that Bowles’ claims were “baseless.”
ROA, Doc. 81 at 11. In particular, the magistrate judge noted that the Parole Commission
had never classified Bowles as mentally ill or altered his parole date based upon a mental
health classification. Instead, the magistrate noted, the Parole Commission’s decisions
were based primarily on Bowles’ “extraordinarily-serious criminal history, which
include[d] several murders and kidnappings, some of which were committed while on
escape status.” Id. The magistrate judge further noted that, although the Parole
Commission had directed the Bureau of Prisons to prepare a psychiatric/psychological
report prior to a statutory interim parole hearing to be conducted in March 2002, that
action “did not trigger the operation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 4246-47.”
Id. at 12. Because the
Parole Commission was authorized by regulation to consider reports of mental or
psychiatric examination, the magistrate concluded, “it was not improper for the [Parole
Commission] to request such an evaluation of [Bowles].”
Id. at 13 (citing 28 C.F.R.
§ 2.19). On April 15, 2002, over Bowles’ objections, the district court adopted the
magistrate judge’s recommendations and dismissed the petition.
After reviewing Bowles’ appellate pleadings and the record on appeal, we
conclude the district court properly dismissed Bowles’ petition. We agree with the
district court that the Parole Commission’s decisions have been rationally based not on
Bowles’ mental status, but rather on his extremely serious criminal history and the
corresponding likelihood that he will commit further crimes when and if paroled. See
3
generally Gometz v. United States Parole Comm’n, 294 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2002)
(noting that, in reviewing a decision by the Parole Commission, “the inquiry is only
whether there is a rational basis in the record for the Commission’s conclusions”). As for
Bowles’ original assertion that the Parole Commission violated his due process rights in
ordering the Bureau of Prisons to prepare a psychiatric or psychological report, we note
that Bowles makes no mention of the argument in his appellate brief and has apparently
abandoned the issue. Even assuming otherwise, we find no merit to the issue because
Bowles has not presented any facts that would persuade us that he was deprived of “any
significant property interest.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532, 542
(1985). Finally, we reject Bowles’ assertion that the respondents were required to comply
with the procedures set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 4247 for conducting a psychiatric or
psychological examination. Simply put, § 4247 is not implicated in these circumstances
because the respondents have not attempted to invoke 18 U.S.C. § 4246, which allows for
a court-ordered mental evaluation of a hospitalized criminal defendant who is due for
release but is suffering from a mental disease which would create a substantial risk of
bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another.
We will briefly address additional arguments raised by Bowles in his appellate
pleadings. First and foremost, it is apparent that Bowles incorrectly believes he was
statutorily entitled to be released in October 1995, after having served thirty years of his
life sentence. Under 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d), a prisoner must be released on parole after
4
serving “thirty years of each consecutive term or terms of more than forty-five years
including any life term” unless the Parole Commission “determines . . . that there is a
reasonable probability that he will commit any Federal, State, or local crime.” Because
the Parole Commission determined there was a reasonable probability that Bowles would
engage in criminal conduct if released from confinement, it was not obligated to parole
him after he had served thirty years of his sentence. Second, Bowles contends that the
Parole Commission was prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause from utilizing 18 U.S.C.
§ 4205(b)(2) to deny parole after he had served thirty years of his sentence. We find no
basis in the record for Bowles’ assertion that the Parole Commission relied on
§ 4205(b)(2) in denying parole. Indeed, that statutory provision is simply a 1976
recodification of 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2), the statute under which Bowles was originally
sentenced. Finally, Bowles complains that a magistrate judge was initially assigned to
review his habeas claims. We find nothing improper about the magistrate’s role in this
matter since the magistrate merely made recommendations to the district court about the
disposition of the case and the district court ultimately reviewed those recommendations
de novo and entered judgment against Bowles. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (discussing powers
of magistrate judges).
5
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Bowles' motion to proceed on
appeal in forma pauperis is DENIED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
6
