Filed: Oct. 13, 2006
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 13, 2006 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 05-2324 v. (D.C. No. CR -05-1218 JP) (D ist. N.M .) CRESCENCIO M UN OZ-OR TIZ, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before M U RPH Y, SE YM OU R, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges. Crescencio M unoz-Ortiz appeals the district court’s imposition of a sentence of 37 months subsequent to
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 13, 2006 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 05-2324 v. (D.C. No. CR -05-1218 JP) (D ist. N.M .) CRESCENCIO M UN OZ-OR TIZ, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before M U RPH Y, SE YM OU R, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges. Crescencio M unoz-Ortiz appeals the district court’s imposition of a sentence of 37 months subsequent to h..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
October 13, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 05-2324
v. (D.C. No. CR -05-1218 JP)
(D ist. N.M .)
CRESCENCIO M UN OZ-OR TIZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before M U RPH Y, SE YM OU R, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
Crescencio M unoz-Ortiz appeals the district court’s imposition of a
sentence of 37 months subsequent to his pleading guilty to illegally reentering the
United States after deportation for a previous conviction for an aggravated felony.
W e affirm.
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
On April 2, 2005, United States Border Patrol Agents encountered M r.
M unoz-O rtiz at the Santa Teresa port of entry in Dona Ana County, New M exico.
An investigation of M r. M unoz-Ortiz’s history established that he was deported to
M exico on July 12, 2003, and had been convicted of the felony of committing or
attempting a lew d act upon a child in South Carolina on M ay 30, 1996. M r.
M unoz-Ortiz was then arrested and later pled guilty to illegally reentering the
United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). The United State Probation
office prepared a presentence report (PSR ) calculating a sentence range based on
the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The PSR assigned a base offense level
of 8 for illegal reentry and recommended a 16 level enhancement pursuant to
U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) for M r. M unoz-Ortiz’s prior conviction for a lewd act
upon a child under South Carolina law. The PSR further recommended a 3 level
reduction in the offense level for acceptance of responsibility. The resulting
offense level of 21, in conjunction with a criminal history category of I, resulted
in a guidelines sentencing range of 37 to 46 months.
In response to the PSR, M r. M unoz-Ortiz filed a sentencing memorandum
requesting a reduction in the sixteen-level enhancement. He argued that under
United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005), the district court was required to
consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and that those factors
warranted a sentence below the guideline sentencing range. M r. M unoz-Ortiz
argued that his pure motives for reentry, to “resume his role as father and provide
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a stable environment for his children,” and his voluntary disclosure of the actions
that led to his sole felony conviction call for a sentence below the Guidelines
range. Rec. vol. II at 4. He specifically stated that his reasons for re-entry were
not “solely to find work,” but were focused on remedying his w ife’s struggles to
raise their three children in the United States.
Id. at 9. Counsel for M r. Ortiz-
M unoz reiterated these arguments at the sentencing hearing, and claimed his
client’s case is “outside the heartland of cases that typically might come before
this Court.” Rec. vol. IV at 11. The district court subsequently imposed a
sentence of 37 months, the bottom of the guideline range recommended by the
PSR.
On appeal, M r. M unoz-Ortiz contends the district court’s imposition of a
sentence at the bottom of his guideline range was substantively unreasonable in
light of United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005), and the factors outlined in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Specifically, he claims that the “nature and circumstances
of the offense and the history characteristics of the defendant weigh heavily in
favor of a lesser sentence,” and were not properly taken into account by the
district court. Aplt. Br. at 17.
“Under Booker, we are required to review district court sentencing
decisions for ‘reasonableness.’” United States v. Cage,
451 F.3d 585, 591 (10th
Cir. 2006). In United States v. Kristl,
437 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir. 2006), we
announced a two-step approach to review the procedural and substantive
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components of sentences post-Booker. First, if challenged, we consider whether
the district court properly calculated the defendant’s guidelines sentence and
considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Sanchez-
Juarez,
446 F.3d 1109, (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Chavez-Diaz,
444 F.3d
1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 2006). If the district court properly determined the
guidelines sentence, we then determine whether the sentence imposed is
reasonable in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Kristl, 437
F.3d at 1054-55. Sentences imposed within the advisory guideline range are
presumed reasonable.
Id. at 1054. “The defendant may rebut this presumption by
demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the . . . sentencing
factors laid out in § 3553(a).”
Id. at 1055.
M r. M unoz-Ortiz neither challenges the district court’s calculation of the
guidelines nor asserts the § 3553(a) factors were not considered by the district
court. Therefore, his w ithin guidelines sentence is “entitled to a rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness.”
Id., 437 F.3d at 1054. To rebut this
presumption, M r. M unoz-Ortiz must demonstrate “that the sentence is
unreasonable when viewed against the other factors delineated in § 3553(a).”
Id.
M r. M unoz-Ortiz seeks to rebut this presumption by contending his motive
for illegally crossing the border, namely, to alleviate his family’s hardship,
warrants a lower sentence. At the sentencing hearing, M r. M unoz-Ortiz presented
the district court with an oral recounting of the suggested mitigating factors
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presented in his sentencing memorandum. The court noted that it had
“considered all [the] information” presented by the government and M r. M unoz-
Ortiz, and was aware that family issues in this case represented “another sad
situation.” Rec. vol. IV at 12, 15. The court, however, was unpersuaded that “a
sentence outside the guidelines would be justified” in this case.
Id. at 15. There
is nothing to indicate that the court’s consideration of the factors of §3553(a),
including the “the history and characteristics of the defendant” that created this
“sad situation,” was unreasonable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The court
considered the relevant factors required by § 3553(a) and the circumstances of
this case, and we cannot say it acted unreasonably in rejecting M r. M unoz-O rtiz’s
request for a lower sentence.
W e A FFIR M .
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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