Filed: Apr. 01, 2010
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: disability insurance benefits. See Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir.On appeal, Mr. Talamantes raises three challenges to the ALJs decision.and stated that she gave significant weight to the evaluators opinion.because the medical record contains insufficient evidence to assess his RFC.
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 1, 2010
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
THOMAS A. TALAMANTES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 09-1204
(D.C. No. 1:07-CV-01664-CMA)
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, (D. Colo.)
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, BALDOCK, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Thomas A. Talamantes appeals from a district court judgment affirming a
decision by the Commissioner of Social Security to deny his application for
disability insurance benefits. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
42 U.S.C. § 405(g), we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Background
Mr. Talamantes alleges disability since June 9, 2004, due to chronic back
pain, depression, high cholesterol, and high blood pressure. He last met insured
status requirements on December 31, 2005, when he was fifty years old. He has
been a tree trimmer and a chef, but stopped working outside the home in August
2000, when he became the primary caretaker of his two children and his
residence. His typical day involves self-care, cooking, housework, tending to his
animals, and gathering wood for the day.
His primary complaint, back pain, stems from a 1975 rollover motor
vehicle accident that occurred while Mr. Talamantes was in military service.
For this reason, he has received consistent medical care through the Veterans
Administration Health Care System (VA). His back pain, sometimes
accompanied by hip, leg, and foot pain, began to worsen in 2000 or 2001. VA
medical records compiled from 2000 to 2006 indicate mild degenerative problems
at several levels of his lumbar spine, as revealed by an MRI, an x-ray, an
electromyogram, a nerve conduction study, a musculoskeletal examination, a
neurosurgery examination, observation of motion, and orthopedic tests.
Treatment has involved medication and a TENS unit (a device that sends
electrical impulses to block pain signals), but surgery has not been recommended.
The medical records are replete with observations of exaggerated pain behaviors,
conflicting statements about pain levels, and inconsistent descriptions of physical
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activities. His high cholesterol levels and high blood pressure are controlled by
medication.
At times, Mr. Talamantes has complained of stress, anxiety, anger,
irritability, and depression. He was prescribed Prozac at his request, but refused
formal mental health treatment. Although a nurse practitioner described him as
depressed, a follow-up mental status evaluation indicated that he had normal,
nondepressed mood; coherent thought processes; good insight and judgment;
intact memory; and an average fund of knowledge. He was assigned a global
assessment of functioning score of 75, which indicates that symptoms, if present,
“are transient and expectable reactions to psychosocial stressors (e.g. difficulty
concentrating after family argument),” and cause “no more than slight impairment
in social, occupation, or school functioning.” See Am. Psychiatric Ass’n,
Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 32 (4th ed. 1994).
Mr. Talamantes’ application for disability benefits was denied initially and
on reconsideration. He then requested and received a de novo hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). In her written decision, the ALJ detailed the
medical record, discussed Mr. Talamantes’ testimony, and reviewed the testimony
of a Vocational Expert (VE). Specifically, the ALJ found that (1) Mr. Talamantes
suffered from the severe physical impairment of degenerative changes of the
lumbar spine, a condition which was reasonably likely to produce pain and related
symptoms; (2) he did not have a severe mental impairment or a severe impairment
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related to high blood pressure or high cholesterol; (3) he did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled a listed
impairment; (4) his “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting
effects of [his] symptoms are not entirely credible,” Admin. App., Vol. 1 at 24;
(5) he was unable to perform his previous jobs; (6) he had the RFC to perform a
limited range of unskilled light work on the date last insured; and (7) he could
perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, such as
gate guard, storage facility rental clerk, and video rental clerk. Thus, the ALJ
concluded that Mr. Talamantes was not disabled at step five of the sequential
evaluation process. See Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009)
(explaining the five-step framework for determining disability).
Discussion
On appeal, Mr. Talamantes raises three challenges to the ALJ’s decision.
“We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the
correct legal standards were applied.” Cowan v. Astrue, 552 F.3d 1182, 1184-85
(10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). “We consider whether the ALJ followed the
specific rules of law that must be followed in weighing particular types of
evidence in disability cases, but we will not reweigh the evidence or substitute
our judgment for the Commissioner’s.”
Id. (quotation omitted).
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Compliance with Medical Opinion Standards
Mr. Talamantes’ first contention is that the ALJ violated the
Commissioner’s regulations regarding the weight to be given medical opinions.
He claims that the ALJ accorded disproportionate weight to the RFC assessment
of a nontreating, nonmedical source. It is true that the ALJ mistakenly referred to
an evaluator with a doctor-of-education degree as a “[s]tate agency physician”
and stated that she gave “significant weight” to the evaluator’s opinion. Admin.
App., Vol. I at 26.
The ALJ’s mistake, however, does not necessarily mean that she committed
reversible error. Under the applicable regulations, “[a]n ALJ is required to give
controlling weight to a treating physician’s well-supported opinion, so long as it
is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record.” Drapeau v.
Massanari, 255 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir. 2001). The ALJ must also evaluate
every medical opinion in the record, giving varying weight to each opinion
“according to the relationship between the disability claimant and the medical
professional.” Hamlin v. Barnhart,
365 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004).
In other words, a violation of the applicable regulations contemplates a disregard
of a medical-source opinion.
Here, the ALJ reviewed both the medical record and the state-agency
evaluator’s RFC findings. She “not[ed] there are no other opinions from treating
or examining physicians contained in the file which would indicate the claimant is
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not capable of” the restricted-light-work assessment reached by the evaluator.
Admin. App., Vol. I at 26. In reaching her RFC finding, the ALJ “considered all
symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as
consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” Id. at 24.
Agreeing with the evaluator, the ALJ found that Mr. Talamantes had the
RFC “to lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; stand and/or walk
for up to 6 hours in an 8 hour day and sit for up to 6 hours in an 8 hour day with
the ability to alternate positions as needed” but was “precluded from stooping,
and limited to occasional crouching or crawling.” Id. at 23. What is more, the
ALJ added another restriction to the evaluator’s RFC. “[T]o give the claimant the
greatest benefit of the doubt,” she “assum[ed] that he must have the ability to
alternate positions as needed.”
Id. at 26.
The evaluator’s assessment and the ALJ’s ultimate finding were in accord
with the medical evidence, not at odds with it. Although the ALJ erred in
mischaracterizing the source of the initial RFC description, this error was not in
violation of the medical-opinion regulations: there were no conflicts between the
medical opinion on record and the evaluator’s opinion. Cf. Poppa v. Astrue,
569 F.3d 1167, 1174 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding harmless error in ALJ’s failure to
inquire about potential conflict between VE testimony and DOT job descriptions
when no actual conflict existed). We conclude the ALJ’s misapprehension of the
evaluator’s medical qualifications amounted to harmless error.
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Substantial Evidence Underlying RFC Determination
A related issue is Mr. Talamantes’ claim that the ALJ’s RFC determination
is not supported by substantial evidence. He contends that the ALJ should have
obtained additional opinions regarding his physical and mental impairments
because the medical record contains insufficient evidence to assess his RFC.
“In a social security disability case, the claimant bears the burden to prove [his]
disability,” though the nonadversarial nature of these matters imposes a duty on
the ALJ “to ensure that an adequate record is developed . . . consistent with the
issues raised.” Flaherty v. Astrue, 515 F.3d 1067, 1071 (10th Cir. 2007)
(quotation omitted).
Mr. Talamantes’ physical and mental condition is well-documented in his
VA medical records. None of his numerous medical providers suggested
uncertainty or the need for additional investigation, so there was no need for
further development of the record. The existing medical records provided
substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s RFC assessment.
Commissioner’s Step-Five Burden
If the analysis reaches step five of the sequential-evaluation process, the
burden shifts to the Commissioner to show “there are sufficient jobs in the
national economy for a hypothetical person with [the claimant’s] impairments,”
Jensen v. Barnhart, 436 F.3d 1163, 1168 (10th Cir. 2005), “given [his] age,
education, and work experience,” Lax v. Astrue,
489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir.
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2007) (quotation omitted). In posing hypothetical questions to the VE, the ALJ is
required to identify only those physical and mental impairments borne out by the
evidentiary record. Decker v. Chater, 86 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir. 1996).
Specifically, Mr. Talamantes argues that the Commissioner did not satisfy
his burden at step five of the analysis because the ALJ’s hypotheticals did not
“relate with precision” all of the impairments included in his RFC. Hargis v.
Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1482, 1492 (10th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted). He claims
there is a significant distinction to be made between “the opportunity to alternate
positions between sitting and standing,” as stated in a hypothetical to the VE,
Admin. App. at 360, and the “ability to alternate positions as needed,” as
described in the RFC,
id. at 26. Any discrepancy between these two statements is
“minor enough not to undermine confidence in the determination of this case.”
Gay v. Sullivan,
986 F.2d 1336, 1341 n.3 (10th Cir. 1993).
Our review of the record indicates that the ALJ’s question adequately
included the limitations that she found were supported by the medical record.
That record, along with the VE’s testimony on existing jobs, provided substantial
evidence to support the ALJ’s step-five determination.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the ALJ applied the correct
legal standards and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination
and step-five conclusion. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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