Filed: Oct. 28, 2004
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 28 2004 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 04-6071 (D.C. Nos. 02-CV-1580-R and JESSE JOSEPH MAYNARD, 98-CR-164-R) (W.D. Okla.) Defendant - Appellant. ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY Before KELLY, HENRY, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. Petitioner-Appellant Jesse Joseph Maynard, a federal inmate appearing pro se, seeks to appeal from the distric
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 28 2004 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 04-6071 (D.C. Nos. 02-CV-1580-R and JESSE JOSEPH MAYNARD, 98-CR-164-R) (W.D. Okla.) Defendant - Appellant. ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY Before KELLY, HENRY, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. Petitioner-Appellant Jesse Joseph Maynard, a federal inmate appearing pro se, seeks to appeal from the district..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 28 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 04-6071
(D.C. Nos. 02-CV-1580-R and
JESSE JOSEPH MAYNARD, 98-CR-164-R)
(W.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, HENRY, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-Appellant Jesse Joseph Maynard, a federal inmate appearing pro
se, seeks to appeal from the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion
to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. In order to merit a certificate of
appealability (COA), Mr. Maynard must make “a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing,
Mr. Maynard must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district
court’s resolution of the constitutional issues contained in his motion debatable or
wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see also Miller-El v.
Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Because we determine that Mr. Maynard has
not made such a showing, we deny a COA and dismiss the appeal. In view of our
resolution, we deny Mr. Maynard’s motion for release pending review. Fed. R.
App. P. 23(b).
On September 1, 1999, Mr. Maynard was convicted by jury of conspiracy,
18 U.S.C. § 371, concealment of the assets of a bankruptcy estate, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 152 and 2, and embezzlement against a bankruptcy estate, 18 U.S.C. §§ 153
and 2. He was subsequently sentenced to 78 months in prison, and this court
affirmed the conviction on June 20, 2001. See United States v. Maynard, No. 00-
6082, 2001 WL 690392 (10th Cir. June 20, 2001).
Mr. Maynard filed his § 2255 motion in the district court on October 25,
2002. After thoroughly examining the issues raised by Mr. Maynard and the trial
record including the transcript, the district court denied Mr. Maynard’s motion on
January 6, 2004. Mr. Maynard subsequently filed an application for a COA with
the district court. The district court failed to act on this application. Thus,
pursuant to the Tenth Circuit Emergency General Order of October 1, 1996, the
application was deemed denied. Mr. Maynard then made timely application for a
COA with this court.
In his application for a COA, Mr. Maynard seeks to appeal the following
contentions rejected by the district court on the merits: (1) the bankruptcy court
and district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the bankruptcy court and
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district court compromised his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment by
denying his jurisdictional challenge without a hearing; (3) he was denied
constitutionally effective assistance of counsel. Aplt. Appl. for COA at 3; Aplt.
Opening Br. at i. Having carefully considered the materials, we do not believe
that the district court’s determinations are fairly debatable.
Mr. Maynard first posits in his application that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the offenses charged in the indictment. He argues
that, because First American Casualty Company (“FACC”), the debtor in the
underlying bankruptcy petition, was a foreign corporation, the bankruptcy court
lacked jurisdiction, and, consequently, jurisdiction could not lie for the criminal
charges levied against Mr. Maynard, FACC’s President. The district court
concluded that Mr. Maynard’s collateral attack of the bankruptcy proceeding
offered no defense to his subsequent criminal conviction. This conclusion is not
fairly debatable. “[S]uch an attack may not be countenanced in any case against
the bankrupt, even in a criminal proceeding, where the indictment has charged the
bankrupt with a violation of the Bankruptcy Act.” United States v. Kramer, 279
F.2d 754, 757 (3d Cir. 1960)(emphasis added). Moreover, it appears from the
record that Mr. Maynard voluntarily sought the protection of the bankruptcy
court, signing the Chapter 11 petition on behalf of FACC. Under such
circumstances, Mr. Maynard is estopped from raising this attack where the record
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discloses a valid petition. See United States v. Vanderberg, 358 F.2d 6, 9 (7th
Cir. 1966).
Mr. Maynard next asserts that, because both the bankruptcy court and the
district court denied his jurisdictional challenge without a hearing, his rights to
due process under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution were in some manner
compromised. Mr. Maynard argues that Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1, relevant to parties
seeking to raise an issue of foreign law, mandates that the court of first instance
suspend proceedings and conduct a hearing to determine the jurisdictional issue.
Mr. Maynard first raised this issue, tangentially, as part of his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, arguing that counsel was ineffective in pursuing a hearing
on the matter. The district court, addressing the timing of the trial court’s denial
of a motion to quash the indictment on the basis of jurisdiction, found no
prejudice in that the motion lacked all merit. As we have noted above, the
district court’s conclusion on this issue is not fairly debatable. Moreover, Mr.
Maynard has failed to point to any authority, including Rule 44.1, that supports
his broad assertion that a court is required to hold a hearing on the jurisdictional
issue. As we have noted in other contexts, courts have wide discretion in
structuring their consideration of jurisdictional challenges. See Holt v. United
States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995). Especially given the nature of Mr.
Maynard’s claim, the district court was competent to dispose of the issue without
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a hearing.
In his final claim, Mr. Maynard reasserts that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel at both the trial and appellate level. Specifically, Mr.
Maynard alleges that counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the issue of pre-
indictment delay, file pre-trial motions, provide a defense strategy, safeguard Mr.
Maynard’s right to a fair trial and right to be heard, file post-trial motions,
adequately represent Mr. Maynard at sentencing, and provide effective assistance
as appellate counsel. Aplt. Appl. for COA at 3. In order to prevail on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Mr. Maynard must show that his counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard for attorney behavior and “that
counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
The district court concluded, after an exhaustive discussion, that Mr. Maynard
could not show deficient performance or prejudice or both. When viewed against
the backdrop of our resolution of Mr. Maynard’s direct appeal, the district court’s
conclusion is not fairly debatable.
Finally, Mr. Maynard contends that the district court misunderstood the
facts regarding a $270,000 reinsurance refund at issue in his criminal trial. See
Aplt. Appl. for COA at 11. We disagree. In raising this issue, Mr. Maynard
reiterates an argument that proved unsuccessful on direct appeal. The district
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court’s recitation of the facts is entirely in keeping with those previously
identified by this court. See Maynard, 2001 WL 690392, at *1-2. As the district
court was bound by this court’s prior determination, so too are we.
Finally, on September 3, 2004, Mr. Maynard filed a Fed. R. App. P. 28(j)
supplemental authority letter seeking to raise (for the first time) a Sixth
Amendment challenge to his sentence based on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Blakely v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Prior to the letter
of September 3, Mr. Maynard did not challenge the district court’s ability to
determine the facts resulting in his sentence calculation. We have previously
refused to consider an issue asserted for the first time in a Rule 28(j) letter. See
United States v. Kimler,
335 F.3d 1132, 1138 n.6 (10th Cir. 2003). In that Mr.
Maynard did not seek permission to file a brief properly raising the Blakely issue,
we decline to consider the matter further. See United States v. Maldonado-
Ramires, ___ F.3d ___, No. 03-1458,
2004 WL 2181755, at *3 n.1 (10th Cir.
Sept. 29, 2004).
Accordingly, Mr, Maynard’s motion for release pending review is DENIED,
the application for a COA is DENIED and the appeal is DISMISSED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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