Filed: Aug. 14, 2009
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit August 14, 2009 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT GEOFFREY L. RASHAW-BEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 09-3190 v. (D.C. No. 08-CV-3287-SAC) (D. Kan.) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before TACHA, TYMKOVICH, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges. Geoffrey L. Rashaw-Bey, a federal prisoner, alleges that he lost over $200 worth of property when federal prison officials mishandled
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit August 14, 2009 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT GEOFFREY L. RASHAW-BEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 09-3190 v. (D.C. No. 08-CV-3287-SAC) (D. Kan.) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before TACHA, TYMKOVICH, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges. Geoffrey L. Rashaw-Bey, a federal prisoner, alleges that he lost over $200 worth of property when federal prison officials mishandled h..
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 14, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
GEOFFREY L. RASHAW-BEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 09-3190
v.
(D.C. No. 08-CV-3287-SAC)
(D. Kan.)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, TYMKOVICH, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Geoffrey L. Rashaw-Bey, a federal prisoner, alleges that he lost over $200
worth of property when federal prison officials mishandled his belongings while
they were transferring him between prison units. In an attempt to recover
damages for the loss of his property, Mr. Rashaw-Bey filed a negligence claim
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80. The FTCA
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This
order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for certain torts committed by
federal officials in the scope of their employment.
This, however, is not one of them. The FTCA specifically retains
sovereign immunity for cases involving detention of goods by any “law
enforcement officer.”
Id. at § 2680(c). The Supreme Court recently interpreted
§ 2680(c) to cover claims that prison officials mishandled prisoners’ property.
See Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
128 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2008). We agree with the
district court that Ali squarely applies to Mr. Rashaw-Bey’s claim. See D. Ct.
Order of June 25, 2009, at 5. Consequently, there is no subject matter jurisdiction
for federal courts to consider his claim under the FTCA.
In an effort to avoid this conclusion, Mr. Rashaw-Bey raises three other
arguments. None warrants reversal. First, Mr. Rashaw-Bey argues that he should
have been able to name the prison guards as individual defendants, rather than
have to sue the United States. This argument fails because the government is
statutorily authorized to have itself substituted as the named defendant in FTCA
suits. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). Second, he argues that the court would have had
jurisdiction if it had granted his motion to keep the individual prison guards as the
named parties in the suit. Yet, nothing in the FTCA’s detention exception turns
on whether the named defendant is a federal official or the United States. Third,
Mr. Rashaw-Bey argues that the U.S. Attorney’s request for dismissal of the case
was unwarranted because the Attorney General’s office is not aware of this case.
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But whether the Attorney General or his immediate office is aware of this case is
neither here nor there. The U.S. Attorney has sought dismissal of a suit filed
against the United States, and the federal courts are not statutorily authorized to
entertain it.
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal. Mr. Rashaw-
Bey is reminded that, as a party proceeding in forma pauperis, he is obligated to
continue making appropriate payments until he has paid his litigation fees in full.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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