Filed: Jun. 11, 2007
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS June 11, 2007 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 06-3432 v. (D. Kansas) CARLOS GASCA, also know n as (D.C. Nos. 06-CV-3130-JW L and Chino, 03-CR-20085-JW L) Defendant-Appellant. OR DER Before H E N RY, TYM K O VICH , and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges. Carlos Gasca seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s ord
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS June 11, 2007 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 06-3432 v. (D. Kansas) CARLOS GASCA, also know n as (D.C. Nos. 06-CV-3130-JW L and Chino, 03-CR-20085-JW L) Defendant-Appellant. OR DER Before H E N RY, TYM K O VICH , and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges. Carlos Gasca seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s orde..
More
F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
June 11, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 06-3432
v. (D. Kansas)
CARLOS GASCA, also know n as (D.C. Nos. 06-CV-3130-JW L and
Chino, 03-CR-20085-JW L)
Defendant-Appellant.
OR DER
Before H E N RY, TYM K O VICH , and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges.
Carlos Gasca seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the
district court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition to vacate, modify, or
set aside his sentence. In his § 2255 petition, M r. Gasca alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel in the negotiation of his plea agreement. For substantially
the same reasons set forth by the district court, we agree that M r. Gasca is not
entitled to a COA, and we dismiss this appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
In July 2003, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging M r.
Gasca with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute
methamphetamine (count 1), marijuana (count 2), and cocaine (count 3), in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. In August 2004, prior to the
completion of the government’s case at trial, M r. Gasca agree to plead guilty to
count 1 of the indictment.
M r. Gasca’s plea agreement stated:
Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives any right to
appeal or collaterally attack any matter in connection with
this prosecution, conviction and sentence. The defendant
is aware that Title 18, U .S.C. § 3742 affords a defendant
the right to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed.
By entering into this agreement, the defendant know ingly
waives any right to appeal the conviction or a sentence
imposed which is within the guideline range determined
appropriate by the court. The defendant also waives any
right to challenge a sentence or manner in which it was
determined in any collateral attack, including, but not
limited to, a motion brought under Title 28, U.S.C. § 2255
[except as limited by United States v. Cockerham , 237
F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir.2001) ]. In other words, the
defendant waives the right to appeal the sentence imposed
in this case except to the extent, if any, the court departs
upwards from the applicable sentencing guideline range
determined by the court. However, if the United States
exercises its right to appeal the sentence imposed as
authorized by Title 18, U.S.C. § 3742(b), the defendant is
released from this waiver and may appeal the sentence
received as authorized by Title 18, U.S.C. § 3742(a).
....
The defendant agrees to waive any rights that may have
been conferred under Blakely v. W ashington, 2004 W L
1402697 (June 24, 2004), and agrees to have his sentence
in this case determined under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines (Guidelines). The defendant further waives
any right to have facts that determine the offense level
under the Guidelines alleged in an indictment and found
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; agrees that facts that
-2-
determine the offense level will be found by the Court at
sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence and agrees
that the court may consider any reliable evidence,
including hearsay; and the defendant agrees to w aive all
constitutional challenges to the validity of the Guidelines.
....
This plea agreement w as interpreted into Spanish for the
defendant by M arcella Renna in the presence of m y
attorney Scott Gyllenborg. M s. Renna is a federally-
certified interpreter of Spanish.
Rec. doc. 242, at 2-3 (Government’s M otion Requesting Enforcement of the Plea
Agreement) (quoting Plea A greement, Rec. doc. 150, at ¶¶ 11, 12, and 17).
At the change of plea proceeding, the district court informed M r. Gasca of
the maximum penalty for offense to which he had pleaded guilty: life
imprisonment followed by a term of supervised release and a fine of $4,000,000.
The court also informed M r. Gasca of the statutory minimum of ten years’
imprisonment.
In response to the court’s inquiries, M r. Gasca stated that he had talked to
his attorney about how the Sentencing Guidelines might apply. The court then
explained:
I will not be able to determine the guideline sentence for
your case until a presentence report has been prepared by
the probation officers of the court. And you and the
government have had an opportunity to challenge or
contest the facts reported to m e by the probation office,
and also to challenge or contest the recommended
application of the sentencing guidelines by the probation
-3-
office. So that the sentence might be different from any
estimate that you have received.
Id. at 6 (quoting Tr. of Aug. 12, 2004 Plea Hr’g at 4-8). The court added that
“[u]nder some circumstances, I would have the authority to depart from the
guidelines, and I could impose a sentence that is more severe or less severe than
the sentence called for by the guidelines.”
Id.
M r. Gasca indicated that he understood these aspects of the Guideline
sentencing scheme. He told the court that he was satisfied with the services of
his counsel.
The court sentenced M r. G asca to a term of 360 months’ imprisonment.
M r. Gasca filed a notice of appeal, but this court dismissed the appeal after the
government moved to enforce the waiver-of-appeal provision of the plea
agreement. Subsequently, M r. Gasca filed the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion,
alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel in negotiation of
the plea agreement. In particular, M r. Gasca asserted that his counsel: (1) failed
to explain the effect of the Sentencing Guidelines, including the possibility of a
360-month sentence; and (2) failed to explain the waiver of appeal provision in
the plea agreement. M r. Gasca further alleged that (3) because he did not speak
English and the plea agreement “was translated to him in summary fashion and
not verbatim,” he did not understand that the m inimum sentence w as ten years
and that the Guidelines authorized a sentence of 360 months. Rec. doc. 240, at 2.
-4-
The government responded by filing a motion to enforce the provision of
the plea agreement waiving the right to collaterally attack the conviction and
sentence. After M r. Gasca failed to file a timely response, the district court
granted government’s motion and subsequently denied M r. Gasca’s application
for a COA. Filing an application for a COA with this court, M r. Gasca now seeks
to appeal the district court’s ruling.
II. D ISC USSIO N
In order to obtain a COA, M r. Gasca must make “a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). M r. Gasca may
make this showing by demonstrating that “reasonable jurists could debate whether
(or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a
different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” M iller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336
(2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] claim can be debatable even
though every jurist of reason might agree, after the COA has been granted and the
case has received full consideration, that [the] petitioner will not prevail.”
Id. at
338.
Here, for substantially the same reasons set forth by the district court in its
O ctober 26, 2006 order, w e conclude that M r. Gasca is not entitled to a COA. As
the district court observed, provisions in plea agreements w aiving the right to
-5-
appeal and collaterally attack a conviction and sentence are enforceable if (a) the
disputed issue falls within the scope of the waiver; (b) the defendant knowingly
and voluntarily waived his rights; and (c) the waiver will not result in a
miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir.
2004) (en banc). H owever, despite a waiver provision in a plea agreement, a
defendant may still overcome a waiver provision if he establishes that he received
ineffective assistance in the negotiation of the plea agreement. In assessing an
allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel in this context, we must examine
“the factual circumstances surrounding the plea to determine whether [but for
counsel’s errors], the petitioner would have proceeded to trial.” M iller v.
Champion,
262 F.3d 1066, 1072 (10th Cir. 2001).
M r. Gasca argues that the waiver provisions of the plea agreement should
not be enforced because his counsel did not explain the potential sentence and the
waiver provisions of the plea agreement. However, the transcript of the change-
of-plea proceeding indicates that the district court explained both matters and that
M r. Gasca stated that understood them. M oreover, M r. Gasca’s counsel has
submitted an affidavit stating that “I am satisfied that the entire document [the
plea agreement] was read in Spanish to M r. Gasca in my presence.” Rec. doc.
242 attach. A. In light of the district court’s explanations, M r. Gasca has failed to
assert a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that would vitiate the
plea agreement.
-6-
Accordingly, we DEN Y M r. Gasca’s application for a CO A and DISM ISS
this appeal.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
-7-
