Filed: Apr. 19, 2005
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 19 2005 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk DANIEL A. HAMRICK, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 04-3182 (D.C. No. 03-CV-4202-JAR) FARMERS ALLIANCE MUTUAL (D. Kan.) INSURANCE COMPANY; PAULA GREATHOUSE, Director of Kansas Workers Compensation Division; SANDY PRAEGER, Commissioner of Kansas Insurance Department, Defendants - Appellees. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before LUCERO , McKAY , and ANDERSON , Circuit Jud
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 19 2005 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk DANIEL A. HAMRICK, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 04-3182 (D.C. No. 03-CV-4202-JAR) FARMERS ALLIANCE MUTUAL (D. Kan.) INSURANCE COMPANY; PAULA GREATHOUSE, Director of Kansas Workers Compensation Division; SANDY PRAEGER, Commissioner of Kansas Insurance Department, Defendants - Appellees. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before LUCERO , McKAY , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judg..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 19 2005
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DANIEL A. HAMRICK,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 04-3182
(D.C. No. 03-CV-4202-JAR)
FARMERS ALLIANCE MUTUAL (D. Kan.)
INSURANCE COMPANY; PAULA
GREATHOUSE, Director of Kansas
Workers Compensation Division;
SANDY PRAEGER, Commissioner of
Kansas Insurance Department,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO , McKAY , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
Daniel A. Hamrick, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his suit
against Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance Company (“Farmers Alliance”), Sandy
Praeger, the Kansas Insurance Commissioner, and Paula Greathouse, the Director
*
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument pursuant
to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
of the Kansas Workers Compensation Division. 1
Hamrick sought monetary
damages and a temporary restraining order in district court for alleged
constitutional violations and alleged violations of the Kansas Workers
Compensation Act.
Hamrick suffered a heart attack while on a work assignment and filed for
workers compensation benefits. He was awarded benefits by a workers
compensation administrative law judge (“ALJ”). The workers compensation
appeals board (“Board”) affirmed the ALJ’s decision in 1997 and the Kansas
Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s decision. In November 2000, Hamrick
wrote to Farmers Alliance and demanded payment of the 1997 award, but to no
avail.
In an action ostensibly independent from his efforts to enforce the 1997
award, Hamrick then filed an application for post-award medical benefits. After a
hearing on Hamrick’s application, the ALJ issued a decision granting limited
relief, which Hamrick appealed. On appeal, the Board partially reversed the
ALJ’s order and granted penalties for Farmers Alliance’s failure to pay the 1997
award and granted reimbursement for additional medical expenses. Because the
1997 award order remained valid and could be enforced in state court, the Board
declined to enter a second order to pay the medical expenses. The Board then
1
Hamrick voluntarily dismissed his claims against defendant Kenneth Hursh.
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reminded Hamrick of the enforcement provisions contained in the workers
compensation act:
The employee may maintain an action in the district court of the
county where the cause of action arose for the collection of such past
due disability compensation and medical compensation, any civil
penalties due under this section and reasonable attorney fees incurred
in connection with the action.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-512a(b).
In affirming the Board’s decision, the Kansas Court of Appeals held that
Hamrick’s due process rights were not violated by the delays in the workers
compensation proceedings. Further, the court of appeals concluded that the
delays in the proceedings were in large part attributable to Hamrick. The decision
also explained that Hamrick could have filed an enforcement action on his award
in state court as early as February 1997.
In May 2003, Hamrick suffered another heart attack. He then filed another
application for post-award medical benefits in which he requested all medical
expenses associated with the May 2003 heart attack. In addition, Hamrick
requested a declaration that the expenses awarded in 1997 are still owed. A
notice of hearing was sent to Hamrick. He filed an application for review and
modification of the Board’s earlier decision, and another notice of hearing was
sent to him. He then filed this action in federal court and filed a motion for a
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temporary restraining order to restrain the workers compensation division from
proceeding with his administrative hearings.
Proceedings against Praeger and Greathouse were dismissed; the district
court concluded that Eleventh Amendment immunity barred the suit and that
Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971), counsels abstention because there is an
ongoing state administrative proceeding that would provide an adequate forum to
hear Hamrick’s constitutional claims, and the state proceeding relates to a matter
traditionally resolved by state law – workers compensation. As to Farmers
Alliance, the court first concluded that the insurance company was not acting
under color of state law when it allegedly refused to pay certain claims, and
therefore did not deprive Hamrick of property without due process. Further, the
court concluded that the Kansas Workers Compensation Act provides the
exclusive remedy for workers compensation claims, and therefore Hamrick must
go through those established procedures to obtain payment from Farmers
Alliance.
Before us, Hamrick fundamentally seeks enforcement of the 1997 workers
compensation award, notwithstanding that he has not availed himself of the
enforcement procedures set forth in the Kansas Workers Compensation Act. He
also seeks additional medical expenses for his second heart attack, ignoring that
his right to benefits for his second heart attack needs to be determined by the
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workers compensation board. Rather than follow the appropriate administrative
and state procedures, Hamrick has filed this action in federal court trying to assert
federal claims in an apparent attempt to circumvent the state workers
compensation procedures. The district court dismissed his case for lack of federal
subject matter jurisdiction and we agree with the district court’s dismissal.
Hamrick’s remedy for the collection of the 1997 award lies in an enforcement
action in state court pursuant to the Kansas statutory scheme. He must proceed
with his workers compensation hearing to determine his right to additional
benefits for his 2003 heart attack.
Having reviewed the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we conclude
that the district court correctly decided this case. We therefore AFFIRM the
challenged decision for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court.
Hamrick filed several “Objections” during the pendency of this appeal.
These objections do not actually contain any requests for relief. To the extent
they can be liberally construed to seek sanctions against the appellees, they are
DENIED .
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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