Filed: Sep. 13, 2005
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS September 13, 2005 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 05-1047 v. (D. Colorado) LONNIE LEE TUNCAP, (D.C. No. 04-CR-121-WM) Defendant - Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before SEYMOUR, HARTZ, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges. Defendant Lonnie Lee Tuncap pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The Presentenc
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS September 13, 2005 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 05-1047 v. (D. Colorado) LONNIE LEE TUNCAP, (D.C. No. 04-CR-121-WM) Defendant - Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before SEYMOUR, HARTZ, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges. Defendant Lonnie Lee Tuncap pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The Presentence..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
September 13, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 05-1047
v. (D. Colorado)
LONNIE LEE TUNCAP, (D.C. No. 04-CR-121-WM)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, HARTZ, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Lonnie Lee Tuncap pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The Presentence Report
(PSR) recommended a base offense level of 24, see United States Sentencing
Guidelines (USSG) § 2K2.1(a)(2), because it concluded that Mr. Tuncap’s two
prior Colorado convictions for third-degree assault were crimes of violence, see
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
USSG § 4B1.2. After the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, see USSG
§ 3E1.1, Mr. Tuncap’s total offense level of 21 and criminal history category V
yielded a guidelines range of 70 to 87 months.
Mr. Tuncap filed a motion objecting to the PSR’s recommendations on the
grounds that the prior Colorado convictions for third-degree assault were not
crimes of violence and that using the prior convictions to enhance his sentence
violated Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296 (2004). He also filed a motion for
downward departure, arguing that using the two prior Colorado convictions to
enhance his sentence took his case out of the heartland of § 2K2.1.
At the sentencing hearing the district court overruled Mr. Tuncap’s
objections and denied the motion for downward departure. The court, at the
behest of both Mr. Tuncap and the government, and noting that it was
“constrained by the law,” sentenced Mr. Tuncap to the 70-month guidelines
minimum. R. Vol. II at 13.
On January 12, 2005, five days after the January 7, 2005, sentencing
hearing, the Supreme Court handed down United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. __,
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). That same day, Mr. Tuncap filed a motion to correct the
sentence. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a). He filed his notice of appeal on January
19, 2005. On April 1, 2005, the district court held a hearing on Mr. Tuncap’s
motion and concluded that it did not have jurisdiction because Fed. R. Crim. P. 35
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allowed for correction of sentence only within seven days of sentencing, a period
long past.
On appeal Mr. Tuncap argues that the district court erred when it found that
his two prior Colorado convictions for third-degree assault were crimes of
violence. He also asserts that his case must be remanded for resentencing because
there was error under Booker and the error was not harmless. The government
argues that the district court properly concluded that the Colorado convictions
were crimes of violence, but it concedes that United States v. Labistida-Segura,
396 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2005), requires Mr. Tuncap’s case to be remanded for
resentencing.
We agree that Labistida controls, and we REMAND to the district court for
resentencing. The question whether third-degree assault is a crime of violence
was resolved in United States v. Paxton, 04-1427 (10th Cir. Sept. 9, 2005).
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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