Filed: Dec. 02, 2005
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 2, 2005 TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 05-4035 v. (D.C. No. 2:04-CV-894-PGC) KAI HAMPTON, (D. Utah) Defendant-Appellant. ORDER * Before EBEL, McKAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges. This is a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 appeal. Appellant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Subsequentl
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 2, 2005 TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 05-4035 v. (D.C. No. 2:04-CV-894-PGC) KAI HAMPTON, (D. Utah) Defendant-Appellant. ORDER * Before EBEL, McKAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges. This is a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 appeal. Appellant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Subsequently..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 2, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 05-4035
v. (D.C. No. 2:04-CV-894-PGC)
KAI HAMPTON, (D. Utah)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER *
Before EBEL, McKAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
This is a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 appeal. Appellant pled guilty to
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Subsequently, Appellant filed a motion to vacate, set aside,
or correct his federal sentence with the district court. In his motion, Appellant
alleged that his sentence was illegal based on the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296 (2004). The district court denied
Appellant’s motion, holding that Blakey cannot be retroactively applied to § 2255
motions. The district court did not act on the issue of certificate of appealability.
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
Under these circumstances, we deem the certificate of appealability to have been
denied at the district court level. Appellant then filed a letter with this court
which has been docketed as an application for a certificate of appealability. The
issues he raises on appeal are not identical to those he raised to the district court.
Appellant continues to claim that his sentence was illegal under Blakely, but on
appeal he also alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to make the
appropriate Blakely-type objections at either the sentencing hearing or on direct
appeal.
In order for this court to grant a certificate of appealability, Appellant must
make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). To do so, Appellant must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could
debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000) (quotations omitted).
While the district court’s holding in this case could be supported by our
decision in United States v. Price,
400 F.3d 844, 845 (10th Cir. 2005), where we
held that Blakely does not apply retroactively to initial § 2255 motions, Price is
not applicable here because Appellant was not sentenced until after Blakely was
decided. Appellant’s Blakely argument therefore does not need to be applied
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retroactively. Instead, the proper issue to be resolved in this case is whether
counsel’s failure to object on Blakely grounds at sentencing and on direct appeal
amounted to ineffective assistance. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668
(1984).
Appellant’s claim that his sentence was enhanced because of the use of his
prior convictions is a misunderstanding of the law; the Supreme Court’s decision
in Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
523 U.S. 224 (1998), makes it clear that
prior convictions do not apply to Blakely. Therefore, Appellant’s counsel’s
failure to object under Blakely was not error.
We have carefully reviewed Appellant’s brief, the district court’s
disposition, and the record on appeal. Because Appellant has failed to
demonstrate that he is prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to object on Blakely
grounds, no reasonable jurist could conclude that Appellant’s counsel was
ineffective under Strickland.
Accordingly, Appellant has failed to show a denial of a constitutional right
as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and we must DENY his request for a
certificate of appealability and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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