Filed: Nov. 28, 2006
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT PA TRIC K C . LY N N , Petitioner-A ppellant, v. No. 05-3470 (D.C. No. 03-CV-3464-JAR) RAY ROBERTS, W arden, El Dorado Correctional Facility; PHILL KLINE, Attorney General of Kansas, Respondents-Appellees. OR DER Before H E N RY, A ND ER SO N, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges. This matter comes before the panel on M r. Lynn’s motion for an extension of time and his petition for rehearing or for rehearing en banc. His motion for a third exte
Summary: UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT PA TRIC K C . LY N N , Petitioner-A ppellant, v. No. 05-3470 (D.C. No. 03-CV-3464-JAR) RAY ROBERTS, W arden, El Dorado Correctional Facility; PHILL KLINE, Attorney General of Kansas, Respondents-Appellees. OR DER Before H E N RY, A ND ER SO N, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges. This matter comes before the panel on M r. Lynn’s motion for an extension of time and his petition for rehearing or for rehearing en banc. His motion for a third exten..
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UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT
PA TRIC K C . LY N N ,
Petitioner-A ppellant,
v. No. 05-3470
(D.C. No. 03-CV-3464-JAR)
RAY ROBERTS, W arden, El Dorado
Correctional Facility; PHILL KLINE,
Attorney General of Kansas,
Respondents-Appellees.
OR DER
Before H E N RY, A ND ER SO N, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
This matter comes before the panel on M r. Lynn’s motion for an extension
of time and his petition for rehearing or for rehearing en banc. His motion for a
third extension of time to file his petition is granted. Upon consideration of the
petition, the panel grants rehearing in part, withdraws the Order filed on
September 1, 2006, and issues the attached Order and Judgment in its place. The
panel denies the petition for rehearing in all other respects.
The petition for rehearing en banc was transmitted to all of the judges of
the court who are in regular active service. As no judge in regular active service
on the court requested that the court be polled on the en banc request, the petition
for rehearing en banc is denied.
Entered for the Court
ELISABETH A. SHUM AKER, Clerk
By:
Deputy Clerk
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
November 28, 2006
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
PA TRIC K C . LY N N ,
Petitioner-A ppellant,
v. No. 05-3470
(D.C. No. 03-CV-3464-JAR)
RAY ROBERTS, W arden, El Dorado (D . Kan.)
Correctional Facility; PHILL
KLINE, Attorney General of K ansas,
Respondents-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before H E N RY, A ND ER SO N, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
Patrick C. Lynn, a Kansas state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his
28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. W e grant COA on three
issues, and because M r. Lynn has had ample opportunity to brief his arguments, 1
*
After examining the appellant’s filings and appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G ).
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order is not
binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel.
1
In addition to his application for COA, M r. Lynn has filed an Opening
(continued...)
we decide the merits of those issues and AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.
I.
In 1996, M r. Lynn was convicted of aggravated burglary, aggravated
kidnaping, rape, and aggravated sodomy after a trial in Kansas state court. After
his sentences were reversed by the Kansas Court of Appeals in his first direct
appeal and the Kansas Supreme Court in a second direct appeal, in 2004 M r. Lynn
was resentenced to a term of imprisonment of 49 years and 8 months.
In his § 2254 petition, M r. Lynn asserted four claims: (1) ineffective
assistance of counsel, (2) prosecutorial misconduct, (3) newly discovered
evidence that had been suppressed during his trial, and (4) errors by the trial court
that violated his Sixth and Fourteenth A mendment rights. He later filed a more
definite statement fleshing out his claims and adding claims of (5) trial court
errors that violated the Kansas Constitution and Brady v. M aryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), (6) judicial misconduct, and (7) trial court error in refusing to allow him
1
(...continued)
Brief and documents entitled Supplemental Arguments for Relief, M otion for
Serious Sanctions, Request for Orders; Second Supplemental Arguments for
Relief and M otion for Very Serious Sanctions, Request for Orders and
Evidentiary Hearing Remand; Supplement to Rehearing/EnBanc Request and
M otion for Orders; Appellant’s Affidavits of Events and Request for Out of Time
Filing if Briefs Not Received or Timely Filed; and Emergency M otion for Orders
and Request for Stay Until Resolved Due to Deliberately Illegal Conditions.
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to argue trial errors before his resentencing. Liberally construing his claims, the
district court denied relief and denied a COA.
II.
Standards of Review
A COA may issue only if the appellant makes “a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). For claims rejected on
the merits, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find
the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.”
Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). For claims rejected on procedural
grounds, “a CO A should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”
Id. Our COA
analysis is limited to “an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a
general assessment of their merits” rather than “full consideration of the factual
or legal bases adduced in support of the claims.” M iller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S.
322, 336 (2003).
“W e review the district court’s legal analysis of the state court decision de
novo.” Bland v. Sirmons, 459 F.3d 999, 1009 (10th Cir. 2006). For claims
decided by the Kansas courts, M r. Lynn “is entitled to federal habeas relief only
if the state court decision ‘was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
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application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States,’ or ‘was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’” Id.
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)). Claims that were presented to, but not
decided by, the state courts are not constrained by the § 2254(d) standards. See
Sperry v. M cKune,
445 F.3d 1268, 1274-75 (10th Cir. 2006). In such instance, w e
review questions of law de novo.
Id. at 1275.
COA Analysis
In his filings before this court, M r. Lynn urgently requests that someone
listen to his pleas and consider his arguments. W e have done so, giving his issues
careful and serious consideration. W e also have review ed two boxes of state
court records and a box of district court records. 2 Although we grant COA on
three issues, as explained below , ultimately we conclude that M r. Lynn’s
arguments are not sufficient for habeas relief. 3
2
M r. Lynn complains the appellate record does not contain the entire state
court record. W e acknowledge the appellate record does not contain certain
evidence and documents he references. W e need not require the production of
such items, however, because for purposes of our review, we have assumed
M r. Lynn’s description of any missing item or document is true and accurate.
3
On appeal, M r. Lynn also extensively complains about prison restrictions
on paper, stamps, envelopes, copies and writing utensils. As the district court
explained to M r. Lynn, these types of conditions-of-confinement claims by state
prisoners must be brought in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; they do not justify
habeas relief. See Rael v. Williams, 223 F.3d 1153, 1154 (10th Cir. 2000).
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W e disagree that the district court should have afforded M r. Lynn an
evidentiary hearing, allowed him to pursue discovery, and appointed him counsel;
that it erred in refusing to order the production of state court records; and that it
erred in refusing to transfer prior pleadings and exhibits. W ith the exception of
three issues, we adopt the district court’s thorough analysis and deny a COA for
substantially the reasons expressed in the November 1, 2005 M emorandum and
Order Denying M otion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 4 The three exceptions are
M r. Lynn’s Brady claims, trial error claims, and judicial misconduct claims.
Finally, to the extent M r. Lynn raises new issues on appeal, we do not consider
them. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976).
In one part of its decision, the district court stated the Brady claims “would
be procedurally barred in this Court because the Kansas state courts never
addressed petitioner’s Brady arguments.” R. Doc. 77 at 28. In the next section,
the court indicates that the Brady claims had never been presented to the state
courts, not just that the state courts had never decided them. Id. at 29. It appears,
however, that M r. Lynn raised his Brady arguments before the state appellate
4
To the extent that the district court failed to rule on M r. Lynn’s claim that
he was denied the opportunity to present claims of trial error before resentencing,
we note that M r. Lynn’s right to allocution at sentencing stems from Kan. Stat.
Ann. §§ 22-3422 and 22-3424(e)(4). Federal habeas relief is not available for
violations of state law. See Estelle v. M cGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).
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court in his first direct appeal, albeit in his pro se reply brief. 5 As discussed
above, a state court’s decision not to address an issue does not preclude review ; it
merely affects the standard of review . Because reasonable jurists “would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling” and
“would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of
a constitutional right,” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, we grant COA on the issue of
whether M r. Lynn’s constitutional rights, as explained by Brady, were violated.
As for the trial error and judicial misconduct claims, the district court
stated those claims could not be raised in a § 2254 proceeding because they had
not been raised in the state courts. To the contrary, a procedural default can be
overcome on habeas by showing cause and prejudice for failure to raise the
defaulted claim or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See, e.g., House v. Bell,
126 S. Ct. 2064, 2076 (2006); Edwards v. Carpenter,
529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000).
Thus, reasonable jurists “would find it debatable whether the district court was
correct in its procedural ruling.”
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. M r. Lynn facially
alleged these claims in his habeas pleadings, and thus, reasonable jurists w ould
also find it debatable that the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
5
M r. Lynn’s Brady arguments appear to concern the non-production of a
M ay 16, 1996 surveillance tape of proceedings at the police station after his arrest
and a M ay 16, 1996 mug shot. To the extent he also claims that certain evidence
about the victim and her medical reports was suppressed in violation of Brady,
M r. Lynn’s own arguments show that such information was disclosed by the
prosecution to defense counsel prior to trial, and thus Brady is not implicated.
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constitutional right. See Paredes v. Atherton, 224 F.3d 1160, 1161 (10th Cir.
2000). Thus, we grant COA on the questions of whether trial court errors or
judicial misconduct violated M r. Lynn’s constitutional rights.
M erits Analysis
Brady Claims
Under Brady and its progeny, constitutional error results from the
suppression of evidence “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995) (quotation omitted).
“The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have
received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he
received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of
confidence.”
Id. at 434. Having undertaken a de novo review of M r. Lynn’s
Brady claims, we do not believe that it is reasonably probable that pre-trial
disclosure of the 5/16/96 surveillance videotape and the 5/16/96 mug shot would
have led to a different result at M r. Lynn’s trial or that the evidentiary
suppressions undermined confidence in the outcome of M r. Lynn’s trial.
Particularly, assuming that the 5/16/96 booking room videotape shows what
M r. Lynn avers (that his pants were zipped and buttoned at the police station),
given that the tape recorded events at a different locale than, and sometime after,
M r. Lynn’s arrest, we do not believe that such evidence necessarily contradicts
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the testimony of the officers about the state of M r. Lynn’s clothing when they
arrested him. Neither the videotape nor the mug shot “could reasonably be taken
to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the
verdict.” Id. at 435.
Trial Error and Judicial M isconduct Claims
In order to move forward with these claims, M r. Lynn first must overcome
his procedural default by showing cause and prejudice. Ineffective assistance of
counsel may be cause for a default, see Edwards, 529 U.S. at 451, but we find no
ineffective assistance. The claims lack merit, and thus counsel’s failure to argue
them w as not deficient performance. See
Sperry, 445 F.3d at 1275. For the same
reason, M r. Lynn cannot show prejudice from the failure to raise them before the
state courts, and we also find no fundamental miscarriage of justice would arise
from a failure to address these claims. Consequently, the trial error and judicial
misconduct claims are procedurally defaulted and do not entitle M r. Lynn to
habeas relief.
III.
M r. Lynn’s A ffidavits of Events and Request for Out of Time Filing is
GRANTED to the extent that his application for COA and opening brief are
allowed to be filed. His Supplemental Arguments for Relief filed June 21, 2006
and Second Supplemental A rguments for Relief filed July 21, 2006 are allowed to
the extent that the filings further explain his application for COA and opening
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brief. The motions for sanctions and further orders in those filings are DENIED.
His February 8, 2006 letter, construed as a M otion for Recusal, and his
Emergency M otion for Orders are DENIED. His Petition for Time Extension and
Emergency Intervention Orders and Supplement to Rehearing/En Banc Request
and M otion for Orders are DENIED as moot. Any other pending motions or
requests are DENIED. M r. Lynn’s request for a certificate of appealability is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as explained in this order and judgment.
As to the issues on which COA is granted, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIR M ED.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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