Filed: May 24, 2010
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit May 24, 2010 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 09-2195 v. (D.Ct. No. 1:07-CR-01764-MCA-1) (D. N.M.) DUSTIN RAY DENNIS, Defendant-Appellant. _ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before BARRETT, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiall
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit May 24, 2010 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 09-2195 v. (D.Ct. No. 1:07-CR-01764-MCA-1) (D. N.M.) DUSTIN RAY DENNIS, Defendant-Appellant. _ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before BARRETT, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially..
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 24, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 09-2195
v. (D.Ct. No. 1:07-CR-01764-MCA-1)
(D. N.M.)
DUSTIN RAY DENNIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BARRETT, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant-Appellant Dustin Ray Dennis pled guilty to one count of felon in
possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
and 924(a)(2). The district court sentenced him to seventy-seven months in
prison and three years supervised release. While Mr. Dennis appeals his
sentence, his attorney has filed an Anders brief and motion to withdraw as
counsel. See Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). For the reasons set
forth hereafter, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss this appeal.
I. Background
Pursuant to a formal plea agreement, Mr. Dennis pled guilty to one count of
felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). As part of his plea agreement, Mr. Dennis
acknowledged he understood his constitutional rights and the possible penalties
against him and he entered the agreement voluntarily. He also agreed to waive
his rights and admitted to knowingly possessing a firearm and ammunition on
June 14, 2007. In addition, the record on appeal shows a plea hearing was held
before the district court on May 6, 2009, at which Mr. Dennis appeared and pled
guilty. During the Rule 11 colloquy at his plea hearing, the record shows the
district court questioned him, in part, about his guilty plea and advised him of his
constitutional rights and the charges, penalties, and possible consequences of his
plea. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
After the district court accepted Mr. Dennis’s guilty plea, a probation
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officer prepared a presentence report calculating his sentence under the applicable
2008 United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”). The
probation officer set his base offense level at twenty, under U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), for committing the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one
felony conviction for a crime of violence. She also recommended increasing the
offense level four levels, under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6), because Mr. Dennis used
or possessed the firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense; i.e., the
firearm and methamphetamine were found in a stolen vehicle driven by Mr.
Dennis. Finally, she reduced the offense level by three levels for acceptance of
responsibility, for a total base offense level of twenty-one. This, together with a
criminal history category of VI, resulted in an advisory sentencing range of
seventy-seven to ninety-six months imprisonment.
In response to the presentence report, Mr. Dennis filed an objection to the
four-level enhancement for his use or possession of a firearm in connection with a
drug trafficking offense. He also filed a memorandum in support of a concurrent
or partially-concurrent sentence in relation to his undischarged prison sentences
in the State of Colorado. At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Dennis renewed his
objection to the four-level enhancement on grounds authorities did not test the
substance found in the vehicle with the firearm to confirm it was
methamphetamine. In response, the government provided the testimony of a
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deputy marshal at the scene who stated a field test verified the substance found
was methamphetamine; during cross-examination, however, the deputy marshal
acknowledged no further lab test was conducted. Following the deputy marshal’s
testimony, the district court overruled the objection and determined the four-level
enhancement applied. However, it granted Mr. Dennis’s request for a partially-
concurrent sentence and sentenced him to seventy-seven months imprisonment,
with fifty months to run consecutive to his Colorado cases and the remaining
twenty-seven months to run concurrently with the Colorado cases. In sentencing
Mr. Dennis at the low end of the Guidelines range, the district court stated it had
considered the advisory Guidelines and the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).
After Mr. Dennis filed a timely notice of appeal, his counsel filed an
Anders motion and appeal brief, explaining a conscientious review of the record
revealed no nonfrivolous issues to appeal in this case and moving for an order
permitting withdrawal as counsel. See
Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. In support of his
Anders filings, counsel suggests Mr. Dennis knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently pled guilty. Counsel also points out the government provided
evidence at the sentencing hearing establishing the substance found together with
the firearm tested positive for methamphetamine, in support of the previously
disputed four-level enhancement. Finally, appellate counsel, who also
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represented Mr. Dennis at the plea and sentencing hearings, suggests a possible
issue for appeal might be based on a claim that he, as trial counsel, inadequately
and ineffectively represented Mr. Dennis. However, counsel notes that a strong
presumption exists his conduct fell within the range of reasonable professional
assistance, and, on review of the record, no per se evidence of ineffective
assistance exists.
Pursuant to Anders, this court gave Mr. Dennis an opportunity to respond to
his counsel’s Anders brief. See
id. Mr. Dennis has not filed any such response.
The government filed a notice of its intention not to file an answer brief in this
appeal.
II. Discussion
As required by Anders, we have conducted a full examination of the record
before us. See
id. To begin, Mr. Dennis’s appellate counsel raises the possibility
that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim might exist, but provides nothing in
support of his assertion. Regardless of whether such a claim exists, we have long
held ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be brought in collateral
proceedings and not on direct appeal. See United States v. Calderon,
428 F.3d
928, 931 (10 th Cir. 2005). Not only has the claim not been adequately developed
in this appeal, but we have held that “‘[e]ven if the record appears to need no
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further development, the claim should still be presented first to the district court
in collateral proceedings ... so the reviewing court can have the benefit of the
district court’s views.’” United States v. Delacruz-Soto,
414 F.3d 1158, 1168
(10 th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Galloway,
56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10 th Cir.
1995) (en banc)). As a result, we decline to consider Mr. Dennis’s unsupported
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal.
Turning next to his guilty plea, the record shows Mr. Dennis entered a
formal, written plea agreement acknowledging he understood his rights and the
possible penalties against him and he entered the agreement voluntarily.
Similarly, his appellate counsel, who also represented Mr. Dennis at trial, asserts
Mr. Dennis knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pled guilty, and the record
provides no indication otherwise. Given Mr. Dennis has not responded or
otherwise established that his plea was unknowingly, unvoluntarily, or
unintelligently made, we conclude no nonfrivolous issue exists on appeal to
challenge his conviction.
As to Mr. Dennis’s sentence, we review it for reasonableness as guided by
the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Kristl,
437 F.3d 1050,
1053-55 (10 th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Having made such a review, we find no
nonfrivolous basis for challenging the sentence imposed. The record supports the
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district court’s calculation of his Guidelines range, including the application of
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6) for a four-level offense level increase because Mr. Dennis
used or possessed a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense. He has
failed on appeal to respond to his counsel’s Anders argument that the evidence in
the record supports such an enhancement or otherwise provide any argument
showing the methamphetamine was improperly tested. As a result, we conclude
the district court properly calculated Mr. Dennis’s sentence with the four-level
enhancement, after which it sentenced him to seventy-seven months
imprisonment; this is at the low end of the advisory Guidelines range and entitled
to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. See
id. at 1053-55. Mr. Dennis
has failed to rebut this presumption with any nonfrivolous reason warranting a
lower sentence. See
id.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and
DISMISS this appeal.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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