Filed: Jan. 19, 2007
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS January 19, 2007 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 06-3266 v. (D . Kan.) (D.C. No. 06-CV-3063-JTM ) JEFFR EY D . TELLIN G H U ISEN, Defendant-Appellant. OR DER * Before M U RPH Y, SE YM OU R, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges. Jeffrey D. Tellinghuisen, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) that w
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS January 19, 2007 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 06-3266 v. (D . Kan.) (D.C. No. 06-CV-3063-JTM ) JEFFR EY D . TELLIN G H U ISEN, Defendant-Appellant. OR DER * Before M U RPH Y, SE YM OU R, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges. Jeffrey D. Tellinghuisen, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) that wo..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
January 19, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 06-3266
v. (D . Kan.)
(D.C. No. 06-CV-3063-JTM )
JEFFR EY D . TELLIN G H U ISEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
OR DER *
Before M U RPH Y, SE YM OU R, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
Jeffrey D. Tellinghuisen, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (COA) that would allow him to appeal from the district
court’s order denying his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). Because we conclude that M r. Tellinghuisen has failed
to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” we deny
his request for a COA and dismiss the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Background
M r. Tellinghuisen pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a restricted
person in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). This was just one count
in an eighteen-count indictment; the government dismissed the other seventeen
counts in exchange for his guilty plea. His plea agreement included this appeal
waiver:
Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives any right to appeal or
collaterally attack any matter in connection with this prosecution,
conviction and sentence. The defendant is aware that Title 18,
U.S.C. § 3742 affords a defendant the right to appeal the conviction
and sentence imposed. By entering into this agreement, the
defendant knowingly waives any right to appeal the conviction or a
sentence imposed which is within the guideline range determined
appropriate by the court. The defendant also waives any right to
challenge a sentence or otherwise attempt to modify or change his
sentence or manner in which it was determined in any collateral
attack, including, but not limited to, a motion brought under Title 28,
U.S.C. § 2255 [except as limited by United States v. Cockerham,
237
F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001)] and a motion brought under Title
18, U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In other words, the defendant waives the
right to appeal the sentence imposed in this case except to the extent,
if any, the court departs upwards from the applicable sentencing
guideline range determined by the court. However, if the United
States authorizes its right to appeal the sentence imposed as
authorized by Title 18, U.S.C. § 3742(b), the defendant is released
from this waiver and may appeal the sentence received as authorized
by Title 18, U.S.C. § 3742(a).
R. Vol. I, Doc. 23, at 3 (brackets in original). The district court conducted a
thorough plea colloquy before accepting M r. Tellinghuisen’s guilty plea. It
explained each provision in depth and gave particular attention to the appeal
waiver. The court accepted M r. Tellinghuisen’s guilty plea only after satisfying
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itself that the plea was knowing and voluntary. The court then sentenced him to
120 months imprisonment.
M r. Tellinghuisen did not appeal his sentence. Instead, he filed this habeas
petition under § 2255, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
The district court denied his petition, ruling that the appeal waiver in his plea
agreement barred it as a collateral attack on his sentence.
Discussion
The denial of a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 may be appealed
only if the district court or this Court first issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(B). A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
Id. § 2253(c)(2). To make such
a showing, a petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate
whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that
the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Slack v. M cDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 483–84 (2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Even under the liberal standard by which we judge a pro se litigant’s
pleadings, see Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kan.,
318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir.
2003), M r. Tellinghuisen fails to convince us that the district court should have
resolved his petition differently. The district court employed the correct three-
part test we announced in United States v. Hahn,
359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir.
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2004) (en banc), to determine w hether the appellate w aiver in M r. Tellinghuisen’s
plea agreement barred his § 2255 petition. It also correctly noted that a defendant
with a valid appeal waiver may bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
only when the alleged ineffective assistance “is ‘in connection with the
negotiation of the waiver.’” R. Vol. I, Doc. 26, at 2 (quoting
Hahn, 359 F.3d at
1327).
None of the seven instances of ineffectiveness that M r. Tellinghuisen
alleges in his § 2255 petition motion relates to his attorney’s negotiation of the
appeal w aiver. This same shortcoming plagues his arguments on appeal. See
Appellant’s Br. 4-17. Because none of these grounds are a permissible basis for
avoiding his appellate waiver,
Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327, no reasonable jurist w ould
debate whether the district court properly resolved his habeas petition.
Conclusion
Accordingly, we D EN Y M r. Tellinghuisen’s request for a COA and
DISM ISS this appeal.
Entered for the Court,
M ichael W . M cConnell
Circuit Judge
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