Filed: Jan. 30, 2007
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 30, 2007 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court M A D IN A BU H EN D WA , Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 05-1526 v. (D. Colorado) (D.C. No. CIV-03-CV -485-REB-OES) U N IV ERSITY O F C OLO RA D O AT BOULDER, Defendant-Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before KELLY, A LA RC ÓN, ** and LUCERO , Circuit Judges. M adina Buhendwa appeals from the order dismissing her claims of discrimination, asserted unde
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 30, 2007 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court M A D IN A BU H EN D WA , Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 05-1526 v. (D. Colorado) (D.C. No. CIV-03-CV -485-REB-OES) U N IV ERSITY O F C OLO RA D O AT BOULDER, Defendant-Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before KELLY, A LA RC ÓN, ** and LUCERO , Circuit Judges. M adina Buhendwa appeals from the order dismissing her claims of discrimination, asserted under..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
January 30, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
M A D IN A BU H EN D WA ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 05-1526
v.
(D. Colorado)
(D.C. No. CIV-03-CV -485-REB-OES)
U N IV ERSITY O F C OLO RA D O AT
BOULDER,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, A LA RC ÓN, ** and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
M adina Buhendwa appeals from the order dismissing her claims of
discrimination, asserted under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 791 et seq. (“Rehabilitation Act”), and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (“Title VI”) against the University of Colorado at Boulder (the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 (eff. Dec.
1, 2006) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1 (eff. Jan. 1, 2007).
**
The Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón, Senior Circuit Judge, United
States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
“University”). She contends that the District Court erred in concluding that (1)
she is not disabled under the Rehabilitation Act and was not discriminated against
solely on the basis of her disability; and (2) she was not subjected to
discrimination or denied benefits provided under Title VI because of her race.
W e affirm because we conclude that she has failed to demonstrate that she was
subjected to discrimination based solely on her alleged disability or that she was
denied benefits under Title VI because of her race.
I
At the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit, M s. Buhendwa was a
student at the University of Colorado at Boulder. She is a native of the nation of
Zaire and of African ethnicity, but is now a lawful permanent resident of the
United States. Her native language is Sw ahili. She also speaks M ashi, Lingala,
French, and English. M s. Buhendwa began taking classes at the University in the
early 1990s. She eventually pursued pre-medical school studies with a triple
major in kinesiology, classics, and psychology.
During her academic career, M s. Buhendwa attempted to pass calculus five
separate times. Her first four attempts resulted in course withdrawal or a failing
grade.
A
In the spring semester of 2001, M s. Buhendwa enrolled in a calculus class
taught by Professor Stanislaw Swierczkow ski. W hile enrolled in this class, M s.
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Buhendwa visited the Student Academic Services Center. She met with Daniel
W est, the U niversity’s English as a Second Language Program Coordinator. M s.
B uhendw a complained to M r. West that she experienced test-taking anxiety. At
her request, M r. W est addressed a letter to Professor Noel Lenski. It reads as
follows:
M adina Buhendwa recently visited the Student
Academic Services Center (SASC) for help with certain
academic issues, one being test anxiety. Upon your
approval this letter provides support for M adina to
receive additional time for your course exams. Through
discussion with M adina, she describes a common test
anxiety for student’s [sic] whose native language is not
English. Her second language proficiency does not
allow her to process reading and writing in English as
efficiently as native English language speakers.
Extended testing time can improve M adina’s exam
performance on a more equal level with native English
speakers.
Please note that test anxiety is not a recognized disorder
within the ADA. Nonetheless, it is a legitimate learning
challenge for countless students on the Boulder campus,
and for those who are non-native speakers of English
this challenge is exponential. Unfortunately, budget
constraints prevent the SASC from offering assistance in
this area beyond helping students identify the problem
and supporting strategies for help. As M adina’s
professor, you could provide assistance within the
testing environment. Additional time and, when
possible, alternative testing space have proved helpful
for other students with similar difficulties. If you elect
to provide M adina additional time, we suggest 30
additional minutes for an hour exam and 45 additional
minutes for a 75 minute exam.
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Before the District Court, the University noted that M r. W est’s letter was
addressed to Professor Lenski, not Professor Swierczkowski, and argued that it
was unauthenticated. However, before this Court, the University does not dispute
that Professor Swierczkowski had knowledge of M r. W est’s suggestion.
During the semester in which she was enrolled in Professor
Sw ierczkowski’s class, M s. Buhendwa did not consult the University’s Office of
Disability Services to seek a determination on whether she was disabled. That
office evaluates student disabilities and requests for accommodations under the
Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §
12101 et seq. Although M s. Buhendwa claims that she injured her back and took
pain medications while she w as a member of Professor Swierczkow ski’s class,
she testified in her deposition that she did not inform Professor Sw ierczkowski of
the symptoms caused by taking her medication.
Students in Professor Swierczkowski’s calculus course were required to
take four examinations. Pursuant to M r. W est’s suggestion, Professor
Swierczkow ski agreed to grant M s. Buhendwa additional time to complete these
examinations.
M s. Buhendwa fell asleep before completing her final examination. W hen
Professor Sw ierczkowski discovered that she was asleep, he declined to allow her
extra time to complete the examination. She received a 58.5% on the final
examination.
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B
Professor Sw ierczkowski’s course also included ten quizzes. In her
deposition, M s. Buhendwa testified that she had informed Professor
Swierczkowski that throughout the semester she would have to miss some of his
quizzes because she would “need to be at work.” She further testified that
Professor Sw ierczkowski originally agreed to ignore her missed quizzes when
calculating her final grade. After she fell asleep during the final examination,
however, he changed his mind and gave her a zero score on each of her missed
quizzes. M s. Buhendwa alleges in her affidavit that,
[u]p until the time I fell asleep during the final exam,
Professor Sw ierczkowski had been abiding by our
agreement and calculating my [quiz] grade on the work I
performed. After I fell asleep during the final exam, he
unilaterally and arbitrarily changed the method he used
to calculate my grade and instead calculated my grade
based upon the total number of quizzes given.
M s. Buhendwa testified in her deposition that she heard Professor
Swierczkowski tell an unnamed blond student that she could take a quiz in his
office, and she saw another unnamed blond student taking an examination or quiz
in his office. She also testified that she heard Professor Sw ierczkowski tell one
of these blond students that he would calculate her grade without considering the
fact that she missed a quiz.
Despite the fact that M s. Buhendwa never scored higher than 65% on any
of her examinations and missed more than half the quizzes, Professor
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Swierczkowski gave her a passing grade of “C-.” M s. Buhendwa had an overall
grade point average (“GPA ”) of 1.98 at the end of the spring semester. She
asserts in her brief that because she did not maintain a 2.0 or greater GPA , she
was denied financial aid for the fall semester.
II
This Court review s a grant of summary judgment de novo. M cGuinness v.
University of New M exico School of M edicine, 170 F.3d 974, 977 (10th Cir.
1998). Summary judgment is appropriate w hen there is “no genuine issue as to
any material fact and [] the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “There is no genuine issue of material fact unless
the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”
Bones v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc.,
366 F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir. 2004).
To establish a genuine issue of material fact, a plaintiff must “go beyond
the pleadings and designate specific facts so as to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case[.]” Sealock v.
Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000). “Unsubstantiated allegations
carry no probative weight in summary judgment proceedings.” Self v. Crum,
439
F.3d 1227, 1230 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Phillips v. Calhoun,
956 F.2d 949, 951 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992)).
III
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A
M s. Buhendwa argues that the District Court erred when it granted
summary judgment in favor of the University on her Rehabilitation Act claim.
She contends that the District Court erred in concluding that her test-taking
anxiety did not qualify as a disability and that she w as not discriminated against
based on her alleged disability. W e note, however, that the District Court made
no ruling regarding whether M s. Buhendwa is disabled under the Rehabilitation
Act. The District Court stated in the adopted Report and Recommendation that
“[f]or purposes of the M otion for Summary Judgment, the University does not
dispute that plaintiff is disabled[.]” W e need not determine in this appeal whether
test-taking anxiety is a mental or physical impairment because M s. Buhendwa has
conceded that she was not allowed additional time to complete her final
examination because she fell asleep during the time allotted for the examination.
To establish a cause of action under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must
show “(1) that he [or she] is a handicapped individual under the Act, (2) that he
[or she] is otherwise qualified for the [benefit] sought, (3) that he [or she] was
[discriminated against] solely by reason of his [or her] handicap, and (4) that the
program or activity in question receives federal financial assistance.” Johnson by
Johnson v. Thom pson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1492 (10th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (alterations added and in original). M s. Buhendwa bases her
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Rehabilitation Act claim against the University as a student at the University,
which receives federal funding.
M s. Buhendwa focuses much of her argument on the first element of her
claim, regarding whether she is “a handicapped individual under the Act.”
However, M s. Buhendwa has failed to demonstrate that she was discriminated
against solely by reason of her alleged handicap – the third essential element of
her claim.
M s. Buhendwa testified in her deposition that Professor Sw ierczkowski
granted her extra time to complete all of her examinations, except for the final
examination. She testified that he did not allow her extra time on the final
examination because he discovered that she had fallen asleep. The alleged
discrimination she experienced was not based on language-induced test-taking
anxiety, but was instead caused by the fact that she fell asleep during the
examination. Thus, summary judgment was appropriate on this claim.
B
M s. Buhendwa also challenges the dismissal of her Title VI claim against
the University. She asserts that she established a prim a facie case of
discrimination by showing that two “blond” students were given an opportunity,
not afforded to her, to take quizzes and examinations in Professor
Sw ierczkowski’s office, and that one of the students was told by Professor
Swierczkowski that, in calculating her grade, he would ignore her missed quizzes.
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Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, in pertinent part “that no
person shall, ‘on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity’ covered by Title VI.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.
275, 278 (2001). “[P]rivate individuals may sue to enforce § 601 of Title VI and
obtain both injunctive relief and damages.”
Id. at 279.
A Title VI claim is analyzed using the burden-shifting analysis outlined in
Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981).
Bryant v. Indep. Sch. D ist. N o. I-38 of Garvin County, OK,
334 F.3d 928, 929-30
(10th Cir. 2003).
First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the
preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of
discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in
proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
defendant to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for [the discharge]. Third,
should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must
then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the
defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext
for discrimination. . . . The ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains
at all times with the plaintiff.
Id. at 930 (quoting
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53).
In the context of employment discrimination cases, a prim a facie claim of
disparate treatment is established w hen a plaintiff shows: (1) that he or she is a
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member of a protected class; (2) that he or she was disciplined; and (3) that
similarly situated comparators were treated differently for the same or similar
conduct. M acKenzie v. City & County of Denver, 414 F.3d 1266, 1277 (10th Cir.
2005). “Individuals are considered ‘similarly-situated’ when they (1) have dealt
with the same supervisor; (2) were subjected to the same w ork standards; and (3)
had engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating
circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of
them for it.”
Id.
M s. Buhendwa contends that, as a person of African ethnicity, she was
treated differently for the same conduct as were her similarly situated
comparators who were blond. She testified in her deposition that,
[t]he blond girl was – when she did not do her – her
quizzes, Professor Sw ierczkowski told her that she can
do – she could come to the office to do it. And the day I
was in his office, the gentleman who was sitting in his
office was taking the exam, was also white, was a blond,
young male, was taking – And he had told me that he
would do that, he would at least – he would calculate my
quiz based on the grade, based on the quiz that I have
done. Then after I fall asleep, he gave me the zero.
M s. Buhendwa testified that she was never offered the opportunity to take quizzes
in Professor Sw ierczkowski’s office, and, despite stating his intention to do
otherwise, he counted all of her missed quizzes as zeros when calculating her
final grade.
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M s. Buhendwa cites Bryant in support of her argument that such statements
sufficiently establish a prima facie case of discrimination. In Bryant, this Court
acknowledged that the black-student plaintiffs had set forth a prim a facie case of
discrimination when “[t]hey alleged that they were suspended after the February
8, 2000, fight while Caucasian students who participated in the fight were not
suspended.” 334 F.3d at 930. Thus, M s. Buhendwa maintains that her deposition
testimony regarding the unnamed “blond” students satisfies the prim a facie case
requirements articulated in Bryant. Her reliance on Bryant is misplaced.
Unlike the circumstances in Bryant, M s. Buhendwa has failed to
demonstrate that she was treated differently from the “blond” students for the
same conduct. First, she testified that Professor Sw ierczkowski’s sanction of
scoring her missed quizzes as zeros was based upon the fact that she fell asleep
during the final examination. In her deposition, M s. Buhendwa stated that
“[Professor Sw ierczkowski] had told me that. . .he would calculate my quiz based
on the grade, based on the quiz that I have done. Then after I fall asleep, he gave
me the zero.” M s. Buhendwa has presented no evidence that the “blond” students
fell asleep during an examination and received no sanction, or whether Professor
Swierczkowski ultimately calculated a “blond” student’s grade differently.
Second, M s. Buhendwa has presented no evidence that the “blond” students
missed any quizzes, or that a “blond” male student was, in fact, making up a
missed quiz in Professor Swierczkowski’s office. She has also failed to
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demonstrate the circumstances that motivated Professor Swierczkowski to offer a
“blond” female student the opportunity to take a quiz in his office.
Accordingly we conclude that the District Court did not err in granting
summary judgment on each of M s. Buhendwa’s claims.
A FFIR ME D.
Entered for the court
Arthur L. Alarcón
Senior Circuit Judge
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