Filed: Aug. 20, 2010
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 20, 2010 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff–Appellee, No. 10-1142 v. (D.C. No. 1:08-CR-00309-WYD-1) (D. Colo.) NATHAN VALDEZ, Defendant–Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT* Before KELLY, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. Nathan Valdez appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a four-level sentencing enhancement pursu
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 20, 2010 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff–Appellee, No. 10-1142 v. (D.C. No. 1:08-CR-00309-WYD-1) (D. Colo.) NATHAN VALDEZ, Defendant–Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT* Before KELLY, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. Nathan Valdez appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a four-level sentencing enhancement pursua..
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
August 20, 2010
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
No. 10-1142
v. (D.C. No. 1:08-CR-00309-WYD-1)
(D. Colo.)
NATHAN VALDEZ,
Defendant–Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before KELLY, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Nathan Valdez appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court abused its
discretion by imposing a four-level sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2B1.1(b)(2)(B). Exercising jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, we affirm.
* The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument pursuant to
Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is not
binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments;
nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
While serving as a postal employee, Valdez opened letters and removed their
contents. He pled guilty to three counts of delay of mail in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1703(a), and three counts of theft of mail matter by an employee in violation of § 1709.
A Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) calculated a base offense level of six, and
added four levels under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) because the offense “involved 50 or
more victims.” Valdez objected to this enhancement. Following a sentencing hearing at
which testimony was presented, the district court found that the four-level enhancement
was appropriate and sentenced Valdez to a term of six months’ home confinement and
three years’ probation. Valdez timely appealed.
Valdez contends that insufficient evidence supported the district court’s finding
that his crimes involved fifty or more victims. “When considering the calculation of a
Guidelines sentencing range, we review legal questions de novo and we review any
factual findings for clear error, giving due deference to the district court’s application of
the Guidelines to the facts.” United States v. Gambino-Zavala,
539 F.3d 1221, 1227-28
(10th Cir. 2008) (quotation and alterations omitted). The government bears the burden of
establishing facts at a sentencing hearing by a preponderance of the evidence. United
States v. Cook,
550 F.3d 1292, 1295 (10th Cir. 2008). We will not reverse a district
court’s factual finding unless our “review of the entire record leaves us with the definite
and firm conclusion that a mistake has been made.”
Id. (quotation omitted).
At the sentencing hearing, Misti Drager, a special agent with the U.S. Postal
Service, testified about a report from Mike Hurley, a supervisor at the main Pueblo,
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Colorado post office. Hurley reported to Drager that seventy-five to one hundred pieces
of mail had been opened. Drager testified that her investigation verified Hurley’s
account. She also testified that video surveillance showed Valdez tampering with “at
least 39 pieces” of mail. Drager admitted that she received fewer than fifty pieces of
tampered mail from Hurley “because he forwarded on many of those pieces before he . . .
started forwarding them to me.” Further, only thirty-five opened pieces of mail were
submitted into evidence. Nevertheless, Drager clarified that Valdez opened other pieces
of mail beyond these thirty-five, and stated under oath that between the video
surveillance, the letters provided by Hurley, and statements from letter carriers, Valdez
opened “at least 75” pieces of mail.
Under our deferential clearly erroneous standard of review, this testimony is
sufficient to support the district court’s factual finding that Valdez opened at least fifty
pieces of mail, and thus there were at least fifty victims. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, app.
n.4(C)(i) (intended recipient counts as a victim for Guidelines purposes). Valdez
complains that some of Drager’s testimony was not based on personal knowledge. But
“hearsay statements may be considered at sentencing if they bear some minimal indicia
of reliability.”
Cook, 550 F.3d at 1296 (quotation omitted). The statements from letter
carriers relayed by Drager clear “this low hurdle.”
Id. Drager verified that Valdez sorted
the pieces of mail that letter carriers reported as opened. Further, a hidden video camera
recorded Valdez opening mail, behavior consistent with the carriers’ reports.
Finally, Valdez appears to argue in conclusory fashion that the district court
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abused its discretion in denying a motion for a downward variance. However, Valdez
does not advance any reasoned argument in support of this contention in his opening
brief; he simply asserts that the court could have considered a lesser term of probation
“given the factors under § 3553(a).” Valdez has accordingly waived this argument. See
Bronson v. Swensen,
500 F.3d 1099, 1105 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[C]ursory statements,
without supporting analysis and case law, fail to constitute the kind of briefing that is
necessary to avoid application of the forfeiture doctrine.”).
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFFIRM.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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