Filed: Jan. 31, 2007
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS January 31, 2007 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court SCOTT ALAN W ATSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 06-3323 v. (D.C. No. 05-CV-3465-SAC) BO AR D O F COU NTY (D . Kan.) C OM M ISSIO N ER S O F SA LIN E CO UN TY, KA NSA S; GLEN KOCHANOW SK I, Sheriff, Saline C ounty Jail; B ETH K O MA R EK, Nurse, Saline County Jail; M ICH AEL J. W HITE, Saline County Commissioner; CRAIG STEPHENSON, Saline County C
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS January 31, 2007 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court SCOTT ALAN W ATSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 06-3323 v. (D.C. No. 05-CV-3465-SAC) BO AR D O F COU NTY (D . Kan.) C OM M ISSIO N ER S O F SA LIN E CO UN TY, KA NSA S; GLEN KOCHANOW SK I, Sheriff, Saline C ounty Jail; B ETH K O MA R EK, Nurse, Saline County Jail; M ICH AEL J. W HITE, Saline County Commissioner; CRAIG STEPHENSON, Saline County C ..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
January 31, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
SCOTT ALAN W ATSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 06-3323
v. (D.C. No. 05-CV-3465-SAC)
BO AR D O F COU NTY (D . Kan.)
C OM M ISSIO N ER S O F SA LIN E
CO UN TY, KA NSA S; GLEN
KOCHANOW SK I, Sheriff, Saline
C ounty Jail; B ETH K O MA R EK,
Nurse, Saline County Jail; M ICH AEL
J. W HITE, Saline County
Commissioner; CRAIG
STEPHENSON, Saline County
C om missioner; SH A RO N A .
BARRAGREE, Saline County
Commissioner; JO HN DOES, in their
individual and official capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, M cKA Y, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 (eff. Dec.
1, 2006) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1 (eff. Jan. 1, 2007).
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G ).
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
This is a pro se state prisoner § 1983 action. Appellant’s complaint alleges
that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of the cruel and inhumane
treatment he received while temporarily incarcerated at the Saline County Jail
located in Salina, Kansas. Appellant has a history of mental illness, and his
claims arise primarily from practices employed and conditions maintained at the
Saline County Jail in order to deal with mentally ill and suicidal prisoners. The
district court dismissed Appellant’s complaint for failure to comply with the
applicable statute of limitations and this appeal ensued.
As the district court noted, Kansas law maintains a two-year limitations
period for § 1983 claims. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a); Brown v. Unified Sch.
Dist. 501, Topeka Pub. Schs.,
465 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2006). That period
is tolled, however, for persons under legal disability. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-
515(a). Under § 60-515(a), a disabled person may bring an action within one year
after the disability is removed, so long as that action is not commenced more than
eight years after the act giving rise to the action.
Plaintiff alleges that his mental illness, as exacerbated by the conditions of
his confinement in the Saline County Jail, rendered him “unable to ‘process[] the
constitutional violations’” (Order, No. 05-3465-SA C, at 3 (D. Kan. Aug. 15,
2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Resp. to O rder to Show Cause at 9)) until
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he was transferred to the W yoming State Penitentiary and received medical
reports and documents relating to his treatment at Saline County Jail 1 (id. at 4).
Plaintiff argues on appeal that he suffered not only from schizophrenia, but also
memory loss, and that the district court failed to take this memory loss into
account in determining the date that his disability had abated. According to
Plaintiff, his continued memory loss requires that the statute of limitation be
tolled until his receipt of the medical reports and documents related to the Ginest
case.
The district court found Plaintiff’s action untimely based upon an action
filed by Appellant in the United States District Court for the District of W yoming
on October 6, 2004. That action made claims similar to those presented by the
complaint in the instant action, but against officials responsible for Carbon
County Jail, where Plaintiff was held following his time at Saline County Jail.
Given this action, the district court stated:
Thus, it appears the plaintiff was mentally capable of
preparing a complaint by no later than October 2004, and that he
had sufficient access to the courts to do so. . . . Because it appears
his incapacity was relieved by October 2004, he had until October
2005, under the tolling provision contained in K.S.A. 60-515[,] to
commence this action. However, he did not comm ence this action
until December 2005.
1
Appellant received these materials in relation to a class action law suit,
Ginest v. Bd. of County Com m’rs,
333 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. W yo. 2004), in which
he was involved and which concerned violations of a consent decree governing
prisoner treatment.
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(Id. at 5.) As that date was two months past the one-year tolling period provided
by Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-515(a), the district court dismissed the instant action as
untimely.
Plaintiff argues that while no disability prevented him from recalling his
treatment at Carbon C ounty Jail or filing suit over that treatment, his memory loss
prevented him from remembering his treatment at Saline County Jail. W hile the
district court’s analysis would not necessarily apply to Plaintiff’s claimed
memory loss concerning his treatment at Saline County Jail, we note that
Plaintiff’s claimed selective memory loss is wholly unsupported by medical
documentation or testimony. Accordingly, we see no reason to reverse the district
court’s decision.
W e therefore A FFIR M the district court’s dismissal of this action as
beyond the applicable statute of limitations.
Entered for the Court
M onroe G. M cKay
Circuit Judge
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