Filed: Apr. 25, 2008
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 25, 2008 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 07-4259 (D.C. No. 2:99-CR-00441-TS-1) v. (D. Utah) ROBERT J. SORENSEN, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially a
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 25, 2008 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 07-4259 (D.C. No. 2:99-CR-00441-TS-1) v. (D. Utah) ROBERT J. SORENSEN, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially as..
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 25, 2008
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 07-4259
(D.C. No. 2:99-CR-00441-TS-1)
v. (D. Utah)
ROBERT J. SORENSEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
The defendant appeals the denial of his “Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Jurisdiction,” in which he argued that the district court lacked subject
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under
the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may
be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P.
32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
matter jurisdiction over his criminal prosecution. We vacate and remand
with instructions to deny the motion for lack of jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
The defendant was convicted in 2002, following the entry of a guilty
plea, of one count of possession of a listed chemical, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(d)(2), and one count of possession of methamphetamine with
intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(2). He was sentenced
to 108 months. He did not file an appeal.
The defendant filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in 2004, challenging
his sentence under United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005). He also
alleged that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial
counsel failed to object to a sentence enhancement for obstruction of
justice, failed to object to the drug quantity calculation in the presentence
report and failed to object to the fact that the defendant did not receive the
benefit of the safety-valve provisions. The district court denied relief.
Again, the defendant did not appeal.
In 2007, the defendant filed a pleading in the district court captioned
“Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction.” The defendant, relying on
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Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942), argued that, because he did not
register or receive benefits from any federal agency regulating controlled
substances, the federal government lacked jurisdiction over his activities.
He contended that the district court had jurisdiction to rule on his motion
under United States v. Ventre,
338 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding
that a waiver of appellate rights in a plea agreement does not deprive the
courts from hearing an appeal based on lack of jurisdiction).
The district court concluded that Wickard did not support the
defendant’s contention that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and
denied relief. The court did not address the issue of whether it had
jurisdiction to rule on the defendant’s motion.
DISCUSSION
We have held that a defendant may only challenge the validity of his
conviction under § 2255. See Bradshaw v. Story,
86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th
Cir. 1996) (§ 2255 is the exclusive remedy to test the validity of a federal
conviction and sentence). We have also held that a defendant may not avoid
the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3), i.e., that he must obtain
authorization from this court prior to filing another § 2255 motion, merely
3
by giving another name to the pleading. See United States v. Torres,
282
F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[T]o allow a petitioner to avoid the bar
against successive § 2255 petitions by simply styling a petition under a
different name would severely erode the procedural restraints imposed
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3) and 2255.”).
Notwithstanding these precedents,it is possible to construe the
defendant’s motion as one filed under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B) (“the
court may hear a claim that the indictment or information fails to invoke the
court’s jurisdiction” at “any time while the case is pending”). In United
States v. Valadez-Camarena,
402 F.3d 1259, 1260 (10th Cir. 2005), we
affirmed a district court’s consideration of the merits of a post-conviction
Rule 12(b)(3)(B) motion challenging an indictment. In doing so, we
implicitly held that a district court could consider such a motion without
requiring that it be raised under § 2255.
We need not resolve any ambiguity in our precedents, however. Like
the challenge in Valadez-Camarena, the defendant’s challenge to his
indictment comes long after the time allowed by Rule 12(b)(3)(B), which, as
noted above, allows such challenges only “while the case is pending.” Nor
has the defendant made any argument that “good cause” to allow his
untimely challenge exists under the exception found in Rule 12(e), or
indeed, that Rule 12(e) applies in these circumstances.
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The defendant’s reliance in the district court on Ventre as a basis for
jurisdiction is unavailing. The issue here is not whether the defendant may,
in a timely direct appeal, challenge the court’s jurisdiction in spite of a
waiver of appellate rights, as in Ventre, but rather whether there is any
authority which allows the district court to rule on the merits of the
defendant’s motion.
We also decline to construe the defendant’s appeal as a request for
authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. Any such
motion would be barred by § 2255(h), which allows a successive motion
only in the presence of “newly discovered evidence” or “a new rule of
constitutional law.” See Brown v. Warden,
315 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir.
2003) (declining to construe a motion as one filed under § 2255 where doing
so would merely trigger the bar on successive petitions). Neither new
evidence nor an intervening constitutional ruling is present here.
CONCLUSION
The district court order is VACATED and this matter is REMANDED
to the district court with instructions to enter an order denying for lack of
jurisdiction the defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction.”
The defendant’s “Motion in Opposition to This Court’s Order Filed January
5
11, 2008” is DENIED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
PER CURIAM
6