Filed: Jul. 18, 2003
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 18 2003 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk DENNIS L. STANTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 02-1336 (D.C. No. 00-RB-2219 (PAC)) ROBERT FURLONG; LARRY (D. Colo.) STEERMAN, Defendants-Appellees. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before SEYMOUR , KELLY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist th
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 18 2003 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk DENNIS L. STANTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 02-1336 (D.C. No. 00-RB-2219 (PAC)) ROBERT FURLONG; LARRY (D. Colo.) STEERMAN, Defendants-Appellees. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before SEYMOUR , KELLY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the..
More
F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 18 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DENNIS L. STANTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 02-1336
(D.C. No. 00-RB-2219 (PAC))
ROBERT FURLONG; LARRY (D. Colo.)
STEERMAN,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR , KELLY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Dennis L. Stanton, an inmate at Colorado’s Sterling Correctional
Facility (SCF) during the period relevant to this action, appeals from a judgment
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
in favor of SCF officer Larry Steerman following a bench trial on his claims of
excessive force and retaliation. 1
We review the district court’s legal conclusions
de novo and its fact findings for clear error, Silbrico Corp. v. Ortiz , 878 F.2d 333,
334 (10 th Cir. 1989), and affirm for the reasons explained below.
The basic historical facts are largely undisputed. Where conflicts in the
evidence do exist, we follow the pertinent findings of the district court, which
have specific “factual support in the record” and do not leave us “with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Nieto v. Kapoor , 268
F.3d 1208, 1217 (10 th Cir. 2001).
Stanton’s claims have their genesis in a disagreement over a rule barring
unassigned inmates from the prison recreation yard on weekends and holidays.
Shortly after Stanton successfully challenged a disciplinary action based on his
violation of the rule, he and Steerman had a conversation about its continued
enforcement, culminating with a pointed exchange in which Stanton (1) stated he
intended to use the yard and hoped Steerman would be there when he did “to try
and stop him,” and (2) replied to Steerman’s inquiry whether that was a threat by
saying “you’re damn right it is.” Steerman responded by handcuffing Stanton and
having him escorted to the shift commander’s office. After questioning Stanton
1
The district court was clearly correct to dismiss warden Robert Furlong
from the case for lack of personal involvement. See R., docs. 64, 70.
-2-
for some ten minutes, the shift commander ordered him taken to segregation for
threatening an officer. This disciplinary action was upheld through administrative
appeal and subsequent state judicial review.
Stanton said nothing about the handcuffs to the shift commander, but when
he was being escorted he complained that the right handcuff was too tight. One
of the officers agreed to loosen it and in the process also found that it was not
double-locked. The officer reported both matters to the shift commander and
Steerman was counseled about proper handcuffing procedure. When Stanton
arrived at the segregation unit and complained of some tingling in his right wrist,
he was examined by medical personnel. They found two abrasions and some
slight edema–the kind of minor trauma which other testimony in the record
indicated was consistent with the normal use of handcuffs. X-rays taken a few
days later revealed an old, poorly healed fracture but no new injury to the wrist.
On these facts, the district court held that Steerman had not used excessive
force in handcuffing Stanton. The district court applied the proper legal standard,
asking whether Steerman had “acted maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline.” Mitchell v. Maynard , 80 F.3d 1433, 1440 (10 th Cir. 1996) (following
Hudson v. McMillian ,
503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992)); see also Northington v. Jackson ,
973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10 th Cir. 1992). Noting the evident security purpose for
-3-
Steerman’s use of the handcuffs, the length of time during which the handcuffed
Stanton voiced no discomfort while speaking with the shift commander, and the
relatively minor indicia of trauma ultimately found on medical examination, the
district court concluded that Steerman did not handcuff Stanton maliciously to
inflict pain or cause harm but reasonably to maintain order while the appropriate
institutional response to Stanton’s threatening behavior was decided upon. See
R., Supp. Vol. I, at 196. We discern no error in this necessarily circumstantial
determination. In particular, we note that while significant physical injury is not
a legal prerequisite for an excessive-force claim, the extent of the injury inflicted
on an inmate can be, and clearly was here, a relevant factual consideration “in
determining whether corrections officers unnecessarily and wantonly inflicted
pain.” Northington , 973 F.2d at 1523.
The principles governing Stanton’s claim of retaliatory prison discipline
were summarized by this court in Peterson v. Shanks , 149 F.3d 1140, 1144 (10 th
Cir. 1998):
We have held that prison officials may not retaliate against or
harass an inmate because of the inmate’s exercise of his
constitutional rights. This principle applies even where the action
taken in retaliation would be otherwise permissible. . . . [H]owever,
it is not the role of the federal judiciary to scrutinize and interfere
with the daily operations of a state prison, and our retaliation
jurisprudence does not change this role. Obviously, an inmate is not
inoculated from the normal conditions of confinement experienced by
convicted felons serving time in prison merely because he has
engaged in protected activity. Accordingly, a plaintiff must prove
-4-
that but for the retaliatory motive, the incidents to which he refers,
including the disciplinary action, would not have taken place .
(emphasis added, citation and quotations omitted). Given the “but for” causation
test to be applied and unique prison-management interests to be accommodated, if
a reasonably related “legitimate penological interest” is found, in fact, to underlie
the challenged disciplinary action, a retaliation claim must fail. See id. Here, the
district court’s finding that Stanton was disciplined because of misconduct has
factual support in the record and suffices to defeat Stanton’s retaliation claim.
Finally, Stanton argues that the district court impermissibly prejudiced his
case when it denied his last-minute motion for service of subpoenas on numerous
witnesses. We review a procedural ruling solely for an abuse of discretion. See,
e.g. , United States v. Lepiscopo , 458 F.2d 977, 978 (10 th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Gutierrez ,
48 F.3d 1134, 1138 (10 th Cir. 1995).
Just days before trial Stanton realized he had failed to take any steps to
obtain subpoenas for many of his witnesses and sent a motion to the district court
requesting assistance in having the necessary subpoenas served at government
expense. On the day of trial, the district judge, who had not yet received the
motion, responded to Stanton’s oral recitation of these events as follows:
This matter has been set for trial for some time. Furthermore,
this litigation . . . is roughly two years old. You previously, the
record discloses, had filed a motion for the issuance of subpoenas by
the court. That was duly considered and denied by Magistrate Judge
Coan.
-5-
At that point, relatively early on in this litigation, you were on
notice of what efforts, if any, you must undertake as a pro se litigant
to arrange the presentation of your witnesses in this trial, and the
court is somewhat astonished to learn that you have waited until
Wednesday of this past week to make those arrangements.
The court has not received or reviewed your request. It is not
timely. It cannot be granted by the court unless there is a
continuance of this trial. The court is not inclined to continue the
trial. This is your opportunity to make an opening statement, and you
may proceed.
R. Supp. Vol. I, at 6.
We see no abuse of discretion here. The transcript reflects the thoughtful
consideration of relevant procedural facts and an informed judgment thereon. We
note that prison authorities brought two of Stanton’s inmate witnesses to trial and
Stanton himself testified as well. His contention that the voluntary presence of
these inmate witnesses somehow renders suspect the absence of prison employees
he had wanted to question suggests a basic misunderstanding of the purpose of the
subpoena process as the prescribed means to compel the attendance of just such
involuntary non-party witnesses. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(C), (2).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED .
Entered for the Court
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
-6-
