Filed: Dec. 15, 2005
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 15, 2005 TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 05-4105 v. (District of Utah) (D.C. Nos. 2:02-CV-76-DB and ROCENDO ROMERO-BORRAYO, 2:01-CR-56-DB) Defendant-Appellant. ORDER Before BRISCOE, LUCERO and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. Petitioner, Rocendo Romero Borrayo, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) so he can appeal the district court’s denial of the motion t
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 15, 2005 TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 05-4105 v. (District of Utah) (D.C. Nos. 2:02-CV-76-DB and ROCENDO ROMERO-BORRAYO, 2:01-CR-56-DB) Defendant-Appellant. ORDER Before BRISCOE, LUCERO and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. Petitioner, Rocendo Romero Borrayo, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) so he can appeal the district court’s denial of the motion to..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 15, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 05-4105
v. (District of Utah)
(D.C. Nos. 2:02-CV-76-DB and
ROCENDO ROMERO-BORRAYO, 2:01-CR-56-DB)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER
Before BRISCOE, LUCERO and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner, Rocendo Romero Borrayo, seeks a certificate of appealability
(“COA”) so he can appeal the district court’s denial of the motion to vacate, set
aside, or correct sentence he brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1)(B) (providing that a movant may not appeal the denial of a § 2255
motion unless the movant first obtains a COA). Because Borrayo has not made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, we deny his request and
dismiss this appeal.
In 1999, Borrayo was convicted in Utah state court of forgery. He received
an indeterminate sentence of zero to five years but was deported to Mexico after
serving only nine months in jail. In 2001, Borrayo pleaded guilty to illegally
reentering the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). The district court
concluded that Borrayo’s 1999 state conviction was an aggravated felony and
enhanced his sentence pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b). Borrayo was sentenced to
a term of seventy-seven months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised
release. Borrayo did not bring a direct appeal but filed the instant § 2255 motion
on January 29, 2002 seeking to set aside his § 1326(a) conviction.
In his § 2255 motion, Borrayo argues that his § 1326(a) conviction for
illegal reentry is improper because his initial deportation was unlawful.
Specifically, Borrayo asserts that he was denied an effective opportunity to appeal
the removal order because his waiver of his appellate rights was not knowing and
voluntary. He contends that he was not informed of the availability of
discretionary relief from deportation when he signed the waiver. Borrayo also
argues that his 1999 state conviction is not an aggravated felony within the
meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(3)(43) and that his attorney provided constitutionally
ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the characterization of his state
conviction as an aggravated felony. Borrayo also argues that his sentence violates
United States v. Booker,
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
The district court rejected Borrayo’s argument that his state conviction is
not an aggravated felony. Relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R), the court
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concluded the term “aggravated felony” includes Borrayo’s 1999 state conviction
because it was “an offense relating to commercial . . . forgery . . . for which the
term of imprisonment is at least one year.” The court determined that the length
of Borrayo’s indeterminate state sentence was measured by the maximum possible
term of imprisonment. See United States v. Reyes-Castro,
13 F.3d 377, 379-80
(1995). The district court’s rejection of Borrayo’s state conviction claim also
resolved the ineffective assistance claim. The court then concluded Borrayo
failed to demonstrate that the waiver of his right to appeal his removal was not
knowing and voluntary. In the alternative, the court determined that Borrayo was
not eligible for discretionary relief and, thus, he could not demonstrate he was
prejudiced by his failure to appeal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(5) (“No alien
described in this section shall be eligible for any relief from removal that the
Attorney General may grant in the Attorney General’s discretion.”). Finally, the
court rejected Borrayo’s Booker argument on the merits. In his application for
COA and appellate brief, Borrayo abandons his ineffective assistance and Booker
arguments. He does, however, challenge the district court’s conclusions that his
state conviction is an aggravated felony and that he was not prejudiced by his
failure to appeal his removal order.
To be entitled to a COA, Borrayo must make “a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make the requisite
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showing, he must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or,
for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell,
322 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (quotations
omitted). In evaluating whether Borrayo has satisfied his burden, this court
undertakes “a preliminary, though not definitive, consideration of the [legal]
framework” applicable to each of his claims.
Id. at 338. Although Borrayo need
not demonstrate his appeal will succeed to be entitled to a COA, he must “prove
something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith.”
Id.
Having undertaken a review of Borrayo’s application for a COA and
appellate filings, the district court’s order, and the entire record on appeal
pursuant to the framework set out by the Supreme Court in Miller-El, this court
concludes that Borrayo is not entitled to a COA. The district court’s resolution of
Borrayo’s § 2255 motion is not reasonably subject to debate and the issues he
seeks to raise on appeal are not adequate to deserve further proceedings.
Accordingly, this court denies Borrayo’s request for a COA and dismisses this
appeal.
Entered for the Court
CLERK, COURT OF APPEALS
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By
Deputy Clerk
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