Filed: Mar. 25, 2003
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 25 2003 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 02-3172 v. (D.C. No. 01-CR-40106-JAR) (D. Kan.) DWAYNE ALLEN GILMORE, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before SEYMOUR, HENRY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. Dwayne Allen Gilmore pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1112 for the death of his two-year old stepson, and to assault on a
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 25 2003 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 02-3172 v. (D.C. No. 01-CR-40106-JAR) (D. Kan.) DWAYNE ALLEN GILMORE, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before SEYMOUR, HENRY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. Dwayne Allen Gilmore pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1112 for the death of his two-year old stepson, and to assault on a p..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 25 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 02-3172
v. (D.C. No. 01-CR-40106-JAR)
(D. Kan.)
DWAYNE ALLEN GILMORE,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, HENRY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Dwayne Allen Gilmore pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1112 for the death of his two-year old stepson, and to assault on a
person under the age of sixteen resulting in serious bodily injury in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(7), stemming from a prior incident involving the same child.
He appeals his sentence of 180 months. We affirm.
Mr. Gilmore killed his stepson by kicking him in the chest. To avoid trial
on a charge of second degree murder, he pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
and agreed to move jointly with the government for an upward departure to a
level at which he would be sentenced in line with a second degree murder
conviction. The plea agreement contemplated a departure to offense level 35, a
three point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and a sentencing range of
151-188 months. The government agreed not to oppose Mr. Gilmore’s request for
a sentence at the low end of that range. The plea agreement and the sentencing
hearing transcript clearly indicate Mr. Gilmore’s understanding that the court
would not be bound by the terms of the plea agreement.
Despite the government’s urging, the district court declined to impose Mr.
Gilmore’s requested sentence of 151 months. Believing the upward departure
should extend one level beyond that contemplated in the plea agreement, the court
departed to a level 36. Allowing a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the
court reached a sentencing range of 168 to 210 months. It then sentenced Mr.
Gilmore to 180 months, which was the statutory maximum punishment for the two
counts and also fell within the overlap of the two sentencing ranges at issue here. 1
1
The fact that the actual sentence imposed falls in the sentencing range
contemplated by the plea agreement as well as the range chosen by the court does
not automatically render any potential error harmless unless the court explicitly
states that it would have chosen the given sentence regardless of which range it
selected. See United States v. Urbanek, 930 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (10th Cir. 1991).
While the court noted its intention to depart to the statutory maximum, we are not
persuaded this is a sufficiently explicit statement. Erring on the side of caution,
we will determine whether level 36 was otherwise improper.
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Mr. Gilmore contends the court erred, maintaining that the degree of upward
departure was unwarranted. 2 We do not agree.
The district court carefully apprised Mr. Gilmore that the plea agreement
did not bind the court to sentence him to a maximum of 151 months:
THE COURT: Just so I’m clear, the agreement that the
defendant and the Government have reached is that although this
superceding information involves two charges that are different than
the way this was charged originally – and one is a voluntary
manslaughter charge which has a statutory maximum penalty of 10
years, and the other is an assault charge which has a maximum
statutory penalty of five years – the Government and the defendant
have agreed that if the Court were to sentence this defendant strictly
by the sentencing guidelines, this defendant would receive a sentence
in a range that would be substantially less than what he would
receive under the sentencing guideline range for a murder two
conviction; but through this plea agreement, the parties are
stipulating that the Court can apply this particular guideline
provision which will allow the Court to depart upward, to the top of
the sentencing guideline range, and essentially to the top of the
2
Mr. Gilmore also contends the government violated its agreement not to
oppose a sentence at the low end of the guideline range by arguing on appeal in
support of the district court’s sentencing decision. We disagree. The plea
agreement is silent as to the government’s rights or obligations regarding
arguments on appeal, stating only that the government agrees “not to oppose” a
sentence at the low end of the guideline range. While there is no time limitation
in the language of the plea agreement, there is also no explicit statement of a
continuing duty. Other circuits have held that the government’s waiver of its
right to participate must be explicit. See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 894 F.2d
1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[W]e will not bar the government from participating
in an appeal when the plea agreement fails to indicate that the parties clearly
intended such a result.”); Brooks v. United States,
708 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th Cir.
1983) (construing obligation as ending with sentencing itself). We decline to
imply a promise on the part of the government extending past sentencing.
Accordingly, we DENY Mr. Gilmore’s motion to strike the government’s brief.
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statutory penalties such that the Court could sentence this defendant
to a total of 15 years actual time; is that correct?
MR. LUEDKE: That’s the statutory maximum, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Correct. That’s not the guideline maximum, but
because of the stipulations you all have entered into, essentially you
are agreeing that the Court can sentence this defendant to the
statutory maximum, 15 years, which is about what the defendant
would receive under the guidelines with a second-degree murder
conviction; is that correct?
MR. LUEDKE: That’s correct, Your Honor. I think that both
the defendant and the Government had envisioned in this plea a
sentence of 151 months, which would have been the bottom of the
guideline range had the defendant pled to second-degree murder,
received the enhancements and credits that would have been
appropriate. That would have been the bottom of the guideline
range.
THE COURT: All right. And this plea agreement is not
binding on the Government, correct?
MR. WURTZ: It’s binding on the Government; it’s not binding
on the Court.
THE COURT: Or, I’m sorry, not binding on the Court.
MR. WURTZ: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Is that your understanding of the
terms of the plea, Mr. Gilmore?
MR. GILMORE: Yes, ma’am.
Rec., vol. II at 18-20 (emphasis added). Mr. Gilmore thus understood not only
that he might be sentenced anywhere in the 151-188 month range to which he had
agreed, but that the statutory maximum was 180 months. More importantly, he
had agreed to an upward departure and knew the court was not bound to remain at
any particular level.
The degree of upward departure is committed to the discretion of the
sentencing court and we review only for abuse of that discretion. See, e.g.,
-4-
United States v. Goldberg, 295 F.3d 1133, 1135 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Whiteskunk,
162 F.3d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Li,
206 F.3d 78, 88 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Rodriguez-Castro,
908 F.2d 438,
442 (9th Cir. 1990). The court gave numerous explicit reasons for the degree of
departure as follows:
The court intends to depart upward to the statutory maximum on both
counts . . . The reason the court is intending to depart to this extent is
because of the very heinous nature of this offense. The guideline
range - or the sentencing guidelines themselves - call for this type of
offense for a four-level enhancement under the specific offense
characteristic, Section 2A2.3(b)(1), if the offense resulted in
substantial bodily injury to an individual under the age of 16. . . .
The court finds that this particular offense, of course, was committed
against a child far under the age of 16, a two-year-old child, and it
was extreme substantial bodily injury, heinous bodily injury, done to
this essentially baby. And the victim, a two-year-old child, died as a
result of the injury sustained after the defendant kicked him in the
chest, an extremely heinous and brutal and vicious thing to do to
anyone, much less a two-year-old baby, and then shook him and
dropped him onto the ground two or three times. The Court has
determined that the actual conduct underlying this offense is far
outside of the heartland that the drafters of the sentencing guidelines
had in mind when they called for a four-level enhancement for
substantial bodily injury to someone under the age of 16. The Court
does not think that within the heartland of cases the Sentencing
Commission considered a case such as this – an extremely vulnerable
and young child and an injury that far exceeded the Court’s
discretion and determination – as something that could be
characterized as substantial[] bodily injury. So for this reason the
Court’s going to depart upward more than the parties’ joint motion
asks for or recommends. . . . The Court has taken into consideration
the nature of the instant offense, the defendant’s personal history and
characteristics, his specific involvement in the instant offense of
conviction, and the provisions of sentencing guidelines section
5K2.1, that’s the guideline on death; 5K2.21, the guideline on
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dismissal and uncharged conduct. . . . The Court believes this
sentence is appropriate based on the death of the defendant’s stepson,
the extremely brutal and heinous injury that was done to the body of
the two-year-old, and further on the dismissal and uncharged conduct
that the defendant was charged with in the original indictment.
Additionally, the Court believes that the sentence will meet the
objectives of punishment, general deterrence, and incapacitation.
Rec., vol. III at 5-7, 19.
While we acknowledge that one of the factors mentioned by the court – the
use of the guideline factor of death – is not appropriate because it is already an
element of the offense, we are permitted in such a case to examine the district
court’s reasoning as a whole to determine whether the degree of departure was
taken in reliance on the inappropriate factor, or whether the same sentence would
have been imposed in the absence of consideration of that factor. See
Whiteskunk, 162 F.3d at 1249-50. Our review of the record indicates that the
district court did not particularly rely on the factor of death, and that the court
intended to sentence Mr. Gilmore to the statutory maximum in any event, based
on the totality of the considerations noted above. We are not persuaded the
district court abused its discretion in the degree of upward departure in this case.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM Mr. Gilmore’s sentence.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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