Filed: Jun. 01, 2007
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS June 1, 2007 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 05-2054 v. D. New M exico JA IM E M EN D O ZA , (D.C. No. CR-04-236-WJ) Defendant - Appellant. OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT * Before O’BRIEN, B AL DOC K , and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges. Jaime M endoza was convicted by a jury of (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distributi
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS June 1, 2007 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 05-2054 v. D. New M exico JA IM E M EN D O ZA , (D.C. No. CR-04-236-WJ) Defendant - Appellant. OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT * Before O’BRIEN, B AL DOC K , and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges. Jaime M endoza was convicted by a jury of (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distributio..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
June 1, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 05-2054
v. D. New M exico
JA IM E M EN D O ZA , (D.C. No. CR-04-236-WJ)
Defendant - Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before O’BRIEN, B AL DOC K , and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
Jaime M endoza was convicted by a jury of (1) conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute and distribution of more than five kilograms of cocaine and (2)
distribution of more than 500 grams of cocaine. He was sentenced to 293 months
imprisonment. M endoza says the district court erred in admitting expert
testimony, denying disclosure of the identities of two confidential informants and
admitting testimony concerning threats he made to tw o government w itnesses.
W e affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
I. Factual Background
On M arch 19, 2002, Nina Valdez was arrested in Albuquerque, New
M exico, after selling 294.4 grams of crack cocaine to an undercover officer. Law
enforcement officers asked Valdez to cooperate and identify the source of the
crack cocaine. Valdez identified the source as “Rob.” 1 The officers asked her to
arrange a meeting with “Rob” so they could arrest him. She called Robert Beal.
During the conversation, Beal asked, “A re w e in trouble?” (R. Vol. VII at 799.)
Valdez said, “Yeah,” which she knew Beal would understand to mean she had
been arrested. (R. Vol. VIII at 988.) Upon receiving the Valdez call, Beal tried
to contact Charles Britt, another dealer who sold to Valdez. Subsequently, Beal
discarded the cellphone he used to contact Valdez. 2
About four months later (July 2002), after learning she w as facing ten years
to life imprisonment (even after entering into a plea agreement), Valdez decided
to cooperate w ith the government. She identified Beal as her source of supply
and provided a telephone number for him. Telephone records showed the number
was subscribed under one of Beal’s aliases. 3 After obtaining a picture of Beal,
1
Valdez testified she did not tell the officers her source of supply was
“Rob” but rather an officer suggested her source was “Richard” and she went
along with it.
2
Beal testified that when a customer is arrested, drug dealers immediately
discard the telephone they use to contact the customer to prevent detection.
3
Beal had several cellphone numbers; most were subscribed under an alias
or girlfriend’s name. He testified drug dealers often place their cellphone
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officers began searching for him.
In late October 2002, the officers discovered Beal’s address and obtained a
search warrant for his residence. They executed the warrant on October 28, 2002.
Because the front door was fortified and the residence had surveillance cameras,
the officers used a ruse to lure Beal outside. Several officers, acting undercover,
ran over his mailbox. They then knocked on his front door, asking him to come
outside to assess the damage. Once he was outside, the officers identified
themselves. Beal, armed with a loaded pistol, started to flee. The officers tackled
and arrested him.
During the search of Beal’s home, officers found an empty wrapper for a
kilogram of cocaine and 1,362 grams of “fresh[ly] cook[ed]” crack cocaine on the
kitchen table. (R. Vol. VI at 337.) Officers also found 89 grams of crack cocaine
in the master bedroom and study, three firearms and $2,100 in cash. Beal had a
safe in a bedroom, two big screen televisions, stereo equipment, a telescope, and a
Pow er Point projector. The officers asked Beal if he would cooperate and
identify his source of supply; he refused.
About two hours after the officers began searching Beal’s residence,
Angela Harvey, Beal’s fiancee, arrived home. She began cooperating
immediately. She identified Beal’s source of supply as “Jaime” and provided a
telephone number. She also told them where Beal would meet M endoza to
numbers under different names to avoid detection.
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purchase cocaine (RG Residence). The officers subpoenaed the telephone records
and learned the number was subscribed to Carla Clifton, with M endoza as an
authorized user. They also set up surveillance at the RG Residence. The
telephone records showed M endoza attempted to contact Beal six times on the
night of B eal’s arrest and seven times the next day. On October 30, 2002, two
days after Beal’s arrest, Clifton called to disconnect the phone number; it was
disconnected on November 7, 2002.
In December 2002, Beal began cooperating with the government and
identified M endoza as his source of supply. Based on information Beal provided,
officers began surveillance at the home of M endoza’s parents (M P Residence).
Surveillance at this location was difficult, however, because the house was
located in a heavy drug-trafficking neighborhood and individuals w ould whistle
or otherw ise alert the neighborhood if they saw a police officer in the area.
Nevertheless, during one surveillance, Special Agent M arcus W est of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) observed M endoza standing in the front yard
of the M P Residence with twelve to fifteen other individuals. W est saw two or
three vehicles drive up on the wrong side of the curb to speak with M endoza.
M endoza leaned in and spoke with the individuals betw een one and two minutes.
In February 2003, Agent W est interviewed Clifton who said she had
obtained a cellphone for M endoza (later denied). After she changed her story,
W est served Clifton with a grand jury subpoena to testify about the use of the
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telephone with that number. Thereafter, W est observed Clifton’s unoccupied
vehicle parked in front of the M P Residence. He then saw M endoza’s vehicle
pull up next to it. Clifton exited M endoza’s car, looked around and then quickly
entered her vehicle. Clifton drove off with M endoza following her. Clifton was
eventually convicted of perjury concerning the telephone number.
Fitzgerald Younger was on probation for trafficking cocaine in July 2001.
On M ay 12, 2003, officers arrested him for violating his probation. Younger
cooperated immediately, naming M endoza as Beal’s source of supply.
In February 2004, officers discovered where M endoza was residing in
Albuquerque and obtained a warrant for his arrest. On February 11, 2004, Agent
W est and DEA Special Agent Joe M ata followed M endoza’s vehicle to a gas
station. W hen he entered the station they arrested him and drove him back to his
residence. There, Agent W est told M endoza he had been watching him. M endoza
replied, “I have been watching you. I know that you drive a silver vehicle.” (R.
Vol. VI at 404.) He also stated he knew W est had a wife and son and had
observed W est at a local shopping mall. M endoza also told W est “he was
stressed out and that he was tired of looking over his shoulder, glad that it was
over.” (Id. at 406.)
After M endoza’s arrest, officers executed a search warrant at his residence
where they uncovered several drug ledgers in the master bedroom. They also
found a M ay 6, 1999 purchase and sales agreement for M endoza’s vehicle, a 1997
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Chevy Tahoe. The agreement revealed M endoza made a $4,000 cash down
payment and received a $9,750 credit on a trade-in towards the purchase price of
$26,950. The monthly payments were approximately $400-$500.
Officers also seized several letters. One letter was written to “Chili Boy”
and was signed “Love, your boy J.” (Id. at 424.) This letter stated in relevant
part:
But it’s not the same anymore. Don’t really have anyone I can trust.
Shit been fucked up . . . for your boy, too. They made that girl go to
court and tried to make her flip on me. She handled it, I guess,
’cause I ain’t heard shit since then. But you know how those fags
work. They still might try some shit.
(Id.) Another letter from “your boy J.” to “Chili” stated: “They came and got
him. M an, this is some crazy shit going on out here. You wouldn’t believe it, but
I hope you put the w ord out. ’Cause, man, this fools [sic] won’t leave me the
fuck alone. W hat I got is to handle it.” (Id. at 428.) Along with these letters,
officers found a letter, dated M ay 15, 2003, written to “Jaime” from “Donny
Chavez, aka Chili” and an envelope addressed to Jaime M endoza from Donny
Chavez. (Id. at 426-27.)
Officers also uncovered a witness list from Clifton’s perjury trial, which
included Beal and Harvey, and Clifton’s presentence investigation report. They
found booking sheets from the Bernalillo County Detention Center for Beal and a
W estern Union receipt showing M endoza sent money to Beal in New York in
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April 2001. 4 They further seized M endoza’s cellphone, which was subscribed
under a different name, and a Beretta pistol in a jacket in a bedroom closet.
M endoza told W est he obtained this firearm for protection because he was “tired
of looking behind him, looking over his shoulder, and that people thought he was
snitching or telling on them.” (Id. at 448.)
Officers discovered M endoza’s W -2 forms for 1999-2002 and paycheck
stubs from 1998-2003. The paycheck stubs (issued mainly from various roofing
companies) showed M endoza earned about $349 per month. In M endoza’s garage
was a red M ustang convertible in the process of being up-graded with new paint,
rims and tires. M endoza also had a big screen television.
After informing M endoza of his M iranda rights, M endoza agreed to speak
with Agent W est. He denied knowing Beal and also told W est the police needed
to leave Clifton alone.
II. Procedural Background
On February 10, 2004, M endoza w as indicted for conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute and distribution of more than five kilograms of cocaine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846 (Count I) and distribution of
more than 500 grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)
4
In December 2000, Beal attempted to leave the drug trade and moved to
New York for eight to nine months. M endoza wired Beal approximately $2,600
over the period of his stay in New York.
-7-
(Count II). 5 M endoza proceeded to trial on the theory he was not Beal’s source of
supply but rather a drug user who purchased drugs from Beal. He also suggested
Danny M ontoya (another known drug dealer) was Beal’s source of supply.
At trial, the government called several witnesses seeking to establish
M endoza as Beal’s source of supply.
Robert Beal’s testimony
Beal began selling rock-size quantities of crack cocaine in 1994, when he
was fourteen-years-old. At that time, his source of supply was Rondale Gaskin,
also known as M ook. In M ay or June 1996, Beal met M endoza through mutual
friends. M endoza offered to supply crack cocaine to Beal at a cheaper price. In
late 1996/early 1997, Beal accepted M endoza’s offer and purchased nine ounces
of crack cocaine. For the next four to five months, until Beal learned to cook
powder cocaine into crack cocaine, Beal continued to buy crack from M endoza.
In 1998, Beal began buying an average of one kilogram of pow der cocaine
per w eek from Mendoza and this continued until his arrest in October 2002. He
paid approximately $17,000 per kilogram. Once he had the cocaine, he would
convert it into crack cocaine and sell it for approximately $400 an ounce. Beal
sold the crack cocaine to various individuals, including Valdez, who would then
5
Count I was based on M endoza’s cocaine sales to Beal from
October/November 1996 to O ctober 28, 2002, the date of Beal’s arrest. Count II
was based on the empty wrapper found on Beal’s kitchen table; the wrapper had
contained cocaine purchased from M endoza.
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re-sell it.
Beal and M endoza arranged the buys over their cellphones and made their
exchanges in front of either the RG or M P Residence. Beal would park his car on
one side of the street and M endoza would park on the other side. Beal would then
enter M endoza’s vehicle. They would talk for a few minutes and Beal would give
M endoza money in exchange for cocaine. Beal would leave M endoza’s vehicle
with the cocaine tucked in his waistband and drive away in his vehicle.
M endoza once told Beal he earned $1,000-2,000 on every kilogram of
cocaine he sold to Beal. Beal made over $3-4 million selling drugs. He used this
money to promote concerts and buy real estate. 6 M endoza advised Beal to stash
his money rather than purchase real estate because these purchases would draw
attention to both of them.
Beal never sold crack cocaine to M endoza. M endoza used ecstasy and
marijuana. Beal would supply M endoza with marijuana purchased from Valdez.
On the day of V aldez’s arrest, Beal did not try to contact M endoza because
M endoza and Valdez did not know each other well and Valdez was not
M endoza’s customer.
On the day before his arrest, Beal obtained a kilogram of cocaine from
M endoza. The empty wrapper found at his residence had held that cocaine. Beal
6
At the time of his arrest, Beal owned an apartment complex, a
condominium and his house.
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also testified the crack cocaine Valdez attempted to sell to an undercover officer
on the date of her arrest was made from cocaine he purchased from M endoza.
Yvonne Gillam’s testimony
Yvonne Gillam began dating Beal in late 1997. She moved in with him in
February/M arch 1998. After moving in, she learned he sold drugs. M endoza was
Beal’s source of supply. She saw Beal leave several times saying he had to “pick
up a package from Jaime” or “meet someone and do some business.” (R. Vol. VI
at 460.) W hen he did so, he always took money and returned home w ith a brick
of cocaine. She accompanied Beal to meet M endoza three times. Normally, she
would stay in the car but, on one occasion she accompanied Beal to a house and
went inside. She stayed in the living room while Beal and M endoza went to a
different room for twenty to thirty minutes. W hen M endoza and Beal returned,
Beal and Gillam left and went straight home. At home, she saw that Beal had a
package of cocaine. She ended her relationship with Beal in early 1999 and has
not spoken with him since.
On cross-examination, Gillam admitted she had helped Beal count his drug
money. After she was subpoenaed and cooperated, government agents informed
her she would not be charged for her association with Beal.
Angela Harvey’s testimony
Harvey, Robert’s fiancee, testified M endoza was Beal’s source of supply,
which was consistent with her statement to officers when she arrived home on the
-10-
day of Beal’s arrest (before she knew Beal had been arrested). She met Beal in
January 2002, learned he sold crack cocaine in February/M arch 2002, and moved
in with him in April 2002. She accompanied Beal several times when he met
M endoza. They would park in front of the RG Residence. W hen M endoza
arrived, B eal w ould exit his vehicle and enter M endoza’s vehicle or the two
would enter the house. W hen Beal returned to the car, he would take a brick of
cocaine from under his shirt and place it under the seat. Harvey also recalled
M endoza coming to Beal’s house to collect money. A few days later, M endoza
called Beal and Beal met him. Harvey later observed Beal cooking powder
cocaine into crack cocaine. She also testified that the day before Beal’s arrest, he
met w ith M endoza.
On cross-examination, Harvey admitted that since Beal’s arrest, she had
daily contact with him, either in person or over the telephone. Beal discussed his
decision to cooperate with the government. Once he decided to cooperate, she
informed him for the first time she had already cooperated with agents on the day
of his arrest. The government provided Harvey use immunity for her testimony;
this immunity did not cover perjury.
Fitzgerald Younger’s testimony
Younger had known Beal for almost fifteen years and Britt for ten to twelve
years. He sold cocaine or crack cocaine “every now and then” for about a year
and a half. (R. Vol. IX at 1163.) H e obtained the drugs from either Beal or B ritt.
-11-
However, his main role was courier, i.e., Beal and Britt paid him to run errands.
Beal initially obtained drugs from Rondale Gaskin. However, when Gaskin’s
supply became insufficient, Beal began obtaining drugs from M endoza. Younger
accompanied Beal on ten to fifteen meetings with M endoza. They would meet
M endoza either at the RG Residence or M P Residence. Beal would place money
under his shirt or in his w aistband, enter M endoza’s vehicle and return with
cocaine under his shirt. After Beal’s arrest, Younger ran into M endoza who asked
whether he believed Beal was “going to stay strong and basically stand his ground
and not say anything about this.” (Id. at 1181.) Younger told M endoza he did not
think Beal would implicate them. Younger identified Danny M ontoya as Britt’s
source of supply.
Nina Valdez’s testimony
Valdez began selling crack cocaine in 1996 when she was dating W ayne
Caan, also a drug dealer. She initially obtained crack cocaine from Caan, who
purchased it from Rondale Gaskin. In 1995, Valdez met Beal through Caan.
Three years later, she began purchasing crack cocaine from Beal for resale. She
also purchased crack cocaine from Britt. W hen Valdez was arrested for
trafficking crack cocaine, her source of supply was Beal.
Valdez first saw M endoza in 1999. Beal asked her for a ride to the RG
Residence. She agreed and parked on the street. M endoza arrived with two other
males. They all went inside the house while Valdez waited in the car. Five
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minutes later, Beal came outside and entered her vehicle. She did not notice
whether Beal had anything with him when he entered the house or when he
returned to her vehicle. She saw Beal and M endoza together two other times.
Once, Beal called Valdez to obtain marijuana. They met at a park, where Beal
entered her vehicle. She gave him the marijuana and, as Beal left the vehicle,
M endoza approached. Beal immediately went to M endoza and began talking with
him. Valdez sat in her car. On the other occasion, she saw Beal and M endoza
together at a concert. She never asked Beal about his source of supply; that was
not something an individual would ask his/her drug source.
Rita Garcia’s testimony
From 1993-2000, Rita Garcia resided with her mother and brother at the
RG Residence. She knew M endoza as her brother’s friend for nine or ten years.
She was also friends with Beal. In summer 2003, M endoza told her he needed a
picture of Beal for his lawyer. Although M endoza was acting “shady” and it
“seemed weird that [M endoza] asked me for a picture of [Beal],” she gave him
one. (R. Vol. VIII at 943.) M endoza came to the RG Residence numerous times
but rarely went inside the house; normally he stayed inside his vehicle and waited
for her brother to come outside. She also saw M endoza meeting people, including
Beal, in front of the house. Beal would approach M endoza in his vehicle and talk
with him, but she never saw Beal enter M endoza’s vehicle.
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M endoza’s Evidence
Beal, Younger and Valdez all agreed to cooperate w ith the government in
the hopes of obtaining lower sentences. The jury was informed of the terms of
their cooperation and plea agreements and M endoza cross-examined them
extensively about their motives for testifying. M endoza also called two witnesses
in an attempt to establish he was a drug user, not a drug dealer, as evidenced by
his financial situation.
M onique Olquin’s testimony
Olquin, the mother of M endoza’s son, dated M endoza from 1999-2001,
while he was living with Daphne Iverson. She believed M endoza started having a
drug problem in 2001. He became less affectionate, his attitude changed, he did
not keep up his appearance, he slept more, lost weight, and his eyes were dilated
and glassy. She helped him financially by paying, among other things, his truck
payment.
Doris Andrus’ testimony
Andrus w as the real estate agent who assisted M endoza and Iverson in
purchasing their home in 2003. She was also Clifton’s grandmother and was
admittedly unhappy with the government for prosecuting Clifton for perjury.
M endoza and Iverson purchased the home for $112,000, putting down $6-7,000.
The monthly payments were $758. She counseled M endoza to get a better paying
job and Iverson to get a job. Contrary to Olquin’s testimony, Andrus felt
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M endoza was well-kept and dependable.
The Verdict
The jury found M endoza guilty of both counts of the indictment. On
January 24, 2005, M endoza was sentenced to a total of 293 months imprisonment.
This appeal followed.
III. Discussion
M endoza argues the district court erred in (1) admitting expert testimony,
(2) not requiring disclosure of the identities of two confidential informants and
(3) admitting testimony that he threatened two government witnesses. He asserts
the errors were not harmless and rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. If the
errors were individually harmless, he claims their cumulative effect requires
reversal.
A. Expert Testimony
Prior to trial, the government filed a Notice of Intention to O ffer Expert
Testimony. It sought to call Agent W est to testify concerning (1) the methods
and practices commonly used in narcotics investigations, (2) the distribution,
transportation, packaging and communication methods employed by those
involved in drug trafficking, (3) the organization of distribution cells, (4) the
security measures used by those involved in drug trafficking, (5) the value of the
controlled substances involved in the case and (6) the meaning of drug
terminology. M endoza objected, claiming W est’s testimony was unreliable and
-15-
would not assist the jury as required by Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. He also claimed its prejudicial effect would substantially outweigh its
probative value under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 7
The district court did not rule on the admissibility of A gent West’s
testimony until W est was on the stand. W est stated his experience and duties, but
before he could answ er the first case-related question, M endoza objected to his
testimony. M endoza did not challenge West’s qualifications, but claimed it was
improper for W est to stamp every aspect of the government’s case as drug-
trafficking. He also objected on relevance and reliability grounds. The court
overruled the objections, gave M endoza a standing objection and permitted W est
to continue his testimony.
W est’s initial testimony discussed (1) the types of informants and their
importance in a drug investigation, (2) the types of drug dealers/sources of
supply, (3) the financial difference between a crack dealer and a crack
user/addict, (4) drug costs in New M exico, (5) the methods drug dealers use to
conceal their identities and avoid detection, i.e., placing their cellphones, utilities
and vehicles in other people’s names, and (6) the characteristics of a drug deal.
W est then proceeded to describe his investigation of the case, beginning with
7
Because his original objections (Doc. 49) were not included in the record,
we glean M endoza’s objections to the government’s Notice of Intention to Offer
Expert Testimony from his “Reply to U nited States’ Response to Defendant’s
Objections to Government’s Notice to Offer Expert Testimony.”
-16-
Valdez’s arrest. He also testified about Beal’s arrest and the search of Beal’s
residence. Finally, W est described his efforts to locate M endoza, M endoza’s
arrest and the search of M endoza’s residence. During his description of the items
found in M endoza’s residence, W est offered his expert opinion that four pieces of
paper found in a bedroom were drug ledgers. He also defined the word “flip,”
which was contained in one of the letters found in M endoza’s home.
On appeal, M endoza abandons his objection that Agent W est’s testimony
was irrelevant and unreliable. Instead, he argues the testimony was admitted in
violation of Rule 704(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which prohibits an
expert from stating an opinion as to whether a defendant had the requisite mental
state. He concedes W est never expressly offered such an opinion, but claims the
practical effect of W est’s testimony was exactly that – M endoza was a drug dealer
and a fortiori had the intent to distribute drugs. That is so, he claims, because
W est w as permitted to offer expert opinions on matters closely associated with his
fact testimony and even if W est’s testimony did not violate Rule 704(b), his
testimony as both an expert and fact witness was extremely prejudicial and
admission of his testimony violated Rule 403.
M endoza argues the aura of expertise conferred upon W est created a risk of
prejudice because the jury could infer that his opinion about the criminal nature
of M endoza’s actions was based on knowledge of M endoza beyond the evidence
at trial. M endoza also claims W est’s dual roles as expert and fact witness
-17-
inhibited cross-examination. He claims any line of questioning he pursued with
W est on cross-examination was hampered by W est’s freedom to retreat to his
training and experience, which in turn bolstered his direct examination testimony.
He further claims W est’s testimony as both an expert and fact witness led to jury
confusion because W est oscillated between his dual roles.
W e review a district court’s admission of evidence, including expert
testimony, for abuse of discretion. United States v. Wood, 207 F.3d 1222, 1235
(10th Cir. 2000). However, we apply plain error analysis when the defendant
fails to state the specific ground for objection to the admission of the evidence
and such ground is not apparent from the context in which the objection is made.
F ED . R. E VID . 103(a)(1), (d). Here, M endoza did not specifically object to W est’s
testimony under Rule 704(b) in either his written or oral objections. M endoza
admits as much but claims his objections clearly stated the concern that W est’s
testimony would state an opinion that M endoza had the mental state or intent to
conspire to distribute drugs and to distribute drugs to Beal. M endoza did not
raise a proper objection, but we need not dwell on the standards of plain error
review because the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the
testimony.
M endoza complains about several aspects of W est’s testimony to illustrate
his Rule 704(b) and Rule 403 arguments. W est testified about the financial
difference between crack cocaine dealers and crack cocaine users/addicts, saying
-18-
crack users/addicts are categorically broke and homeless because they use their
money to buy drugs w hereas dealers do not spend their money on drugs but sell
drugs to make money. They may also invest it in legitimate businesses. But, he
continued, not all dealers have a lot of money because some are not responsible
and may “blow their money” by going to strip clubs, throwing elaborate parties
and putting it into their vehicles, “maybe buy new rims, new tires for their cars.”
(R. Vol. VI at 310-11.) Later, when discussing the items found in M endoza’s
home, W est presented a photograph of a vintage M ustang convertible found in the
garage that “appeared to be going through an upgrade stage of paint and different
rims and tires.” (Id. at 447.) M endoza claims this linking of expert opinion about
the spending habits of drug dealers immediately followed by specific testimony
about his lifestyle improperly tagged him as a dealer – he was not broke, lived
modestly and had a vehicle with new rims and tires.
M endoza’s second example is to the same effect. W est testified about the
methods drug dealers use to communicate and the characteristics of a drug deal.
W est stated drug deals are “typically quick.” (Id. at 309.) They usually begin
with a telephone call between the seller and buyer to arrange a meeting place.
Once they meet, the seller and buyer have a brief conversation and complete the
transaction. Later W est described his observations during the surveillance of the
M P Residence. He stated several cars stopped in front of the residence and their
drivers spoke briefly with M endoza. W est was able to ensure his testimony
-19-
concerning M endoza’s conversations with those drivers conformed to his expert
opinion describing the characteristics of a drug deal.
The next example is W est’s expert opinion testimony that four scraps of
paper found in M endoza’s bedroom containing scribbled initials and various
numerical figures were drug ledgers used to record the amounts people owed for
drugs. He then testified as a fact witness that these ledgers belonged to M endoza
thereby improperly suggesting to the jury that M endoza had the intent to
distribute drugs and in fact distributed them.
W est also testified concerning the seizure of M endoza’s cellphone. W hen
asked w hy he had obtained the subscriber information for the phone, W est
responded: “Again, I wanted to show that tools of the trade for a drug dealer, that
they obtain cellphones and put them in other people’s names to avoid detection.”
(Id. at 445.) M endoza argues this testimony, which w as cloaked in expert
testimony, identified him as a drug dealer and left no room for the jury to
deliberate on the matter.
Lastly, M endoza challenges W est’s testimony concerning the letters found
in M endoza’s home, in particular, his testimony concerning the meaning of the
word “flip” found in a letter attributed to M endoza. The following colloquy
occurred:
Q. [B]ased on your training and experience as a drug enforcement
agent, what does [flip] mean? . . . .
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A. “Flip” means to have someone cooperate. If I wanted to flip you,
I w ould try to make you cooperate with me, come and help me out . .
..
Q. . . . In terms of working with . . . informants, how does . . . the
term “flip,” apply to them? W hat do you try to do? W hat does that
mean?
A. Try to get them to cooperate w ith us, for law enforcement.
Q. But for what purpose?
A. For infiltrating or investigating drug organizations.
Q. And who are you going to try to investigate once you get
somebody to flip?
A. The drug source of supply, the target of investigation.
(Id. at 425-26.) M endoza claims that by introducing a letter in which he
expressed concern that law enforcement officers would attempt to have an
individual “flip” on him, followed by W est’s expert opinion that the definition of
“flip” is to identify the source of supply, the government conveyed to the jury that
M endoza was concerned an associate would identify him as the source of supply.
Thus, M endoza asserts W est was allowed to give an improper expert opinion on
the ultimate issue of fact in the case – that M endoza was a source of supply. In
short, M endoza complains that West would testify as an expert about a dealer’s
profile and then conveniently testify to investigative facts that placed M endoza
squarely in the profile. He claims it was a set up he w as powerless to counter,
prejudicing his defense and ultimately unfair.
-21-
Predictably, the government has a different take on the evidence. The
government claims W est’s testimony did not violate Rule 704(b) because W est’s
expert testimony helped the jury understand the drug distribution business
generally and the significance of some of the evidence introduced at trial. It
stresses that W est’s testimony did not express an opinion of ultimate fact –
M endoza had the intent to distribute cocaine. M oreover, it never asked W est
whether hypothetical facts mirroring the facts of the case indicated an intent to
distribute. To the extent the district court erred in admitting W est’s testimony,
the government claims the error was harmless. It asserts there was overwhelming
evidence M endoza was a drug dealer, not a drug user. Four lay witnesses, Beal,
Gillam, Harvey, and Younger, all testified M endoza supplied Beal with powder
cocaine for years. M oreover, the court instructed the jury it could accept or reject
W est’s opinions.
Rule 702 governs the admission of expert testimony:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a w itness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.
M endoza does not challenge W est’s expert testimony under Rule 702 and rightly
so. W e have consistently allowed law enforcement agents to provide expert
-22-
testimony concerning the drug trade under Rule 702. See, e.g., United States v.
Quintana, 70 F.3d 1167, 1170-71 (10th Cir. 1995) (meaning of drug code); United
States v. Sturmoski,
971 F.2d 452, 459 (10th Cir. 1992) (tools of the drug trade);
United States v. M cDonald,
933 F.2d 1519, 1520-23 (10th Cir. 1991)
(significance of quantity of cocaine, tools of drug trade and use of food stamps to
purchase crack cocaine); United States v. Harris,
903 F.2d 770, 775-76 (10th Cir.
1990) (drug records). M endoza’s arguments are limited to Rules 704(b) and 403.
Rule 704 provides:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an
opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or
condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or
inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental
state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of
a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of
fact alone.
“Rule 704(b) only prevents experts from expressly stating the final conclusion or
inference as to a defendant’s actual mental state. The rule does not prevent the
expert from testifying to facts or opinions from which the jury could conclude or
infer the defendant had the requisite mental state.” United States v. Richard, 969
F.2d 849, 854-55 (10th Cir. 1992).
As M endoza concedes, W est never expressly opined that M endoza had the
requisite intent to distribute cocaine. Rather, he claims that by testifying (1)
-23-
concerning the difference between drug dealers and users, (2) the ways in which
drug dealers dispose of their money, (3) the characteristics of a drug deal, (4) that
the scraps of paper found in M endoza’s residence were drug ledgers, (5) that he
subpoenaed M endoza’s cellphone subscriber information because cellphones are
tools of the trade for drug dealers and are placed under different people’s names
to avoid detection, and (6) that the meaning of the word “flip” is to identify the
source of supply, W est improperly stated an inference or conclusion as to
M endoza’s mental state, i.e., that he was a drug dealer with the intent to distribute
drugs. W e disagree.
In Richard, Officer Danner, who arranged for the sale of 300 pounds of
marijuana to Bernaugh, testified as an expert that the defendants assisted
Bernaugh in the deal. Based on his experience, he stated a drug dealer will not
invite individuals w ho are not aw are of the nature of the transaction to participate
in a drug deal. The defendants argued that by identifying the role each of them
performed, Danner stated an inference that each knowingly participated in the
charged offenses in violation of Rule 704(b). W e rejected this argument:
W hile [Danner’s] remarks may have implied a belief that the
[defendants] were in fact aware of the nature of the transaction,
Danner did not expressly draw that conclusion or inference for the
jury. Hence, the testimony was not prohibited by Rule 704(b), and
the district court did not err in admitting it.
969 F.2d at 855; see also U nited States v. Orr,
68 F.3d 1247, 1252 (10th Cir.
1995) (concluding no plain error occurred in admitting expert’s testimony;
-24-
“[a]lthough the jury could have inferred defendant’s criminal intent from [the
expert’s] statements, [the expert] did not testify that defendant had the requisite
criminal intent for fraud”).
In comparison, in Wood, Dr. W ood was tried for first-degree murder and
the lesser-included offenses of second-degree murder and involuntary
manslaughter based on his treatment of patient Dykes. An expert opined that the
manner of Dyke’s death was homicide, which he defined as w hen the death is
caused at the hands of another person and gave as an example facts similar to
those presented in the case. He also opined that Dr. W ood’s actions were reckless
and fraught with the perils of causing death. Dr. W ood appealed, arguing the
expert’s testimony violated Rule 704(b). W e agreed:
[The expert’s testimony] expressly draw[s] the conclusion or
inference that Dr. W ood acted with the necessary mens rea when he
caused Dyke’s death. The district court instructed the jury that to
convict Dr. W ood on charges of first or second-degree murder, it was
required to find that he possessed the specific intent to cause harm or
death to Dykes. By his testimony that Dr. W ood’s actions caused
Dykes’s death, Dykes’s death was a homicide, and a homicide
involves the intentional taking of a person’s life, [the expert]
expressly inferred that Dr. W ood acted with specific intent to kill
Dykes.
Similarly, [the expert’s] testimony that Dr. W ood’s actions were
reckless specifically describes the mens rea for involuntary
manslaughter. . . . Therefore, [the expert’s] testimony [did] not
merely provide the facts or opinions from which the jury could
conclude or infer the defendant had the requisite mental state. If
believed, his testimony necessarily dictates the final conclusion that
Dr. W ood possessed the requisite mens rea for involuntary
manslaughter. This intrusion into the province of the jury is
-25-
precisely the sort of testimony Rule 704(b) is designed to prevent.
207 F.3d at 1236 (quotations and citations omitted); see also United States v.
Dennison,
937 F.2d 559, 565 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding trial court properly
excluded expert testimony that a hypothetical person suffering from the same
mental disorder as defendant could not form the specific intent to commit assault
because the necessary inference from the testimony was that defendant did not
have the capacity to form specific intent and this inference is for the jury to
make). 8
Here, Agent W est’s challenged testimony constitutes “facts or opinions
from which the jury could conclude or infer [M endoza] had the requisite mental
state,” Richard, 969 F.2d at 854-55; it did not expressly make that inference or
conclusion for the jury as the expert did in Wood. M oreover, unlike in Dennison,
the government did not provide W est a hypothetical question containing facts
mirroring the case facts and ask whether the facts constituted an intent to
8
The D.C. Circuit has also held that a prosecutor cannot make an end run
around Rule 704(b) by posing an intent question to an expert in the form of a
hypothetical question containing facts mirroring the facts in the case. See United
States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 667, 671-72 (D .C. Cir. 1995); but see United States v.
M iller,
395 F.3d 452, 455-56 (D.C. Cir.) (concluding no plain error occurred
when prosecutor asked expert whether a hypothetical set of facts mirroring the
facts of the case was consistent with the sale of drugs w here expert repeatedly
stated he had no personal knowledge of the case against the defendant), cert.
denied,
545 U.S. 1101 (2005). The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have taken a more
lenient view on the use of hypotheticals, allowing them if the expert does not
directly comm ent on the defendant’s mental state. See United States v. Younger,
398 F.3d 1179, 1190 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Romero,
189 F.3d 576, 586
(7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Brown,
7 F.3d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1993).
-26-
distribute. Rather, the government initially asked W est general questions
concerning the drug trade and then moved into his investigation of M endoza.
W hile some of W est’s opinions mentioned facts of this case, in particular, his
opinion that drug dealers often blow their money on (among other things) buying
new rims and tires for their vehicles, they did not make the ultimate inference or
conclusion for the jury that M endoza had the intent to distribute drugs. W est’s
testimony left for the jury the duty to link his expert testimony to the facts and
draw the inference or conclusion that M endoza had the requisite mens rea. His
testimony did not violate Rule 704(b).
Nor did it violate Rule 403, which permits relevant evidence to be excluded
“if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . .” In support of his
Rule 403 argument, M endoza relies on United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45
(2d Cir. 2003). There, the government called a D EA agent, who was also the case
agent, to testify as an expert concerning the use of code words in narcotics
conversations and the meaning of various code words used in recorded
conversations between the defendants and others. During his testimony, the agent
interpreted certain drug jargon but also explained other statements. The latter
testimony appeared to have been based primarily on his familiarity with the
specifics of the case rather than on his general expertise in the drug trade. The
defendants challenged the testimony, claiming the agent’s dual roles as expert and
-27-
case agent allowed him to serve as a summary witness, improperly testifying as
an expert about the general meaning of conversations and the facts of the case.
The Second Circuit found that the use of a case agent as an expert increases
the likelihood that inadmissible and prejudicial testimony will be proffered, in
particular, when the expert goes beyond his expertise and summarizes his beliefs
about the defendant’s conduct based upon his knowledge of the case. Id. at 53-
54. In such circumstances, the risk of prejudice is three-fold: (1) the jury may
infer the agent’s opinion testimony about the defendant’s activity is based on
knowledge of the defendant beyond the evidence at trial, (2) the defendant’s
ability to cross-examine the expert/fact witness may be inhibited because a failed
attempt to impeach the witness as an expert may effectively bolster his credibility
as a fact witness, and (3) the expert may stray from the scope of his expertise and
act as a summary witness w hich usurps the role of the jury and creates jury
confusion as to whether the witness is relying on his general experience and
reliable methodology or improperly on what he has learned of the case.
Id. at 53-
55. Despite these risks, however, the Second Circuit did not categorically
prohibit the use of case agents as experts.
Id. at 56. Rather, it cautioned trial
courts to vigilantly ensure a case agent’s expert testimony is reliable and its
probativeness is not substantially outw eighed by its prejudicial effect.
Id.
The concerns in Dukagjini are well taken and expressed. W e agree.
However, like the Second Circuit, we decline to adopt a per se rule prohibiting
-28-
the use of case agents as experts, but leave it to the trial judge who is attuned to
the dynamics of the trial, to make the necessary 403 determination. W e find no
abuse of that discretion here. But even if we did the error w as harmless.
Beal, Gillam, Harvey and Younger all testified that M endoza was Beal’s
source of supply. W hile Beal, Younger and Harvey may have had self-serving
motives in testifying, Gillam did not and in fact, she had not seen Beal for over
four years. Additionally, although Harvey was provided use immunity from the
government, her testimony was consistent with the statements she made to agents
when she arrived home on the day of Beal’s arrest and before she learned Beal
had been arrested. M oreover, the jury was aware of the terms of Beal’s and
Younger’s plea agreements and their motives in testifying. In addition to these
witnesses, the government presented evidence showing Beal and M endoza were in
almost constant contact with each other on their cellphones and M endoza’s
lifestyle was inconsistent with his legitimate income. Furthermore, the jury was
informed of the statements M endoza made to Agent W est on the day of his arrest
and the threats he made to Beal while incarcerated at the same facility (which
were properly admitted.) See infra Issue C. The substantial evidence supporting
the jury’s verdict renders harmless any error which may have occurred in
allow ing W est to testify as both an expert and fact witness.
B. Confidential Informants
Prior to trial, M endoza moved for the disclosure of the identities of two
-29-
confidential informants, referred to herein as C1 and C2, claiming their testimony
supported his defense that he was not Beal’s source of supply. The government
objected claiming the informants did not possess exculpatory information and
M endoza had failed to show a sufficient need for disclosure other than pure
speculation. In the alternative to denying disclosure, the government claimed the
court should hold an in camera hearing to determine the necessity for disclosure.
See G aines v. Hess, 662 F.2d 1364, 1369 (10th Cir. 1981) (stating in camera
hearing is appropriate procedural vehicle for determining whether disclosure is
required) .
The district court held a hearing on M endoza’s motion. At the hearing, the
government called Agent W est, who had interviewed both confidential
informants, and testified as follows: H e met w ith C1 on September 3, 2002, a
month before Beal’s arrest. C1 was a documented DEA informant but received
no remuneration for his/her services. C1 said Beal and Britt were multi-pound
crack cocaine dealers in Albuquerque. C1 did not know M endoza or have any
information concerning Beal and Britt’s sources of supply. However, C1
participated in a conversation with Beal and Britt in w hich they discussed the loss
of their cocaine supply source. Beal told C1 he could not reach the source of
supply and believed the source had either been arrested or stopped selling
cocaine. Because he could not contact the source, Beal asked C1 to sell him a
couple of kilograms of cocaine. C1 could not recall when this conversation took
-30-
place or provide a time frame. C1 also stated Beal and Britt would go back and
forth between different sources of supply depending on whether the source had
drugs.
W est interviewed C2 on M arch 27, 2003, after he/she was arrested. C2
created fictitious identification documents for the individuals within Beal’s drug
organization and named some of these individuals during the interview. C2 also
informed W est that in the early stages of the organization, Beal and Britt obtained
crack cocaine from Donnell and Rondale Gaskin. However, it was not too long
before they found powder cocaine suppliers which would allow them to make
crack cocaine. C2 did not know these suppliers or M endoza.
After the evidentiary hearing, the court denied M endoza’s m otion. As to
C1, it found he/she did not know M endoza or Beal’s source of supply. Although
it recognized C1 had heard Beal say he believed his source of supply had been
arrested sometime prior to September 2, 2002, and M endoza was not arrested
until February 2004, the court nevertheless concluded M endoza’s claim (that C1’s
testimony established M endoza was not Beal’s source of supply) was speculative.
It also noted B eal would be the subject of cross-examination at trial. W ith regard
to C2, the court found he/she did not know M endoza, was not a participant in any
of the crimes charged against M endoza and it was pure speculation he/she had any
relevant information helpful to M endoza.
M endoza claims the court erred in denying the disclosure of C1 and C2 and
-31-
the error was not harmless. He asserts C1’s testimony concerning his/her
conversation with Beal and Britt would have buttressed his theory that Beal and
Britt had the same source of supply. It also would have shown he w as not Beal’s
source of supply because he and Beal were in contact from the time of the
conversation until Beal’s arrest. 9 As to C2’s testimony, M endoza argues it would
have established M endoza was not a part of Beal’s drug organization because C2
did not know M endoza despite his/her extensive knowledge of the organization.
Thus, M endoza claims both informants’ testimony would have established
reasonable doubt he was Beal’s source of supply.
The government claims the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
disclosure of C1 and C2’s identities. It points out that neither C1 nor C2 knew
M endoza, knew who supplied Beal with cocaine, or participated in or witnessed
the crimes to which M endoza was charged. Therefore, neither informant could
testify that M endoza was not Beal’s source of supply. It further claims Beal’s
9
In an attempt to show Beal was not referring to M endoza in his
conversation with C1 because Beal and M endoza were in constant phone contact,
defense counsel cross-examined W est concerning Beal and M endoza’s phone
contacts. W est testified he obtained Beal and M endoza’s cellphone records and
determined the number of times they contacted each other. Although defense
counsel suggested there were 1,500 contacts from 2000 to early November 2002,
W est could not recall the number of contacts or the time period and defense
counsel did not provide any documentary evidence supporting this number or time
period. W est also could not recall whether there were any months in w hich there
was no contact between Beal and M endoza but stated there were periods of days
in w hich there were no contacts. W ith the aid of M endoza’s telephone records,
W est was able to testify that M endoza had contact with Beal on September 2 and
5, 2002, and several times on September 6, 2002.
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comm ent to C1 that he could not reach his source of supply during a time when he
may have been in regular contact with M endoza had little exculpatory value and
its usefulness to the defense was speculative. 10
The government has the privilege to withhold from disclosure the identities
of persons who provide law enforcement officers with information concerning
violations of the law. Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957). The
privilege’s purpose is to further and protect the public interest in effective law
enforcement.
Id. It recognizes citizens’ obligation to inform law enforcement
officials w hen they know a crime has been committed and encourages them to
perform that obligation by preserving their anonymity.
Id. However, the
privilege is not unlimited.
Id. at 60. W here the disclosure of an informer’s
identity is relevant and helpful to an accused’s defense or essential to a fair
determination of a cause, the privilege gives way and disclosure is required.
Id.
at 60-61.
There is no fixed rule as to when disclosure of an informer’s identity is
10
Alternatively, the government argues that if we have any doubt as to C1
or C2’s potential testimony, we should remand to the district court for an in
camera proceeding pursuant to Gaines. Because the record adequately discloses
C1 and C2’s potential testimony, we find a remand unnecessary. See United
States v. M oralez, 908 F.2d 565, 568-69 (10th Cir. 1990) (remanding for in
camera hearing where record was insufficient to determine the informer’s degree
of involvement and whether disclosure was essential to a fair determination of the
case);
Gaines, 662 F.2d at 1368-69 (remanding for in camera hearing to
determine w hether informant could provide potentially significant exculpatory
testimony).
-33-
required. Id. at 62. Rather, the court must balance the public’s interest in
protecting the flow of information against a defendant’s right to prepare a
defense, considering the particular circumstances of each case, including “the
crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s
testimony, and other relevant factors.”
Id. “[M ]ere speculation about the
usefulness of an informer’s testimony is not sufficient.” United States v. Scafe,
822 F.2d 928, 933 (10th Cir. 1987). Disclosure is not required where the
information sought from the informer would be merely cumulative or where the
informant is not a participant in or a witness to the crime charged. M
oralez, 908
F.2d at 567.
A defendant seeking disclosure of a confidential informer’s identity bears
the burden of showing a need for such disclosure. United States v. M artinez, 979
F.2d 1424, 1426 (10th Cir. 1992). W e review the district court’s decision
denying disclosure for an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 1425-26. W e find no such
abuse here.
C1 did not know M endoza or who served as Beal and Britt’s source of
supply. He/she also did not participate in or witness the crimes charged. W e
recognize C1 w as present during a conversation in which Beal stated he could not
reach the source of supply and believed the source had either been arrested or
ceased selling drugs. However, C1 could not recall when this conversation took
place or even provide a time frame. W hile defense counsel suggested to Agent
-34-
W est there was never a month that went by between 2000 and November 2002
where M endoza and Beal were not in contact, he did not substantiate this
information with documentary evidence. 11 The only period of time in which
M endoza was able to show that he and Beal were in contact was September 2-6,
2002. However, it is pure speculation on M endoza’s part that the conversation
between Beal, Britt and C1 took place around September 3, 2002, the date C1 was
interviewed. Indeed, it is unlikely the conversation took place during that period
because if it had, it seems C1 w ould have been able to recall when the
conversation took place or at least provided a time frame. Further, Beal merely
told C1 he believed his source may have been arrested or stopped selling cocaine.
Again, it is mere speculation that Beal was not referring to M endoza because
M endoza was not arrested until February 2004.
W ith regards to C2, United States v. Halbert is instructive. 668 F.2d 489
11
At trial, the government called Elizabeth Eller, an intelligence research
specialist for the D EA, who performed an analysis of M endoza and Beal’s
telephone records. She compared the number of calls between M endoza’s
telephone number and four different cellphone numbers used by Beal between
September 8, 2001 (the date M endoza’s number was activated), and November 7,
2002 (the date M endoza’s number w as canceled). Based on her testimony, there
was a total of 377 calls between M endoza and Beal from September 8, 2001, to
M arch 28, 2002, and August 2, 2002, to O ctober 29, 2002. Therefore, contrary to
defense counsel’s assertion at the disclosure hearing, the telephone records did
not cover a two year period and the number of contacts was not 1,500. M oreover,
unless Beal or M endoza had another telephone number, there was a period of time
(M arch 29, 2002 - August 1, 2002) where there was no contact between M endoza
and Beal, which contradicts defense counsel’s suggestion that there was never a
month where Beal and M endoza were not in contact.
-35-
(10th Cir. 1982). There, Halbert and Green were accused of helping Cox rob a
bank. Prior to trial, Halbert moved for disclosure of the identity of a confidential
informant who had called law enforcement officials stating he had heard on the
streets that Cox was involved in the robbery. This information led to the
investigation of Cox and Green. Green implicated H albert. The district court
denied Halbert’s motion for disclosure. Halbert proceeded to trial, where he
presented an alibi defense, alleging he was at a sales meeting at the time of the
robbery and his supervisor could verify his alibi. Although his supervisor
testified H albert was not at the meeting, the supervisor and another witness
testified they called Halbert’s apartment on the day and time of the robbery and
spoke with him. The jury convicted Halbert. On appeal, Halbert argued the
district court erred in denying his request for the confidential informant’s
identity. He claimed disclosure was required because the fact the informant did
not mention Halbert was exculpatory. W e affirmed, finding disclosure was not
required because the confidential informant was not a participant in or witness to
the robbery and Halbert could only speculate as to the informant’s testimony. Id.
at 496. W e further found the fact the informant had apparently not heard H albert
was involved in the robbery had little or no exculpatory value because the
informant was not an eyewitness and only learned of Cox’s involvement through
gossip.
Id. M oreover, Halbert was able to present his alibi defense through other
witnesses who claimed to have first-hand knowledge of the relevant events.
Id.
-36-
Similarly, the mere fact C2 had knowledge of Beal’s organization but did
not name M endoza is not exculpatory. M oreover, C2 did not know M endoza, did
not participate in or witness the crimes charged and did not know who supplied
Beal w ith cocaine after Beal stopped purchasing crack cocaine from the Gaskins.
Therefore, he/she would not have been helpful to M endoza’s defense.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the disclosure of
C1 and C2.
C. Threat Evidence
On the afternoon of the second day of trial, the government learned
M endoza had threatened Beal and had made a threatening gesture towards him
while both were being detained at the Bernalillo County Detention Center for
M endoza’s trial. The government sought to question Beal concerning the incident
and add M arshall Dean, an inmate transport officer who observed the threatening
gesture, as a witness. It claimed such evidence was admissible to show
M endoza’s consciousness of guilt. M endoza objected, arguing the evidence was
not probative of guilt because an innocent person w ould also be upset at a witness
who falsely accused him of a crime and therefore its probative value was
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect under Rule 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 12 Conducting the R ule 403 balancing test, the district court
12
when Beal needed to be moved from the Sandoval County Jail, the government
specifically requested he not be moved to Torrance County, where it believed Mendoza
was being detained. While Mendoza was in fact being detained in Torrance County, his
-37-
found the threat evidence was more probative than prejudicial and overruled
M endoza’s objection. 13
Beal testified M endoza called him a “snitch” and a “bitch” and asked him
why he was doing this. (R. Vol. VII at 811.) He told Beal not to go through with
it and he would take care of him financially. M endoza also made a gesture with
his hands which indicated he was going “to get [Beal], kill [Beal].” (Id. at 812.)
Dean testified he observed this gesture while he was taking M endoza out of his
cell to transport him to court for trial. The gesture involved M endoza placing his
finger on his lips and then taking his thumb and running it across his neck. Based
on his training and experience, Dean interpreted the gesture to mean “stay quiet
or die.” (R. Vol. IX at 1222.)
Beal was not the only witness who was threatened by M endoza. During her
testimony, over M endoza’s objection, Valdez recounted a run-in with M endoza in
prison in April/M ay 2004. Valdez was sitting inside a prison classroom; M endoza
counsel had requested he be moved to Bernallilo County Detention Center, which is
closer M endoza also questioned why he and Beal were detained at the same
facility and suggested the government created the situation to see how he would
act in violation of his M iranda rights. However, there was no evidence
supporting this theory. Indeed, to Albuquerque, so he could meet with him during
trial. Therefore, it was M endoza’s counsel’s actions which resulted in M endoza
and Beal being housed in the same facility. The district court also correctly
concluded M iranda did not apply because M endoza’s threats and gesture to Beal
were voluntary and not made during the course of custodial interrogation.
M iranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
13
The court did allow M endoza the opportunity to interview Dean outside
the presence of the jury prior to Dean testifying.
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was in the prison yard for recreation. Valdez looked out the window and saw
M endoza. He looked at her and looked upset. He pointed at her and mouthed
something she could not understand. She interpreted these actions as M endoza
threatening her.
M endoza claims the court committed reversible error in allowing Beal,
Dean and Valdez to testify as to their interpretations of M endoza’s mouthed
words and gestures. He claims the mouthed words and gestures w ere too vague to
be admissible as probative evidence of guilt because they were just as probative
of innocence. He claims an innocent person wrongly accused would be just as, if
not more, likely to become angry upon seeing his accuser than a person who
knows himself to be guilty. M oreover, given that the evidence did not involve
words expressing a clear threat to intimidate a witness, M endoza claims there is
no negative inference to be drawn from it. M endoza further claims the error in
admitting this evidence affected the trial’s outcome. He claims the evidence of
guilt was not overwhelming given the witnesses’ motives in testifying which
undermined their credibility.
The government argues the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
the threat evidence. It claims the evidence was highly probative of M endoza’s
consciousness of guilt and therefore relevant. Contrary to M endoza’s claim that
his threats tended only to prove he was angry because he was being falsely
accused, the government asserts the w eight of authority is that a defendant’s
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threats against a cooperating witness tend to prove the defendant is conscious of
his guilt. It also points out that the meaning of M endoza’s mouthed words and
gestures w as not ambiguous to Beal, Dean or Valdez and each was allowed to
testify about his or her perceptions. M oreover, both Beal and Dean demonstrated
to the jury the gesture M endoza made to Beal so the jury could ascertain the
accuracy of their interpretations of the gesture. Further, the government claims
M endoza’s gesture to Beal was not ambiguous as it was an obvious threat to kill
Beal if he testified.
W e review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.
United States v. Knox, 124 F.3d 1360, 1363 (10th Cir. 1997). Because evidence
that a defendant has threatened a cooperating witness constitutes evidence of
“other crimes, wrongs, or acts,” we evaluate the admissibility of such evidence
under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See United States v.
Esparsen,
930 F.2d 1461, 1475-76 & nn.15-16 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating Rule
404(b) applies to conduct occurring before and after the charged conduct). 14
Rule 404(b) states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident . . . .
14
Both the district court and the parties erroneously believed Rule 404(b)
did not apply to the threat evidence.
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“The list of proper purposes is illustrative, not exhaustive, and Rule 404(b) is
considered to be an inclusive rule, admitting all evidence of other crimes or acts
except that which tends to prove only criminal disposition.” United States v. Tan,
254 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted). “To determine if the
admission of Rule 404(b) evidence was proper, we apply a four-part test which
requires that: (1) the evidence was offered for a proper purpose under Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b); (2) the evidence was relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 401; (3) the
probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by its potential
for unfair prejudice under Fed. R. Evid. 403; and (4) the district court, upon
request, instructed the jury to consider the evidence only for the purpose for
which it was admitted.” United States v. Wilson,
107 F.3d 774, 782 (10th Cir.
1997) (citing Huddleston v. United States,
485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988)).
Evidence is relevant under Rule 401 if it has “any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” F ED . R. E VID .
401.
The four requirements for admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence are met in
this case. First, M endoza’s threats to Beal and Valdez were not admitted to prove
his criminal disposition. Rather, they were offered to prove his consciousness of
guilt, which is encapsulated in Rule 404(b)’s motive, intent and knowledge
language. See Esparsen, 930 F.2d at 1476 n.16.
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Second, the evidence was relevant under Rule 401. “Evidence of threats to a
prosecution witness is admissible as showing consciousness of guilt if a direct
connection is established between the defendant and the threat . . . .” United States
v. Smith, 629 F.2d 650, 651 (10th Cir. 1980). Here, M endoza himself made the
threats to the cooperating witnesses. Contrary to M endoza’s arguments, the threats
were not ambiguous. Beal testified M endoza called him a “snitch” and “bitch” and
asked him why he w as doing this. W hether Beal heard these words, read M endoza’s
lips or a combination of both occurred is unclear. However, the jury was aware of
this and heard testimony concerning the conditions under which Beal and M endoza
conversed. M oreover, the more damning evidence, M endoza’s gesture to Beal, was
witnessed by both Beal and Dean. Their opinions as to this gesture’s meaning were
admissible under Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 15 See United States v.
Garcia,
994 F.2d 1499, 1506-07 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining the requirements for
lay witness testimony in the form of opinions and inferences under Rule 701). And,
because the gesture was demonstrated for the jury, the jury was allowed to reject or
accept their interpretations. W ith regard to Valdez’s testimony, she described for
15
Rule 701 provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences
which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful
to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a
fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.
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the jury what she observed (that M endoza was upset, mouthing something to her and
pointing at her) and had first-hand knowledge of the events to which she testified.
Therefore, her opinion that M endoza was threatening her was admissible under Rule
701. Again, the jury was allowed to accept or reject her opinion.
Third, the district court expressly weighed the probative value of the threat
evidence against the potential for unfair prejudice under Rule 403 and concluded the
former substantially outweighed the latter. District courts are afforded broad
discretion in Rule 403 balancing decisions. United States v. Cherry, 433 F.3d 698,
702 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 1930 (2006). We see no reason to
disturb the court’s Rule 403 decision.
Lastly, M endoza did not request a limiting instruction. In fact, in the
proposed jury instructions, the court included a Rule 404(b) instruction but both
parties agreed it was not applicable to the threat evidence. W hile the parties w ere
mistaken, see supra n.14, the fact remains M endoza never asked the court to instruct
the jury on the proper use of the threat evidence.
W e find no error in the district court’s admission of the threat evidence.
D. Cumulative Error
To the extent we find individual errors harmless, M endoza claims the
cumulative effect of those errors substantially affected his trial’s outcome. The
cumulative error analysis’ purpose is to address the possibility that “[t]he
cumulative effect of two or more individually harmless errors has the potential to
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prejudice a defendant to the same extent as a single reversible error.” United States
v. Rosario Fuentez, 231 F.3d 700, 709 (10th Cir. 2000).
A cumulative-error analysis merely aggregates all the errors that
individually have been found to be harmless, and therefore not
reversible, and it analyzes whether their cumulative effect on the
outcome of the trial is such that collectively they can no longer be
determined to be harmless. Unless an aggregate harmlessness
determination can be made, collective error will mandate reversal, just
as surely as will individual error that cannot be considered harmless.
The harmlessness of cumulative error is determined by conducting the
same inquiry as for individual error--courts look to see whether the
defendant’s substantial rights were affected.
United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1470 (10th Cir. 1990). However,
“[c]umulative-error analysis should evaluate only the effect of matters determined to
be error, not the cumulative effect of non-errors.”
Id. at 1471.
The only potential error (which is assumed only) in this case was the
admission of W est as both an expert and fact witness. There is no cumulate effect.
A FFIRME D.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Terrence L. O’Brien
Circuit Judge
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