Filed: Oct. 12, 2006
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS October 12, 2006 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court JEFFREY LYLE PROPHET, Petitioner-A ppellant, No. 06-1228 v. (D . of Colo.) TONY CAROCHI, W arden, and (D.C. No. 05-CV-1093-M SK-PAC) A TTO RN EY G EN ER AL O F THE STA TE OF C OLO RA D O , Respondents-Appellees. OR DER DENY ING CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY * Before TA CH A, Chief Judge, HA RTZ, and TYM KOVICH, Circuit Judges. ** Jeffrey Lyle
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS October 12, 2006 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court JEFFREY LYLE PROPHET, Petitioner-A ppellant, No. 06-1228 v. (D . of Colo.) TONY CAROCHI, W arden, and (D.C. No. 05-CV-1093-M SK-PAC) A TTO RN EY G EN ER AL O F THE STA TE OF C OLO RA D O , Respondents-Appellees. OR DER DENY ING CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY * Before TA CH A, Chief Judge, HA RTZ, and TYM KOVICH, Circuit Judges. ** Jeffrey Lyle ..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
October 12, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JEFFREY LYLE PROPHET,
Petitioner-A ppellant, No. 06-1228
v. (D . of Colo.)
TONY CAROCHI, W arden, and (D.C. No. 05-CV-1093-M SK-PAC)
A TTO RN EY G EN ER AL O F THE
STA TE OF C OLO RA D O ,
Respondents-Appellees.
OR DER DENY ING CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY *
Before TA CH A, Chief Judge, HA RTZ, and TYM KOVICH, Circuit Judges. **
Jeffrey Lyle Prophet, a Colorado state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s decision denying
his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Prophet also seeks to
proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) in this appeal. For substantially the same reasons
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders; nevertheless, an order may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
set forth in the magistrate judge’s recommendation, we conclude Prophet is not
entitled to a COA. M oreover, we deny his request to proceed IFP because he has
failed to demonstrate a financial inability to pay the required fees.
I. Background
Prophet’s § 2254 petition arises out of his 2000 Colorado conviction for
second-degree murder and second-degree assault, for which he received two
consecutive prison terms for 48 and 12 years, respectively. The Colorado Court
of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentence on direct appeal, and the
Colorado Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari.
Subsequently, Prophet filed post-conviction motions in the Colorado trial court.
The trial court denied his motions, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed
those rulings. The Colorado Supreme Court then denied Prophet’s petition for a
writ of certiorari in the post-conviction proceedings.
In this § 2254 action, Prophet raised the following claims: (1) his guilty
plea was not knowing and voluntary, in violation of his federal constitutional
right to due process, because he was under the influence of the sleep aid Restoril
when he entered the plea; (2) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment by allowing him to enter the plea
while under the influence of Restoril; (3) trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to investigate or advise him on the heat of passion defense.
The magistrate judge concluded claims one and two were meritless and claim
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three was procedurally barred because Prophet failed to raise it before the trial
court as required by state law. W ith respect to claim three, moreover, the
magistrate judge found Prophet had failed to satisfy either the cause and prejudice
or fundamental miscarriage of justice exceptions to the procedural bar. Upon de
novo review, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation
and dismissed the petition.
II. Discussion
To appeal the district court’s denial of his § 2254 petition, Prophet must
obtain a COA by making “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). He may make this showing by demonstrating that
“reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional
claims debatable or wrong.” M iller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003).
“[A] claim can be debatable even though every jurist of reason might agree, after
the COA has been granted and the case has received full consideration, that [the]
petitioner w ill not prevail.”
Id. M oreover, because he seeks to proceed IFP in
this appeal, Prophet must also demonstrate an inability to pay the required fees
and “a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the
issues raised.” M cIntosh v. United States Parole Comm’n,
115 F.3d 809, 812
(10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
For substantially the same reasons set forth by the magistrate judge, we
conclude that Prophet is not entitled to a COA. The magistrate judge’s
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recommendation reflects a careful analysis of the record and is supported by the
applicable law. The court found that Prophet failed to show mental impairment as
a result of drug use at the time he entered his guilty plea and thus neither his due
process claim nor his first ineffective assistance of counsel claim can stand. W ith
respect to the second ineffective assistance of counsel claim— that counsel
impermissibly failed to investigate the heat of passion defense— we agree that the
claim is procedurally barred. Prophet made no showing that he was precluded
from raising the defense in a prior appeal, or that facts existed showing he was
actually innocent of the crime.
Finally, Prophet is not entitled to proceed IFP for the reasons stated in the
district court order dated July 19, 2006, which found Prophet’s IFP motion
deficient because it failed to include required financial information and the
applicable filing fee. The court gave Prophet leave to amend the motion, but he
failed to cure the deficiencies by the required deadline.
III. Conclusion
For substantially the same reasons set forth in the magistrate’s
recommendation we D ENY Prophet’s application for a COA, DENY Prophet’s
motion to proceed IFP, and DISM ISS this appeal.
Entered for the Court,
Timothy M . Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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