Filed: Apr. 01, 2010
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: in his offense level.A. Under USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), a state court conviction for aggravated, assault constitutes a crime of violence only if the elements of the state court, conviction correspond to the generic elements of that crime.recklessly causing any physical injury to another person;
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
April 1, 2010
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 09-1343
(D.C. No. 1:08-CR-00398-REB-1)
JESUS GASTELUM-LAUREAN, (D. Colo.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY, Chief Judge, and MURPHY and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. **
Jesus Gastelum-Laurean pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful reentry
into the United States after having been convicted of an aggravated felony, a
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
The case is, therefore, submitted without oral argument.
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). In calculating Mr. Gastelum-Laurean’s criminal
history, the district court followed the recommendation of the presentence report
and characterized a 2005 aggravated assault conviction under Ariz. Rev. Stat. §
13-1204(A)(8) (2004) as a “crime of violence” pursuant to § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines. That characterization resulted in a
sixteen-point upward adjustment in Mr. Gastelum-Laurean’s offense level. The
district court then sentenced him to seventy months’ imprisonment.
In this appeal, Mr. Gastelum-Laurean argues that the district court erred in
characterizing his Arizona aggravated assault conviction as a crime of violence
under USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The government agrees. In light of the
government’s concession and our review of the applicable law, we vacate Mr.
Gastelum-Laurean’s sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with this
order and judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
We begin by describing Mr. Gastelum-Laurean’s Arizona aggravated
assault conviction. Then we turn to this federal prosecution.
A. The Arizona aggravated assault conviction
Mr. Gastelum-Laurean is a native and citizen of Mexico. In 2005, while
unlawfully in the United States, he pleaded guilty to aggravated assault under
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Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1204(A)(8) (2004). 1 At the time of his state court plea, § l3-
1204(A)(8) provided that
[a] person commits aggravated assault if such person commits assault
as defined in § 13-1203 . . . while the victim is bound or otherwise
physically restrained or while the victim’s capacity to resist is
substantially impaired.
In turn, § 13-1203 (the referenced statute generally defining assault) stated:
A person commits assault by:
1. Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing any physical
injury to another person;
2. Intentionally placing another person in reasonable apprehension
of imminent physical injury; or
3. Knowingly touching another person with the intent to injure,
insult, or provoke such person.
Id. § 13-1203 (2004).
At the plea hearing on the aggravated assault charge, Mr. Gastelum-
Laurean admitted that he had “an altercation with [the victim] and . . . caused her
some injury,” including “some facial injuries.” Aplt’s Br. at 4; Aple’s Br. at 3
(quoting State Ct. Rec. doc. 31, at 9 (Tr. of June 13, 2005 Change of Plea Hr’g, at
9)). However, the parties agree that the state court records do not provide any
other information regarding the categories of assault and aggravated assault to
1
That offense is now recodified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1204(A)(4)
(2009). We cite to the 2004 version of the statute as the one in effect at the time
of Mr. Gastelum-Laurean’s plea. See Aplt’s Br. at 2 n.2 (citing to the 2004
version of the statute).
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which he admitted. Following his guilty plea, the Arizona court sentenced Mr.
Gastelum-Laurean to one year’s imprisonment.
In March 2006, Mr. Gastelum-Laurean was deported to Mexico. He
returned to the United States and was again deported in September 2007. In
August 2008, law enforcement officers apprehended him in Colorado, and this
federal prosecution followed.
B. The federal prosecution
After a federal grand jury indicted him on one count of unlawful reentry
following deportation after conviction of an aggravated felony, a violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1326(a), Mr. Gastelum-Laurean pleaded guilty. Following the
recommendation of the presentence report, the district court ruled that Mr.
Gastelum-Laurean’s Arizona aggravated assault conviction constituted a “crime
of violence” under USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The court found that
the relevant application note to Guideline Section 2L1.2 defines a crime
of violence as any one of several enumerated offenses including
aggravated assault.
[Mr. Gastelum-Laurean] was convicted in the Arizona State
court of aggravated assault as defined by Arizona State law. . . . [W]hen
an offense is specifically identified by the application notes as a crime
of violence, I conclude that the offense is a per se crime of violence
under the guidelines without then determining under Taylor v. United
States, 495 U.S. 575 [(1990)], whether in this case the defendant’s
conviction in Arizona for aggravated assault corresponds to the
guidelines’ generic federal definition of aggravated assault.
Rec. vol. II, at 23 (Tr. of July 23, 2009 Sent. Hr’g). In support of this per se
reliance on the state court’s categorization of the prior offense, the district court
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cited our decision in United States v. Hernandez-Castillo, 449 F.3d 1127 (10th
Cir. 2006), which we will address below.
The district court further found that Mr. Gastelum-Laurean’s total offense
level was twenty-one and that his criminal history category was V, yielding an
advisory sentencing range of seventy to eighty-seven months. The court
sentenced him to 70 months’ imprisonment.
II. DISCUSSION
Mr. Gastelum-Laurean now argues that the district court erred in
characterizing his 2005 aggravated assault conviction as a “crime of violence”
under USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) and in thereby imposing a sixteen-level increase
in his offense level. He maintains that a state’s classification of an offense is not
dispositive as to whether the offense constitutes “a crime of violence” under the
Guidelines. Instead, Mr. Gaste1um-Laurean urges us to follow the categorical
approach of Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
In response, the government agrees with Mr. Gastelum-Laurean. It
concedes that (1) “the district court erred in ruling that [Mr.] Gastelum-Laurean’s
prior Arizona conviction was for an ‘aggravated assault’ within the meaning of
the Section 2L1.2 definition of ‘crime of violence’ merely because the State had
denominated the offense an ‘aggravated assault[;]’” (2) “[Mr. Gastelum-Laurean]
is also correct that consultation with the appropriate sources” reveals the elements
of aggravated assault under the Arizona statute do not correspond to the generic
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crime of aggravated assault; (3) the district court’s judgment may not be affirmed
on alternative grounds; and (4) this court should vacate Mr. Gastelum-Laurean’s
seventy-month sentence and remand for resentencing. Aple’s Br. at 6-7.
Mr. Gastelum-Laurean’s challenge to the district court’s characterization of
his Arizona aggravated assault conviction as a crime of violence under USSG §
2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) is a legal question that we review de novo. See United States
v. Garcia-Caraveo, 586 F.3d 1230, 1232 (10th Cir. 2009). Upon review of the
applicable law, we agree with the parties’ contentions.
A. Under USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), a state court conviction for aggravated
assault constitutes a crime of violence only if the elements of the state court
conviction correspond to the generic elements of that crime.
USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1) sets forth the offense levels for convictions for
unlawfully entering or remaining in the United States. It provides for a base
offense level of eight and a sixteen-level increase “[i]f the defendant previously
was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United States, after . . . a conviction
for a felony that is . . . a crime of violence[.]” USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The
applicable commentary defines a “crime of violence” as:
any of the following offenses under federal, state, or local
law: Murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated
assault, forcible sex offenses (including where consent to
the conduct is not given or is not legally valid, such as
where consent to the conduct is involuntary, incompetent,
or coerced), statutory rape, sexual abuse of a minor,
robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit,
burglary of a dwelling, or any other offense under federal,
state, or local law that has as an element the use, attempted
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use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
of another.
USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii) (emphasis added).
“To determine whether a particular state’s criminal statute falls within the
ambit of the term ‘crime of violence’ under the Guidelines, we look not to how a
state has labeled its statute, but rather consider whether the statute corresponds
with the ‘uniform generic definition’ of the crime, using the analytical framework
set out in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).”
Garcia-Caraveo, 586
F.3d at 1233 (emphasis added). We examine whether the offense defined by the
state statute “‘roughly correspond[s] to the definitions of [the crime] in a majority
of the States’ criminal codes.’”
Id. (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 589) (alterations
in original). We also consult “prominent secondary sources, such as criminal law
treatises and the Model Penal Code.”
Id.
Here, we agree with Mr. Gastelum-Laurean and the government that
“consultation with the appropriate sources reveals that the generally accepted
crime of ‘aggravated assault’ is an offense that has an element either the causing
of serious bodily injury or the use of a dangerous weapon.” Aple’s Br. at 10. See
also Aplt’s Br. at 18 (stating that “[t]hese authorities uniformly support the
following ‘generic’ definition of aggravated assault: an assault that is committed
intentionally or knowingly (or at least with ‘extreme indifference to the value of
human life’) and that either causes serious bodily injury or involves use of a
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dangerous weapon”); see generally United States v. McFalls, 592 F.3d 707, 717
(6th Cir. 2010) (observing that the Model Penal Code definition of aggravated
assault “approximates the definition of ‘aggravated assault’ used by several states
that have consolidated the crimes of assault and battery”); United States v.
Fierro-Reyna,
466 F.3d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 2006) (considering the Model Penal
Code; 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 16.2(d) (2d ed. 2003);
and various state statutes and concluding that “the generic, contemporary meaning
of aggravated assault involves aggravating factors such as use of a deadly weapon
and causation of serious bodily injury”); Model Penal Code § 211.1(2) (stating
that “[a] person is guilty of aggravated assault” if he or she: “(a) attempts to
cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely, knowingly
or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value
of human life; or (b) attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily
injury to another with a deadly weapon”); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive
Criminal Law § 16.3(d), at 571 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing aggravated assault and
stating that “in all jurisdictions statutes punish more severely than simple assault
such aggravated assaults as ‘assault with intent to murder’ (or to kill or rob or
rape) and ‘assault with a dangerous [or deadly] weapon’”).
As we have noted, the district court did not follow this generic-definition
approach. Instead, the court concluded that because Mr. Gastelum-Laurean had
been convicted of an offense labeled “aggravated assault” by an Arizona statute,
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that offense was necessarily a crime of violence under USSG §
2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). As support for this deference to the state’s categorization, the
district court invoked our decision in United States v. Hernandez-Castillo, 449
F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2006).
We agree with the parties that the district court erred in relying upon
Hernandez-Castillo. In that case, this court rejected the defendant’s argument
that a prior statutory rape conviction was not a crime of violence because his
relationship with the victim was consensual. We reasoned that statutory rape was
one of the specific offenses listed in USSG § 2L1.2’s definition of “crime of
violence” and that, because statutory rape was so listed, a conviction for that
offense was a “crime of violence” even if it did not “[have] as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”
USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii). Mr. Hernandez-Castillo did not contend, as Mr.
Gastelum-Laurean does here, that the elements of his state court conviction did
not correspond to the generic definition of the offense in question.
Accordingly, we must now consider whether the elements of aggravated
assault under Ariz. Rev. Stat § 13-1204(A)(8) (2004) correspond to the generic
elements of that offense.
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B. The elements of aggravated assault under Ariz Rev. Stat § 13-1204(A)(8)
(2004) do not correspond to the generic elements of aggravated assault.
We agree with the parties that the elements under the Arizona statute do not
correspond to the generic elements of aggravated assault, which include either
causing serious bodily injury or the use of a dangerous weapon. See Model Penal
Code § 211.1(2). In particular, under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1204(A)(8) (2004), a
person is guilty of aggravated assault when he or she “commits the assault [as
defined by Section 13-1203] . . . while the victim is bound or otherwise
physically restrained or while the victim’s capacity to resist is substantially
impaired.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1204(A)(8) (2004). An assault under section 13-
1203 is committed in one of three ways: “1. Intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly causing any physical injury to another person; or 2. Intentionally
placing another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury; or
3. Knowingly touching another person with the intent to injure, insult or provoke
such person.” Id. § 13-1203 (2004).
As the government concedes,
[n]one of the species of assaultive conduct listed as
“assault” under Section 13-1203 has as an element either
the causing of serious bodily injury or the use of a
dangerous weapon. Moreover, the circumstances
identified in Section 13-1204(A)(4) that elevate the
“assault” to an “aggravated assault”– that the victim was
bound or otherwise physically restrained or that the
victim’s capacity to resist was substantially impaired – do
not add an element of either serious bodily injury or use of
a dangerous weapon.
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Aple’s Br. at 11. Accordingly, the offense of which Mr. Gastelum-Laurean was
convicted was not an “aggravated assault” under the generic definition of that
crime.
C. The government does not contend that Mr. Gastelum-Laurean’s
aggravated assault conviction is a crime of violence under the alternative
“element of force” standard in USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1).
Under the commentary to section 2L1.2, an offense that is not specifically
listed may nevertheless constitute a crime of violence if it “has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another.” USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii). However, the government does not
here contend that Mr. Gastelum-Laurean’s Arizona aggravated assault conviction
satisfies that definition. See Aple’s Br. at 13 (stating that “the fact that [Mr.]
Gastelum-Laurean was convicted of assault under the special circumstances of
Section 13-1204(A)(4) does not permit the conclusion that he was convicted of an
offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against another” and that “[i]t also cannot be concluded that the
Section 13-1203 ‘assault’ component of [Mr.] Gastelum-Laurean’s conviction
involved an element of the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against another”). Accordingly, Mr. Gastelum-Laurean’s aggravated assault
conviction cannot now be characterized as a crime of violence under the
alternative “element of force” standard in USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1).
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III. CONCLUSION
The district court erred in characterizing Mr. Gastelum-Laurean’s 2005
Arizona aggravated assault conviction as a crime of violence under USSG §
2L1.2(b)(1). We therefore VACATE Mr. Gastelum-Laurean’s sentence and
remand for resentencing consistent with this order and judgment.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Chief Judge
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