Filed: Jul. 12, 2004
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 12 2004 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk EDUARDO URIOSTEGUI, Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 03-2147 v. (D.C. No. 02-CV-721) (D. N.M.) KLINGER CONSTRUCTORS INC., Defendant-Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before HENRY , MURPHY , and TYMKOVICH , Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs wi
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 12 2004 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk EDUARDO URIOSTEGUI, Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 03-2147 v. (D.C. No. 02-CV-721) (D. N.M.) KLINGER CONSTRUCTORS INC., Defendant-Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before HENRY , MURPHY , and TYMKOVICH , Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs wit..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 12 2004
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
EDUARDO URIOSTEGUI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 03-2147
v. (D.C. No. 02-CV-721)
(D. N.M.)
KLINGER CONSTRUCTORS INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY , MURPHY , and TYMKOVICH , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Eduardo Uriostegui appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendant Klinger Constructors Inc. on his claims of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
national origin discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
through 2000e-17. 1
Mr. Uriostegui alleged that he was terminated on the basis of
his national origin and that, in response to Mr. Uriostegui’s discrimination
complaint, Klinger retaliated by giving him bad employment references after his
termination. On appeal, Mr. Uriostegui argues that the district court erred in
finding that he failed to rebut Klinger’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the termination and that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies on his
retaliation claim. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, applying the same standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) as the district court.
See Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs. ,
165
F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999).
Having reviewed the briefs, the record, and the applicable law pursuant to
the above-mentioned standard, we conclude that the district court correctly
decided Mr. Uriostegui’s national origin claim. We therefore AFFIRM the
judgment in favor of Klinger on this Title VII claim for substantially the same
reasons stated by the district court in its Memorandum Opinion of June 6, 2003. 2
1
Mr. Uriostegui does not appeal the district court’s ruling on his hostile
work environment claim. See Aplt. Br. at 2.
2
The parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge.
The Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum Opinion is therefore the final order of the
district court.
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On the retaliation claim, Mr. Uriostegui failed to allege retaliation in his
EEOC complaint and the district court found that Mr. Uriostegui’s retaliation
claim was not reasonably related to his discrimination claim. Mr. Uriostegui,
therefore, failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, which is a prerequisite to
bringing suit in federal court. See Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc. ,
337 F.3d 1179,
1183 (10th Cir. 2003).
The district court stated that Mr. Uriostegui’s retaliation claim was not
reasonably related to his discrimination claim because “the act allegedly giving
rise to the claim did not occur until after his original claim had been dismissed by
the EEOC.” Aplt. App. at 211. This statement is not factually accurate. The act
allegedly giving rise to Mr. Uriostegui’s retaliation claim occurred before the
dismissal of the EEOC charge. Because there has been an intervening change in
the law, however, there is no reversible error.
Previously, a plaintiff could seek judicial relief on claims not listed in the
original EEOC charge if the new claims were “like or reasonably related to the
allegations of the EEOC charge . . . ” Martinez v. Potter ,
347 F.3d 1208, 1210
(10th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). This court explained in Martinez , however,
that National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan ,
536 U.S. 101 (2002) abrogated
this so-called “continuing violation doctrine” so that unexhausted claims
involving discrete employment actions are no longer viable.
Id. Instead, “each
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discrete incident of [discriminatory or retaliatory] treatment constitutes its own
unlawful employment practice for which administrative remedies must be
exhausted.”
Id. (quotation omitted). Here, Mr. Uriostegui’s claim that Klinger
retaliated against him by giving a bad employment reference after his termination
is a discrete incident of retaliatory treatment, which required him to file a separate
EEOC claim. Because Mr. Uriostegui failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment in favor of Klinger on the
retaliation claim.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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