Filed: Oct. 26, 2005
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 26, 2005 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court CHRISTOPHER S. VOGT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. No. 04-1264 (D.C. No. 03-WM-448 (MJW)) JUANITA NOVAK, Warden; (D. Colo.) COLORADO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondents-Appellees. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before KELLY, McKAY , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 26, 2005 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court CHRISTOPHER S. VOGT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. No. 04-1264 (D.C. No. 03-WM-448 (MJW)) JUANITA NOVAK, Warden; (D. Colo.) COLORADO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondents-Appellees. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before KELLY, McKAY , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not m..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
October 26, 2005
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
CHRISTOPHER S. VOGT,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 04-1264
(D.C. No. 03-WM-448 (MJW))
JUANITA NOVAK, Warden; (D. Colo.)
COLORADO ATTORNEY
GENERAL,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, McKAY , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After pleading guilty in Colorado state court to second-degree murder and
robbery and agreeing to a minimum forty-year sentence, Petitioner Christopher S.
Vogt now contends that the forty-eight-year sentence he received is
unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Appearing
pro se, he appeals from a final order denying his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Because we conclude that the
Colorado Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Apprendi to the facts of
his case, we affirm .
I. Background facts
Mr. Vogt’s sentences were upheld on direct appeal. The Colorado Court
of Appeals held that the sentences were within the range prescribed by law, and
the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari. In his state post-conviction
proceedings, Mr. Vogt raised a violation of Apprendi and two other bases for
relief, but the state courts rejected his arguments. He re-urged the same three
grounds in his federal habeas petition. The federal district court denied habeas
relief and denied a certificate of appealability (“COA”). We granted COA on two
issues: whether the district court erred in concluding that Apprendi applied to his
petition and whether he is entitled to relief on his Apprendi claim.
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II. Standard of Review
Because Mr. Vogt filed his § 2254 habeas corpus petition after the date the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) became
effective, its provisions apply to this appeal. See Smallwood v. Gibson, 191 F.3d
1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 1999).
If a claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court, we
review the state court ruling under the deferential standard of . . .
AEDPA. Under AEDPA, a petitioner is entitled to federal habeas
relief only if he can establish that the state court decision was
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States,” or was “based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2); see also Hale v. Gibson,
227 F.3d 1298, 1309 (10th Cir. 2000). In conducting this inquiry, we
presume the factual findings of the state trial and appellate courts are
correct, and we place on the petitioner the burden of rebutting this
presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1); Darks v. Mullin, 327 F.3d 1001, 1007 (10th Cir. 2003).
We review de novo the district court’s legal analysis of the state
court decision. Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222, 1230 (10th Cir.
2000).
In applying 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), we first ask whether the
principle of federal law invoked by the petitioner was clearly
established by the Supreme Court at the time of the state court
judgment. Id. at 1229. If so, we ask whether the state court decision
was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of that
clearly established federal law. Id. A decision is “contrary to”
federal law “if the state court applied a rule different from the
governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides a
case differently than [the Supreme Court has] done on a set of
materially indistinguishable facts.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694,
122 S. Ct. 1843,
152 L. Ed. 2d 914 (2002). A state court decision
involves an “unreasonable application” of federal law “if the state
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court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from
[Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of
the particular case.” Id.
Turrentine v. Mullin ,
390 F.3d 1181, 1188-89 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied ,
125
S. Ct. 2544 (2005). Here, the Colorado Court of Appeals correctly identified the
governing legal principle from Apprendi , so we must determine whether its
application to the facts was objectively unreasonable. Mitchell v. Gibson ,
262
F.3d 1036, 1045 (10th Cir. 2001).
III. Analysis
1. Apprendi applies. Apprendi was decided after the Colorado Court of
Appeals denied Mr. Vogt’s direct appeal, but before Mr. Vogt’s petition for a writ
of certiorari from the Colorado Supreme Court was denied. Thus, appellee
concedes that Apprendi does apply to Mr. Vogt’s habeas petition because his
conviction was not final at the time Apprendi was decided. See Caspari v.
Bohlen , 510 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (noting that “[a] state conviction and sentence
become final . . . when the availability of direct appeal to the state courts has
been exhausted and the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has
elapsed or a timely filed petition has been finally denied”); Allen v. Reed ,
No. 03-1185,
2005 WL 2697246, at *2 (10th Cir. Oct. 21, 2005) (accord). We
turn to the second issue on which COA was granted: whether Apprendi requires
habeas relief.
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2. Second-degree murder sentence. Apprendi requires that, even when a
defendant pleads guilty to a crime, “other than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 490. In deciding the question of what findings are required
by a jury, “the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect–does the required
finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the
jury’s guilty verdict?” Id. at 494. Mr. Vogt contends that his murder sentence
violates Apprendi because the trial court imposed it after noting that he had
committed a “crime of violence,” a fact, he claims, to which he did not plead
guilty. He argues that his sentence therefore exceeds the maximum “presumptive
range” provided by a verdict based on his plea.
But, as the Colorado Court of Appeals and the federal district court both
noted, second-degree murder is statutorily defined in Colorado as a “per se” crime
of violence that requires no additional fact-finding for imposition of a mandatory
sentence of at least the midpoint, but no more than twice, the maximum
presumptive range. See R. Doc. 20 at 6; id. Doc. 15 at 13 (relying on Terry v.
People ,
977 P.2d 145 (Colo. 1999), and People v. Terry ,
791 P.2d 374 (Colo.
1990)). Thus, when Mr. Vogt pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, he also
implicitly admitted that it was a crime of violence and he received a sentence to
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which he was exposed by the murder conviction. See Terry, 791 P.2d at 378
(determining that Colorado’s sentencing scheme, which mandates application of
increased sentences for certain enumerated crimes, operated “not as a sentence-
enhancing statute but as a presumptive penalty statute.”). Under these
circumstances, the state courts’ application of Apprendi was neither incorrect nor
objectively unreasonable.
3. Robbery sentence. As the federal district court pointed out, the
analysis is somewhat different for Mr. Vogt’s robbery sentence, a class four
felony that is not statutorily defined as a per se crime of violence. See R. Doc. 20
at 7. The presumptive statutory range for robbery is two to six years, but the
court may impose an aggravated, or enhanced, sentence that does not exceed
twelve years if the court “‘concludes that extraordinary . . . aggravating
circumstances are present.’” Id. (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-105(6) (1999)).
The state trial court sentenced Mr. Vogt to the maximum aggravated sentence, to
be served concurrently with his murder sentence. Citing People v. Allen ,
78 P.3d
751 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001), the Colorado Court of Appeals held that Apprendi
principles were not offended. R. Doc. 3, att. 5 at 2.
The Colorado Court of Appeals distinguished Apprendi in Allen . In doing
so, it apparently relied on Apprendi’s statement that it is permissible “for judges
to exercise discretion – taking into consideration various factors relating both to
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offense and offender – in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by
statute.” Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 481. The Allen court observed, “Apprendi does
not require the invalidation of the sentencing scheme adopted by the General
Assembly, which creates a presumptive sentence range and permits the trial court,
in its discretion to sentence in aggravated or mitigated ranges based on
unspecified extraordinary aggravating or mitigating factors or circumstances
particularized to the defendant or the offense.” Allen , 78 P.3d at 755. The Allen
court thus interpreted the words “prescribed statutory maximum” in Apprendi to
include the maximum aggravated range associated with the offense of conviction.
We recently determined whether Allen’s holding was an unreasonable
application of Apprendi , and we held that it was not, at the time Allen was
written. Allen v. Reed , 2005 WL 2697246, at *7. We stated:
It was not until the decision in Blakely that the Supreme Court
clarified the meaning of statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes.
Blakely [v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296], 124 S. Ct. at 2531 [(2004)].
Prior to the issuance of Blakely , the federal circuits unanimously
believed that the “statutory maximum” was the greatest sentence
permitted by the statute of conviction , irrespective of what fact-
finding the court conducted to impose that sentence[.]
...
Indeed, “at the time [Mr. Allen’s] convictions became final, after
Apprendi but before Blakely , a court would not have felt compelled
to conclude Blakely’s rule was constitutionally required.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Price ,
400 F.3d 844, 848 (10th Cir. 2005), petition
for cert. filed , (U.S. May 31, 2005 (No. 04-10694)). Because no material facts
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distinguish the case at bar from our Allen opinion, we are bound by our published
precedent. We therefore conclude that the state court’s application of Apprendi to
the robbery sentence in Mr. Vogt’s case was likewise not unreasonable.
Mr. Vogt’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED . The mandate shall issue
forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Michael W. McConnell
Circuit Judge
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