Filed: Aug. 23, 2005
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit August 23, 2005 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 05-3075 (D.C. Nos. 04-CV-3301-RDR and v. 02-CR-40091-01-RDR) (Kansas) RODNEY D. THOMAS, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY Before SEYMOUR, HARTZ and MCCONNELL, Circuit Judges. Rodney Thomas, proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge the district court
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit August 23, 2005 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 05-3075 (D.C. Nos. 04-CV-3301-RDR and v. 02-CR-40091-01-RDR) (Kansas) RODNEY D. THOMAS, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY Before SEYMOUR, HARTZ and MCCONNELL, Circuit Judges. Rodney Thomas, proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge the district court’..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 23, 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 05-3075
(D.C. Nos. 04-CV-3301-RDR and
v.
02-CR-40091-01-RDR)
(Kansas)
RODNEY D. THOMAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before SEYMOUR, HARTZ and MCCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Rodney Thomas, proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability
(COA) to challenge the district court’s denial of his petition for sentencing relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 1 He also seeks to proceed in forma pauperis (ifp) in this
appeal. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1), and in compliance
with Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), liberally construe Mr. Thomas’
pleadings and submissions to this court. Proceeding as such, we deny Mr.
Thomas’ request for COA and his motion to proceed ifp.
1
The district court denied Mr. Thomas’ application for a COA.
On October 8, 2002, Mr. Thomas entered a plea of guilty to possession with
intent to distribute five grams or more of a substance containing a detectable
amount of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He was sentenced
on August 1, 2003, to a term of imprisonment of 100 months. Judgment against
him was filed on August 4, 2003. Mr. Thomas did not appeal. Then, on
September 5, 2004, Mr. Thomas filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his
sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He alleged he was entitled to sentencing
relief pursuant to Blakely v. Washingon,
542 U.S. 296 (2004). The district court
denied Mr. Thomas’ § 2255 petition, noting the Supreme Court’s ruling in Blakely
and its ruling in United States v. Booker,
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), do not apply
retroactively to cases on collateral review. The court subsequently denied Mr.
Thomas’ petition for COA, and Mr. Thomas now seeks relief before our court,
citing to both Booker and Blakely as the bases of his claims.
The issuance of a COA is jurisdictional. Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S.
322, 336 (2003). A COA can issue only “if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “A
petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could
disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that
jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement
to proceed further.”
Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327. “The COA determination under
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§ 2253(c) requires an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a general
assessment of their merits.”
Id. at 336. “This threshold inquiry does not require
full consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced in support of the claims.
In fact, the statute forbids it.”
Id. While Mr. Thomas, in applying for a COA, is
not required to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate “something
more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his . . .
part.”
Id. at 338 (internal quotations and citation omitted). In addition, because
Mr. Thomas seeks to proceed ifp in this appeal, he must demonstrate that he is
financially unable to pay the requisite fees, and that there exists “a reasoned,
nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on
appeal.” McIntosh v. United States Parole Comm’n,
115 F.3d 809, 812-13 (10th
Cir. 1997) (internal quotation omitted). With these principles in mind, we have
carefully reviewed Mr. Thomas’ brief, the record of these proceedings, and the
district court’s order.
We have held that neither Blakely or Booker can be applied retroactively to
cases on collateral review. See United States v. Bellamy,
411 F.3d 1182, 1186-87
(10th Cir. 2005) (holding neither Blakely nor Booker can be applied
retroactively); United States v. Prince,
400 F.3d 844, 849 (10th Cir. 2005)
(“Blakely does not apply retroactively to convictions that were already final at the
time the Court decided Blakely, June 24, 2004.”). Accordingly, reasonable jurists
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would not debate the district court’s determination that the Supreme Court’s
rulings in Blakely and Booker cannot be applied retroactively to Mr. Thomas’
case. Mr. Thomas’ request for a COA and his motion to proceed ifp are
DENIED.
SUBMITTED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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